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LBSTRACT
A review of research in mathematics education reveals the lack of
adequate theoretical perspectives of mathematics education, and in
particular, views of the nature of mathematics. It is suggested that
alternative views may significantly affect the teaching of mathematics
in distinct ways.
It is proposed, through an examination of schools of thought on the
nature of mathematical knowledge, that they can be seen to separate into
two streams. There is, firstly, a tendency towards seeing mathematics
as based on indubitable, value-free, universal foundations, which may
not yet have been completely determined; and secondly a view of
mathematics as a social invention, its truths being relative to time and
place.
It is further suggested that one can distinguish between two ways of
teaching, which reflect this separation, the first being a 'closed'
view, whereby the teacher is the possessor of knowledge which is to be
conveyed to the recipients, the pupils. The second is concerned with
enabling pupils to be actively involved in the processes of doing
mathematics, encouraged by 'open' teaching, in the sense of the teacher
working from the ideas and concepts of the pupils. These hypothesised
positions are not intended to describe an actual teacher, since in
practice teachers' views are often not consistent, or even conscious,
and their ways of teaching are influenced by other factors also.
However, it is maintained that they provide an important theoretical
perspective on mathematics education.
A field study is developed to examine some of the consequences of this
thesis. A questionnaire is prepared to attempt to identify teachers'
views, and an aspect of class teaching proposed as revealing 'open' and
'closed' approaches to mathematics teaching. The study is carried out
in one secondary school. From this, a second stage evolves in which the
questionnaire is given to a large group of education students, the
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IJTRODUCT 101
A consideration of theories of mathematics education, purposes, ain,
objectives, place in the curriculum, relevance to the real world etc.,
may best be termed the Philosophy of Mathematics Education. As such, it
may be seen as embedded in the Philosophy of Mathematics and the
Philosophy of Education. Both, however, are contingent upon one's view
of the nature of knowledge, and thus it appears that one must commence
such a study here. Problematically, the relationships are in a sense
circular:
(a) Mathematics has traditionally been seen as the paradigm of
knowledge, demonstrating certainty, universality, indubitable truth
and many other ternE with application elsewhere in philosophy.
Hence in this sense, knowledge begins with mathematics.
(b) Any alternative view which brings into question the certainty of
mathematical knowledge, would reverse the starting point of
consideration.
Education is at least concerned with the transmission of knowledge from
society to its students, and hence alternative views of the status of
knowledge should have profound effects on education. In particular, I
will attempt to show that we in mathematics education tend to direct our
ways of teaching, choice of syllabus content etc. on the grounds of the
certainty of mathematical knowledge. Hence it may be suggested that we
will be most affected by any change in epistemologial view.
In Section 1 I will consider the schools of thought on the nature of
knowledge in general, and of scientific and mathematical knowledge in
particular. I will attempt to show that views on the nature of
mathematics can be seen to be either what is termed a 'Euclidean' view
(or 'absolutist') or a relativist view (or 'fallibilist'). These views,
and some criticisme of each, are discussed and I will attenpt to show
that fallibility or uncertainty is the more defensible and more
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challenging position, demanding imagination and creativity, and endowing
mathematics education with excitement and stimulus.
In Section 2 1 will consider the connections between theories and the
practice of mathematics education. I will attempt to show that
fallibilism and absolutism each demand their own particular approach to
the teaching of mathematics. It is proposed that two teaching patterns
can be identified, which whilst not representing any actual teacher,
characterise two ends of a continuum, described as 'open'-'closed', of
mathematics teaching behaviour. This section will also consider recent
developments in theories of learning mathematics and it is suggested
that the constructivist programmes reflect the 'Open' end of the
continuum and thus also the relativist view of mathematics.
In Section 3 a study is carried out, through two stages, in an attempt
to examine some of the implications of the theoretical analysis. A
questionnaire is developed, from a group of constructs, through a number
of drafts, a pilot test and a validation exercise, to identify teachers'
views of mathematics education and mathematics itself, and a marking
scheme is developed to assess responses to the questionnaire. An
observation tool is adopted, to focus on 'open' and 'closed' teaching,
using the criterion of the depth of teacher questions and teacher
responses to pupil questions of some depth, if any. The results of the
study are discussed, and a second stage study, evolving from this
discussion, is developed. This involves having a large group of
Postgraduate Certificate of Education students complete the
questionnaire, after which some students who scored highest and some who
scored lowest on the questionnaire are interviewed individually, after
watching an extract of a mathematics lesson, on video. In addition, the
questionnaire results of the whole group are analysed, to examine which
ite	 are good discriminators, and which are not. These results are
then discussed.
Finally, some implications for further study are proposed.
SECTION 1
THE ALTERNATIVES FOR VIEVS OF THE NATURE OF XATHEAATICS
-U-
CHAPTER 1 - THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE
Throughout the history of philosophy, scepticism has always provided a
stimulus through its criticism of accepted views. Recent progress in
the sociology of knowledge has perhaps provided the strongest sceptical
position for criticism of rationality and knowledge, a criticism from
which it may be impossible, and indeed unnecessary, to escape.
1.1 The Strong Programme
Much argument centres around the so-called Strong Programme in the
sociology of knowledge. Its major proponents are based in Edinburgh
University, and it has been outlined by David Bloor (1976). Re suggests
that the sociology of knowledge should adhere to four tenets:
l. It would be causal, that is, concerned with the conditions
which bring about belief of states of knowledge. Naturally there
will be other types of causes apart from social ones which will
co-operate in bringing about belief.
2. It would be impartial with respect to truth and falsity,
rationality or irrationality, success or failure.	 Both sides of
these dichotomies will require explanation.
3. It would be symmetrical in its style of explanation. The same
types of cause would explain, say, true and false beliefs.
4. It would be reflexive. In principle its pattern of explanation
would have to be applicable to sociology itself. 	 Like the
requirement of symmetry, this is a response to the need to ask for
general explanations.	 It is an obvious requirement of principle
because otherwise sociology would be a standing refutation of its
own theories.	 (Page 4)
Perhaps the most controversial of the tenets of the strong programme are
the second and the third. The previously accepted view s that true
knowledge requires no explanation. According to this view, rationality,
correct procedures, clear thinking will inevitably lead to truth, which
has a power of its own, by virtue of its own existence. If a scientist
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arrives at erroneous conclusions, this is an Instance of a clear case
for sociological study. But true theories do not need such analysis.
Gilbert Ryle (1949), for example, has written:
Let the psychologist tell us why we are deceived; but we can tell
ourselves and him why we are not deceived.N	 (Page 308)
lore recently, Xartin Hollis (1982) has said:
Ntrue and rational beliefs need one sort of explanation, false and
irrational beliefs another. TM 	(Page 75)
David Bloor (1982) suggests, too, that:
"Imre Lakatos was one of the most strident advocates of a
structurally similar view. He equated rational procedures in
science with those that accord with some preferred philosophy of
science. Exhibiting cases which appear to conform to the preferred
philosophy	 is	 called	 'internal	 history'	 or	 'rational
reconstruction'. He then asserts that 'the rational aspect of
scientific growth is fully accounted for by one's logic of
scientific discovery'. All the rest, which is not fully accounted
for, is handed over to the sociologist for non-rational, causal
explanation.	 (page 26)
1.2 Relativism and its Critics
Arising out of anthropological studies, with probleme of understanding
and interpreting a culture other than that of the observer, and given
impetus by Kuhn's work (1970) on scientific cultures, is the relativist
position. It is an immediate consequence of the second and third tenets
of Bloor's strong programme, that there are no universally acceptable
criteria for truth. The justification for conviction of the truth or
falsity of a particular topic is dependent on, or relative to, the
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context of the individual. In particular, though, as suggested above,
the symmetry tenet:
"that all beliefs are on a par with one another with respect to the
causes of their credibility." 	 (Barnes 1982, page 23)
is the strongest relativist claim.
One of the major critics of the strong programme is Steven Lukes. In a
review of Barry Barnes' book (1974), Lukes summarises Barnes' view as a
negative thesis, with which he agrees, and a positive thesis with which
he does not agree. He writes (Lukes 1975):
"Barnes has thus far presented a perfectly convincing case against
an unwarranted methodological restrictivism, according to which
social causation may only be invoked to explain beliefs when they
are apparently erroneous or irrational.
The trouble is that throughout this book, Barnes seeks to support
his negative thesis by appealing to what I have called his positive
thesis. Instead of merely arguing that the apparent truth or
rationality of a belief or set of beliefs does not preclude their
sociological explanation, he appears to think it necessary to argue
that it cannot do so because there are no universally applicable
criteria of truth and rationality, and hence beliefs and belief
systeme cannot be 'explained by a concept of external causes
producing deviations from rationality'." 	 (Pages 501-502)
Elsewhere, Lukes (1973) attempts to put a case for universal criteria of
truth and rationality, in particular by suggesting that unless one
accepts this universality, we cannot discuss, interpret or understand
the social activities of another society. The commonality of our
interpretations and understandings is just that universality. The issue
of incommensurability will be discussed below, but in relation to Lukes'
argument, it can be seen that the necessity that he suggests we require
is not the case, nor does his argument hold up. As Xary Hesse (1980)
has written:
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"But even if this were true, it does not show that these criteria
are in any sense external or 'absolute', only that they are relative
to at least our pair of cultures, rather than to just our culture."
(Page 43)
Hesse goes on to say:
"... this thesis, along with all other epistemologies that reject
the possibility of absolute grounds for knowledge ... does not imply
that cognitive terminology loses its use, merely that It has to be
explicitly redefined to refer to knowledge and truth claims that are
relative to some set or sets of cultural norms. These might even be
as wide as biological humankind, but If so, they would still not be
rendered absolute or transcendentally necessary in themselves. The
strong thesis does not imply, however, that there is no distinction
between the various kinds of rational rules adopted in a society on
the one hand, and their conventions on the other." 	 (Page 56)
Hence the role of epistelogists is not redundant with relativism.
Within its set of rational (for that society) rules, there are
distinctions between truth and falsity, norms and deviations etc.
"The function of epistemologists to make these things explicit and
to study their Interrelations is both important and not directly
sociological."	 (Page 46)
Hesse continues with a strong statement of the relativist position,
suggesting that those who insist upon a rationalist epistelogy are the
ones who suffer an emasculation of their theories, not those who accept
that criteria of truth and methods of argument are specific to a
particular social group, or a number of such groups.
Xore recently, Lukes has stated his case for universality in, It
appears, a much weaker form. He writes (Lukes 1982):
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"... what is the significance of the rejection of the traditional
folk beliefs in secularizing and modernizing societies, or the
seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution? How are such transitions
to be interpreted? One answer (though none is definitive) is that a
detached, objective and absolute conception of knowledge was in
effect isolated and made dominant in certain spheres - even if some
of those engaged in the process has a deficient self-understanding
of what they were doing." 	 (Page 295)
Whilst we may allow that this is one answer, the apparent at least
difficulty, and perhaps impossibility of producing evidence of such
absolutes, couple with the renewed interest in folk remedies amongst the
most conservative medical profession, and the post-relativity view of
the seventeenth-century Scientific Revolution, encourages us to look for
a different answer. Indeed Lukes himself ends up proposing a position
that he calls 'the soft version of strong perspectivism' which is very
close indeed to the relativism he claims to reject.
The crux of the matter appears to be the fear induced amongst
philosophers and others by the abandonment of objective criteria for
truth, despite Wary Hesse's reassurances. Evidence of this insecurity
can be seen, for example, in Louis Boon's critical review of Bloor's
book (1976). Boon (1979) clearly states that he found the book hard to
read, since:
"Bloor seems to rely on the strategic principles of the B-movie: the
baddies (in this case the philosophers) are dumb." (Page 195)
He proceeds to attempt to demolish the whole programme for the sociology
of knowledge, suggesting that ultimately one must conclude from Bloor's
arguments that:
"naturalism leads to a form of the cunning of reason as the agent of
progress in knowledge." 	 (Page 195)
He manages however to avoid a serious consideration of Bloor's book.
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A.F.Chalmers, in a critical review of a book by Harold Brown (1977),
recognises the relativist position being adopted (Chalmers 1979(a)):
"The author insists that criteria of adequacy are internal to a
science, change in time, and must be evaluated with restect to the
theoretical and historical situation."	 (Page 97)
Later, however, whilst accepting that Brown's case is a strong one,
Chalmers feels the need to supplement Brown's argument, by putting
forward:
"an objectivist non-relativist account of science which construes
theory change, not in terms of the decisions made by individual
scientists or groups of scientists, but in terms of the objective
properties of theories. . . U	 (Page 97)
Chalmers exhibits here this apparent need shown by many scientists and
philosophers for some objectivity, somewhere, on which to hold. His
account of theory change in objective terms is one possiblity. Ve have
already seen Steven Lukes' attempt, which in the end he himself appears
to have abandoned. Chalmers lays out his case f or theory change in an
attempt to strengthen Lakatos' methodology of scientific research
programmes, which Chalmers considers is vulnerable to Feyerabend's
criticism of anarchy, namely, that decisions of adoption of alternative
research programmes do not, according to Feyerabend, fit any rational
pattern (e.g. Feyerabend 1978). Chalmers (1979(b)) maintains that:
"Theory change can be understood as coming about by virtue of the
fact that an established theory was challenged and ousted by a rival
that offered re objective opportunities for development, some at
least of which bore fruit. This contrasts with attempts to explain
theory change by reference to the rationality or otherwise of the
decisions and choices of individual scientists." 	 (Page 231)
He recognises a constraint, however, and admits that:
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"... the fact that a programme presents oppportunities for
development is no guarantee that those opportunities will lead to
actual success when taken up. Whether or not a research programme
supersedes a rival will depend, not solely on its degree of
fertility, but also on its success in practice." 	 (Page 231)
Chalmers' second point reveals the weakness of his argument. Even
looking backwards at stages where such choices had to be made, it is at
least problematic to exactly determine which programme offered more
objective opportunities for development, since, by his own admission,
the successful development of these opportunities depends on all sorts
of other factors. An assessment of whether one theory has actually
superseded another would have to be made relative to the outcome, which
was dependent on all these various factors. It certainly seeme to be
the case that at the stage of such a choice, the relative merits of
alternative programmes could hardly be objectively determined. Such an
assessment would be made in the light of the prejudices of the
scientific community at the time, the position, social and cognitive, of
the individual scientist or group of scientists, and many other factors.
In any case, it does not seem to make the study of the history of
science or the philosophy of science less relevant if one accepts the
existential nature of the state of knowledge at any given time.
Martin Hollis, in an article entitled "The Social Destruction of
Reality" (1962) claime that the relativist programme leads to what he
calls 'a lethal dry rot', in that since epistemology and ontology are
both relative, subject to an overall coherence, and since the terme of
that coherence are also relative, being included in the epistemology,
there is no constraint left. He suggests and then rejects the
possibility of stopping the rot by accepting an objective world
argument, and instead maintains firstly a 'bridgehead' of concepts
shared by all cultures to avoid incommensurability, and:
"The other way, then, is to place an a priori constraint on what a
rational man can believe about his world. On transcendentalist
grounds there has to be that 'massive central core of human thinking
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which has no history' and it has to be one which embodies the only
kind of rational thinking there can be. The 'massive central core'
cannot be an empirical hypothesis, liable in principle to be
falsified in the variety of human cultures but luckily in fact
upheld... the existence of a core must be taken as a precondition of
understanding beliefs. There has to be an epistemological unit of
mankind.
The plain snag here is that such reflections yield at most an
existence proof. TM	(Page 83)
The criticism that relativism has no constraints is a common one amongst
those who are seeking to justify the existence of absolutes. It is an
important criticism, and must be answered, and Vittgenstein provides an
answer.
U The procedure of putting a lump of cheese on a balance and fixing
the price by the turn of the scale would lose its point, if it
frequently happened for such lumps to suddenly grow or shrink for no
apparent reason. TM	(Bloor 1973 page 184)
Mstrange coincidence, that every man whose skull has been opened had
a brain!	 (Vittgenstein 1979 para 207)
NI have a telephone conversation with New York. ly friend tells me
that his young trees have buds of such and such kind. I am now
convinced that his tree is... Am I also convinced that the earth
exists?
The existence of the earth is rather part of the whole picture
which forms the starting-point of belief for me.' (Vittgenstein
1969 paras 207, 209)
It is not necessary to appeal to objective knowledge, a priori knowledge
or absolute certainty. 	 Wittgenstein is here showing that whilst in
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principle, logically, we can invent any fictitious natural history, in
practice we are constrained by facts of nature.
"If humans were not in general agreed about the colour of things, if
undetermined cases were not exceptional, then our concepts of colour
could not existl No:- our concept would not exist." (Vittgenstein
1967(a) para 351)
"Do I want to say, then, that certain facts are favourable to the
formation of certain concepts; or again unfavourable? And does
experience teach us this? It is a fact of experience that human
beings alter their concepts, exchange them for others when they
learn new facts; when in this way what was formerly important to
themn becomes unimportant, and vice versa." (Wittgenstein 1967(a)
para 352)
It is perfectly adequate to proceed as scientists, philosophers,
epistemo]ogists and others from 'facts of nature' and not to have to
demand universals. To repeat the point made above by Nary Hesse, there
is plenty for us to do, within our perspective, sorting out correctness
and error, truth and falsity and so on. These occupations are as vital
when endowed with relativist values and perhaps re so.
This point about the use of terms like true and false by a relativist is
highlighted by David Bloor, in a reply to a criticism by Steven Lukes on
Bloor's article "Durkheim and J(auss Revisited: Classification and the
Sociology of Knowledge (Bloor 1982):
"Another objection concerns my use of the words 'true' and 'false'.
Lukes says I have no right to use those terms, given the relativist
position that I am developing in this paper...
First, when a relativist is describing the beliefs of, say, the
corpuscular philosophers, he may have occasion to say what they
designated as true and false. Similarly, when addressing an
argument to readers who cannot themselves be assumed to be
-20-
relativists, then the terms represent a convenient shorthand. The
natural way to recommend say, a relativist methodology would be to
suggest that both true and false beliefs should be treated as
equally problematic by the sociologist of knowledge... Finally,
despite what Lukes supposes, even from the relativist standpoint
itself, there is no reason for totally discarding words like 'true'
and 'false'.	 There is a simple relativist analysis of what is
involved in their use: these terms simply signalize some important
practical discriminations. They are an Idiom of acceptance and
rejection. Everyone needs to treat beliefs and claims selectively
in the conduct of their practical and theoretical affairs. What the
relativist says is that the justifications that can be given for
these selections (including his own) will be relative to time and
place and of merely local credibility. 	 Bereft of metaphysical
pretentions, the words 'true' and 'false' still retain their
Immediate, local and practical import. 	 Are believers in a flat
earth the only ones amongst us with the right to operate with the
distinction between 'up' and down'?"	 (Page 321)
1.3 Incommensurability
As mentioned above, incommensurability of different cultures or
communities is a serious criticism of relativist theories. Kuhn, in his
book "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" (1970) claims that to be
within a scientific community is to hold the paradigm of that community.
Any paradigm shift that occurs, that is the conversion from one paradigm
to another, has to be like a Gestalt switch in that it must take place
in a flash. Hence, Kuhn maintains, it is impossible to hold two
competing paradigms at the same time. Be says:
"Therefore, at times of revolution, when the normal-scientific
tradition changes, the scientists's perception of his environment
must be re-educated - in some familiar situations he must learn to
see a new gestalt. After he has done so the world of his research
will seem, here and there, incommensurable with the one he had
Inhabited before."	 (Page 11)
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Feyerabend (1978) supports this view of the incommensurability of rival
theories. He writes, for example:
"Incommensurable theories, then, can be refuted by reference to
their own respective kinds of experience; i.e. by discovering the
internal contradictions from which they are suffering. (In the
absence of commensurable alternatives these refutations are quite
weak, however,..) Their contents cannot be compared. Nor is it
possible to make a judgement of verisimilitude except within the
confines of a particular theory (remember that the problem of
incommensurability arises only when we analyse the change of
comprehensive cosmological points of view - restricted theories
rarely lead to the needed conceptual revisions)." 	 (Page 284)
Feyerabend is of course presenting here his own brand of philosophy of
anarchism, in which there are no criteria for preferring any alternative
theory.
It is interesting to note that Kuhn and Feyerabend are both counter-
examples to their own theories of the impossibility of seeing two rival
theories at the same time. Kuhn (1970) writes, for example:
"How am I to persuade Sir Karl, who knows everything I know about
scientific development and who has somewhere or other said it, that
what he calls a duck can be seen as a rabbit? How am I to show him
what it would be like to wear my spectacles when he has already
learned to look at everything I can point to through his own?'
(Page 3)
One possible counter to incommensurability, as we have seen above, is to
suggest that as it must be possible to look at other societies and
cultures and understand what is going on, and in science to understand
two rival theories at the same time, then there must be at least a
bridgehead of concepts that are of necessity in common to all cultures.
However, again as we have seen above, it see impossible to determine
any incontrovertible content to this bridgehead of concepts.
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There are, it see, at least two ways in which the proble of
incommensurability can be seen to disappear: there may be a fundamental
misunderstanding of a gestalt switch; there is no necessary bridgehead,
but there are facts of nature, in the Vittgensteinian sense.
1.3.1 There may be a fundamental misunderstanding of a gestalt switch
Kuhn, Feyerabend and others often use diagran of objects that can be
seen, at different times by the same person, or by different people at
the same time, to be two different objects, e.g. Kohier's goblet and
faces drawing. They claim that what is happening here is that it is
impossible to see both objects at the same time. In an analogous
fashion, one cannot see two alternative world views at the same time.
However, it is not the case that one says • I can only see the gobletsN,
or I can only see the two facesu. One says. 0 At this instant I can see
one, whereas just after I can see the other drawing. One is, in a
sense straddling both images, or paradign, at the same time, able to
see both while at any moment holding one or the other in view. This
certainly fits Yittgenstein's description of different language games
that overlap, like intersecting sets. As mentioned above, Kuhn is Just
such an example, of a person who is able to see competing theories,
which he would presumably see as incommensurable, the Popperian world
and the Kuhnian world, at the same time.
Derek Phillips uses an example of a person who at school may see an
object as a glass and metal instrument, and after training would see it
as an X-ray tube, with all the knowledge which is associated with
understanding the working and functions of such a machine. Again, it is
not the case that the person would only see the object in one way,
unable to bring the two images together. The person would be more
likely to say uf ore I saw that as a glass and metal object, and I can
see how I only saw it that way, but now I recognise it to be an X-ray
tube. (Phillips 1?7 page 104). Again this hypothetical person is
straddling two rival views at the same time.
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To take this argument into the heart of Kuhn's concern, scientific
revolutions, again it seen more reasonable to say, that whilst the
insight of a new rival paradigm may be instantaneous, in a flash as it
were, the 'training' leading up to the gestalt switch, to use Kuhn's own
image, would have been a gradual process of doubts, inconsistencies,
rival ideas read or heard. After the switch, as with our two examples
above, the scientist would be more likely to say, "I can see how I used
to think that, but now I see it this way", rather than to suddenly find
hiuelf/herself unable to communicate with colleagues who, moments
before were in the same scientific community.
1.3.2 Vittgensteinian 'facts of nature'
Whilst we can imagine alternative cultures, or world views, even ones
that would clearly have great difficulty understanding each other's
concepts, there are still underlying facts of nature. One cannot
ascribe necessity or absoluteness to them, but they are nevertheless
facts of nature of our common world. Vittgenstein (1967(b)) writes, for
example:
"'There are 60 seconds to a minute.' This proposition is very like
a mathematical one. Does its truth depend on experience? - Well,
could we talk about minutes and hours, if we had no sense of time;
if there were no clocks, or could be none for physical reasons; if
there did not exist all the connexions that give our measures of
time meaning and importance?" (Section V para 15)
or in another case
"What we are supplying are really remarks of the natural history of
men: not curiosities, however, but rather, observations on facts
which noone has doubted and which have only gone unremarked because
they are always before our eyes" (Section 1 para 141)
and finally
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"The limitations of empiricism are not assumptions unguaranteed, or
intuitively known to be correct: they are ways in which we make
comparisons and in which we act." (Section V para 18)
Wittgenstein himself illustrates the commensurability of alternative
rival theories. His early work, the Tractatus, and his later work
Philosophical Investigations are opposing views of knowledge. The later
work is written as a dialogue between the early Vittgenstein and the
later one, as the first extract above Illustrates. 	 There Is no
difficulty in this for VlttgensteIn.	 He understands his former
position, and is in dialogue with himself to present his later views.
1.4 Summary
Scientific philosophy today has here been characterised as an ongoing
and somewhat heated debate between the proponents of relativism and
those wishing to provide some secure and objective basis to knowledge in
general and scientific knowledge in particular. It appears that the
ixtive of the opponents of relativism is the fear that we have no firm
foundations, no certainty, without some way of judging progress, if not
truth Itself, with universal objective criteria. On one side, any
attempt to identify universals seems to fail in the light of
relativistic arguments. On the other side, Kuhn appears to wish to draw
back from the edge of irrationalism, although his arguments do not allow
him to do so, whilst Feyerabend has no hesitation in stepping over that
borderline.	 Comin sense suggests that there is such a thing as
progress, certainly over a period of time. 	 This is inadequate in a
search for universal criteria, but perfectly adequate from the
Wittgensteinian position suggested here. In any case, it has been
suggested here that the fears of the absolutists are unnecessary.
Indeed MAry Hesse encourages scientists with the thought that we are
better off working from a relativist position.
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1.5 Sociology of Mathematics
If there is a strong prejudice amongst scientists against a strong
position in the sociology of knowledge, it must surely be stronger still
amongst mathematicians, since we are inclined to consider mathematical
concepts as somehow a priori, even if there are no others than in
mathematics. In the next chapter we will consider the state of the
philosophy of mathematics, but in this section I propose to examine the
current literature in the sociology of mathematics. This will be
followed by a discussion of the role of mathematics education in social
control within schools.
Bloor (1976) outlines the probleme facing a sociological analysis of
mathematics knowledge:
"Everyone accepts that it is possible to have a relatively modest
sociology of mathematics studying professional recruitment, career
patterns and similar topics. This might justly be called the
sociology of mathematicians rather than of mathematics. A more
controversial question is whether sociology can touch the very heart
of mathematical knowledge. Can it explain the logical necessity of
a step in reasoning or why a proof is in fact a proof? The best
answer to these questions is to provide examples of such
sociological analyses, and I shall attempt to do this. It must be
admitted that these 'constructive' proofs cannot be offered in
abundance. The reason is that mathematics is typically thought
about in ways which obscure the possibility of such investigations.
An enormous amount of work is devoted to maintaining a perspective
which forbids a sociological standpoint. By exhibiting the tactics
that are adopted to achieve this end, I hope to convey the idea that
there is nothing obvious, natural or compelling about seeing
mathematics as a special case which will forever defy the scrutiny
of the social scientist. Indeed I shall show that the opposite is
the case. To see mathematics as surrounded by a protective aura is
often a strained, difficult and anxiety-ridden stance. Furthermore
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it leads its advocates to adopt positions at variance with the
accepted spirit of scientific inquiry." 	 (Page 74)
As Bloor has said above, if sociological accounts can be produced of the
choice of alternative theories by mathematicians, and even alternative
conceptions of the nature of mathematics, and of mathematical truth,
then Bloor's argument has indeed strong support. He proceeds to attempt
to do this in his book, and there have been a number of sociological
studies published since, in the same vein.
Joan L. Richards (1979) has investigated the attitudes of British
mathematicians to non-Euclidean geometry in the 19th century:
"In order to understand the kinds of implications that were
attendant on non-Euclidean geometry In the 1870's, when Riemann's
and Helmholtz's ideas were introduced, it is first necessary to
outline the position which geometry held within English
philosophical traditions. When this position is clear, the
Implications which were inherent in non-Euclidean geometry will be
easier to understand. A discussion of philosophical tradition will
shed light on the conflicts which were developing in the 1860's and
1870's over the status of scientific knowledge. It was in the midst
of this controversy that the new geometrical ideas were introduced,
and they had important implications for these discussions. Within
this context, the reaction of English mathematicians as a group, to
geometrical developments, their tendency to develop geometry within
the projective framework rather than the differential one, makes a
great deal of sense. 	 In large part it represents a conservative
recation against the new geometry, an attempt to maintain the status
quo against the broad impact of differential geometry." 	 (Page 145)
In another article, this time dealing with algebra, Joan Richards (1980)
attempts to show that the British conception of truth In particular in
mathematics, meant that British mathematicians in the 19th century
failed to develop abstract algebra. They had, she maintains, recognised
a formalist view of mathematical development, but for them It was
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meaningless in the view of truth which they saw exemplified by
mathematics.
David Bloor presented a paper entitled "Did Hamilton's metaphysics
influence his algebra?" at a workshop on the Social History of
Xathematics in 1979. In this paper, he criticizes the work of Thomas
Hawkins (1976, 1977) who attempted to show that Hamiltoa's work, in
particular his development of quaternions, was a result of his
metaphysics. Bloor suggests firstly that a case can equally be put that
Hamilton only couched his results in terme which fit his idealist view
of mathematics, but that his work is clearly in the intuitive, problem-
solving tradition; secondly he attempts to show that the way one
construes reality is involved with social control, the dominance of one
group over another. He writes:
"I think that the role of Hamilton's metaphysics is best understood
by examining his attitude to the 'formalism' of the Cambridge
school. It is well known that Hamilton was hostile to formalism. He
said that if we abandon the idea of an independent truth for
mathematics then the "Symbols will become what many now account them
to be, the all-in-all of algebra". He said that his reaction to
Peacock's Treatise was that it would "reduce algebra to a mere
system of symbols, and nothing more, an affair of pothooks and
hangers, of black strokes on white paper.".
The question that I think should be asked is: Vhat is happening when
some mathematicians treat symbols as if they were self-sufficient
things and see mathematics as marks on paper, whilst others demand
that symbols have a reference and meaning that makes them more than
mere marks?
Xy answer is that attitudes towards symbols are themselves symbolic.
I suggest that man will impute self-sufficiency to their symbols
when they, their users, are asserting their own seif-sufficience or
impressing their independence on others. Conversely symbols will be
portrayed as standing in need of reference to something ideal when
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their users want to impress on others the need for an analogous
dependence in the social realm. To be a formalist is to say: "We
can take charge of our own destiny". 	 To reject formalism Is to
reject this message.	 It Is therefore an appropriate way of
endorsing the established institutions of social control, especially
the traditional means of spiritual guidance." 	 (Page 12)
This is a similar kind of analysis of alternative theories as that shown
by Bloor in his "Knowledge and Social Imagery" (1976) Here, in
considering the Popper/Kuhn debate, he describes Enlightenment and
Romantic Ideologies, places Popper In the former and Kuhn in the latter,
and characterises their conflict as a typical clash between these two
ideologies and their rival social theories. Yhat Is significant for us
here is not whether Bloor is correct, or that Bloor's analysis of the
Popper/Kuhn debate actually explains more than another sociological
analysis, but that sociological analyses are actually taking place.
Scientific method, the comparison of rival theories for their greater or
lesser explanatory power, is being applied to scientific knowledge
Itself, with some considerable success, and quite independent of the
truth or falsity of the mathematical theory. We shall return to the
issue Implied in the last paragraph quoted from Bloor's paper, and in
particular the last sentence, spiritual guidance, in the next section,
with reference to education.
Judith Grabiner, in an article entitled "Is mathematical truth time-
dependent?" (1974) looks at the work of Euler, Cauchy and Veierstrass on
infinitesimals and rigour. She concludes:
"Perhaps mathematical truth is eternal but our knowledge of it is
not. We have seen an example of how attitudes towards mathematical
truth have changed in time. After such a revolution in thought,
earlier work Is re-evaluated. Some is considered worth more; some
worth less.
What should a mathematician do knowing such re-evaluations occur?
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I suggest a third possibility: a recognition that the problem I
have raised is just the existential situation mathematicians find
themselves in. Mathematics grows in two ways: no only by
successive increments, but also by occasional revolutions. Only if
we accept the possibility of present error, can we hone that the
future will bring a fundamental improvement in our knowledge. We
can be consoled that most of the old bricks will find places
somewhere in the new structure. 	 Mathematics is nQt. the unique
science without revolutions. 	 Rather mathematics is that area of
human activity which has at once the least destructive and still the
most fundamental revolutions." 	 (Page 364)
Bos and Xehrtens (1977) have attempted to give some structure to the
sociology of mathematics, in an article entitled "The Interactions of
Mathematics and Society in History - Some Explanatory Remarks." They
write:
"In accordance with its special purpose, the paper has three aims.
First it argues for the importance of the subject, which we feel,
deserves more attention from historians of mathematics than it
receives at the moment. In part 1 we discuss three arguments for
studying the relation of mathematics and society and for treating
this theme in teaching. The second aim, treated in part 2, is to
provide a preliminary exploration of the roles which mathematics may
play in society. These concepts are, of course, debatable, but we
hope they may be helpful in a further discussion. The third aim,
the subject of part 3, is to mention a number of specific themes on
which research on the relation of mathematics and society could
focus, and to provide references to literature, in particular for a
discussion of these themes in teaching.'	 (Page 7)
The quantity of literature on the sociology of mathematics, while
remaining far behind the literature on the sociology of science, is
nevertheless growing, and regular workshops are being held in the social
history of mathematics. 	 One can expect much research to emerge,
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providing the examples that Bloor suggests will demonstrate the strong
programme.
1.6 Mathematics Education and Social Control
I propose here, taking Bloor's analysis, to show that the two schools of
thought in the philosophy of mathematics discussed in chapter 2 of this
thesis, namely the Euclidean programme and the Lakatosian alternative
programme, and the two ways of teaching discussd in chapter 4 of this
thesis, namely 'closed' and 'open', can be seen as rival conceptions of
the aims and purposes of education. Teaching mathematics as a body of
knowledge can be characterised as one particular view of the
relationship between teacher and pupil, that of the learned and the
learner, the possessor of knowledge and the receiver of knowledge, the
controller and the controlled. Teaching mathematics as a way of
thinking, on the other hand, can be seen, with its dynamic set of
methods, techniques and development of intuitive skills, as another
view, that of encouraging the creative process that each individual
learner goes through in the process called learning, and that is the
role of the teacher to the pupil. The latter conception can be called
child-centred, in that the emphasis is on the creative process that the
pupil must go through for learning to take place. A shift away from the
metaphysical status of mathematical knowledge, and towards the patterns
of thought and behaviour that identify mathematics, is also a shift away
from the control of one group by another by virtue of its privileged
position in relation to knowledge, and towards a form of control more by
acceptance of one group of the greater experience of the other. As
Bloor (1979) has described it:
We should start with the idea that in our social interactions we
are always trying to put pressure on our fellows or evade that
pressure. The crucial point is that in order to apply pressure more
effectively we try to make reality our ally. We construe reality in
such a way that it justifies or legitimates our course of action.
(Page 13)
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We can certainly see mathematics education in this light. In earlier
days mathematics was seen to be the paradigm of certain knowledge, and
consequently the model for systems of moral knowledge, scientific
knowledge etc., particularly in the Euclidean style. It is probably the
case that to a large extent mathematics is still seen in this light by
many teachers of mathematics, although not consciously. This will be
considered further in Section 3 of this thesis. The ability to appeal
to a higher authority for certainty is, in the traditional mode, a
necessary tool for social control. Deviant behaviour is then clearly
identified and can be excluded.
An interseting analogy has been drawn by Bloor (1978) between monster-
barring techniques in mathematical development, as outlined so clearly
in Lakatos' book "Proofs and Refutations" (1977), and the exclusion of
animals which do not fit a specific categorisation in Jewish Dietary
Laws, described by Mary Douglas in her book "Natural Symbols:
Explorations in Cosmology" (1973). Bloor writes:
"These books have a common theme: they deal with the way man
responds to things which do not fit into the boxes and boundaries of
accepted ways of thinking: they are about anomalies to publicly-
accepted schemes of classification. Whether it be a counter-
example to a proof; an animal which does not fit into the local
taxonomy; or a deviant who violates the current norms, the same
range of reactions is generated.
The crucial point is that Mary Douglas has an explanation of why
there are different responses to things which break the orderly
boundaries of our thinking: these responses are characteristic of
different social structures. Her theory spells out why this will be
so, and describes some of the mechanisms linking the social and the
cognitive. This means we should be able to predict the social
circumstances which lie behind the different responses which
mathematicians make to the troubles in their proofs."	 (Page 245)
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Similarly, we may see the responses which mathematics teachers make to
the troubles in their classrooms. We perpetuate the view that
mathematics is an esoteric affair. We have the knowledge, both of the
correct way of doing any specific piece of mathematics, and of the
significance and relevance of a particular piece of work. We do not
really need to explain to an inquisitive pupil. We can merely state
that it is too complicated to explain, the word of the teacher will have
to be accepted; or it is on the examination syllabus, and that higher
authority, the examiner, is also quite adequate justification. Of all
the subjects in the school curriculum, mathematics appeals most as an
authority-based subject. This probably explains why a mathematics
exercise is most often given as a disciplinary measure. Mathematical
behaviour is right or wrong, and the higher authority determines which.
It is a clear analogy with moral behaviour.
Alternatively, pupils can receive the view that they actively
participate in the learning process, and that without their activity,
their learning does not take place. Mathematics can be mastered by all,
to some degree, since it is a way of dealing with a certain set of
experiences encountered in interaction with the world around. Teachers
are seen as those with more experience of mathematizing, who can usually
lead pupils in the best direction to explore and develop those
perceptions.
It can often happen that pupils have a perception of a particular
problem that is quite novel, whether correct or not. In fact at first
the teacher may not be sure whether the approach is correct. If the
teacher acknowledges the pupil's response, encourages the pupil and the
class to examine the idea, test it, generalise it etc., the teacher may
be seen to be demonstrating the notion that mathematical knowledge is
not the exclusive domain of the teacher, providing the teacher with a
position of authority in the social interactions as well as the
knowledge.
It may be, then, that an epistemological committment is also a
comaittment to a form of social interaction in the classroom, providing
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the teacher with the authority of the possessor of knowledge, or as the
guide and adviser to pupils in the learning process.
1.7 Sociology of Xathematics - A Summary
From the perspective of relativism, studies of mathematics discussed
provide exciting new pictures of the nature of the development of
mathematical knowledge, symmetrical with respect of truth and falsity,
and reflexive with respect to sociological studies themselves. The
commlttments in a social sense that result from epistemological
positions adopted are revealed. The social nature of mathematics is
convincingly argued for.
	
Derek Phillips (1977) writes, giving a
Wittgensteinian image:
"... measuring, calculating, inferring and so forth, are bounded by
facts of nature, but particular systems of measurement, calculation
and so on, are fully a matter of social convention. One or another
type of mathematics is invented or created against the background of
a certain consistency of objects in nature (they do not suddenly
change size or shape, they do not suddenly disappear), the human
capacity to remember numbers accurately, and the like, the various
uses that counting and calculating have in our lives and so forth.
But while these facts of nature set certain limitations as to the
possibilities of various language games - including mathematics -
they can account neither for the existence of particular language
games nor for the manner in which people learn to play those games.
(Page 135)
1.8 Conclusion
As has been suggested above, a common tactic amongst scientists and
philosophers has been to fall back on mathematics as the form of
knowledge with certainty built into it. As Lakatos (1978) has described
it:
-34-
"Classical epistemology has for two thousand years modelled its
ideal of a theory, whether scientific or mathematical, on its
conception of Euclidean geometry. 	 (Page 29)
"By the turn of this century mathematics, 'the paradigm of certainty
and truth', seemed to be the last stronghold of orthodox
Euclideans."	 (Page 30)
In Chapter 2 the situation in the philosophy of mathematics will be
discussed.
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CHAPTER 2 - THE PHILOSOPHY OF ILTHEJ(LTICS
A brief summary will first be given of the three traditional schools of
thought in the philosophy of mathematics, namely logicism, formalism and
intuitionism. This will be followed by an examination of the theories
of Imre Lakatos in relation to the nature of mathematical knowledge, and
other recent work along the same lines. In particular, the effects of
the loss of the traditional certainty of mathematical knowledge will be
discussed, and implications for mathematics education suggested.
2.1 Loglcism
Carl Hempel has described the thesis of logicism concerning the nature
of mathematics in the following way (Benacerraf 1964):
"Mathematics is a branch of logic. It can be derived from logic in
the following sense:
a. All the concepts of mathematics, i.e. of arithmetic, algebra,
and analysis, can be defined in terms of four concepts of pure
logic.
b. All the theorems of mathematics can be deduced from those
definitions by means of the principles of logic (including the
axioms of infinity and choice).
In this sense it can be said that the propositions of the system of
mathematics as here delimited are true by virtue of the definitions
of the mathematical concepts involved, or that they make explicit
certain characteristics with which we have endowed our mathematical
concepts by definition. The propositions of mathematics have,
therefore, the same unquestionable certainty which is typical of
such propositions as "All bachelors are unmarried", but they also
share the complete lack of empirical content which is associated
with that certainty: The propositions of mathematics are devoid of
all factual content: they convey no information whatever on any
empirical subject matter." 	 (Page 378)
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Henipel goes on to discuss the apparent paradox in that despite this
emptiness of factual content mathematics applies to empirical subject
matter. He explains this as follows:
"Thus, in the establishment of empirical knowledge, mathematics (as
well as logic) has, so to speak, the function of a theoretical juice
extractor: the techniques of mathematical and logical theory can
produce no more juice of factual information than is contained in
the assumptions to which they are applied; but they may produce a
great deal more juice of this kind than might have been anticipated
upon a first intuitive inspection of those assumptions which form
the raw material for the extractor." 	 (Page 379)
Even before Godel's incompleteness results, there were fundamental
problens with the logicist programme. As Russell wrote in his
"Introduction to lathematical Philosophy" (Benacerraf 1964):
"... But although all logical (or mathematical) propositions can be
expressed wholly in ter of logical constants together with
variables, it is not the case that, conversely, all propositions
that can be expressed in this way are logical. We have found so far
a necessary but not a sufficient criterion of mathematical
propositions. We have sufficiently defined the character of the
primitive ideas in terns of which all the ideas of mathematics can
be defined, but not of the primitive propositions from which all the
propositions of mathematics can be deduced. This is a more
difficult matter, as to which it is not yet known what the full
answer is.
We may take the axiom of infinity as an example of a proposition
which, although it can be enunciated in logical terme cannot be
asserted by logic to be true."	 (Page 130)
Carnap has written (Benacerraf 1964):
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"A greater difficulty, perhaps the greatest difficulty, in the
construction of mathematics has to do with another axiom posited by
Russell, the so-called axiom of reducibility, which has justly
become the main bone of contention for the critics of the system of
Principia Xathematica. We agree with the opponents of logicism that
it is unadmissible to take it as an axiom." (Page 35)
Godel's work appears to have put paid to the logicist programme
entirely, in showing that, given any consistent set of arithmetical
axioms, there are true arithmetical statements which are not derivable
from the set.
2.2 Formalism
Hilbert's Formalist programme has been summarised by Lakatos (1978):
"How could we test Russellian logic? All true basic statements -the
decidable kernel of arithmetic and logic - are derivable in it, and
thus does not seem to have any potential falsifiers. So the only
way of criticising this peculiar empiricist theory is, on the face
of it, to test it for consistency. This leads us to the Hilbertian
circle of ideas.
Hilbertian meta-mathematics was 'designed to put an end to
scepticism once and for all'. Thus its aim was identical with that
of the logicists.
"One has to admit that in the long run the situation in which we
find ourselves because of the paradoxes is an unbearable one.
Just imagine: in mathematics, in this paradigm of certainty and
truth, the most common concept-formations and inferences that
are learned, taught and used, lead to absurdities. But if even
mathematics fails, where are we to look for certainty and truth?
There is however a completely satisfactory method of avoiding
paradoxes."
Hilbert's theory was based on the idea of formal axioaatics. He
claimed (a) that all arithmetical propositions which are formally
proved - the arithmetical axioms - will certainly be true if the
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formal system is consistent, in the sense that A and not-A are not
both theorems, (b) that all mathematical truths can be proved, and
(C) that meta-mathematics, this new branch of mathematics set up to
prove the consistency and completeness of formal systems, will be a
particular brand of Euclidean theory: a 'finitary' theory, with
trivially true axioms containing only perfectly well known terms,
and with trivially safe inferences. • It is contended that the
principles used In the meta-mathematical proof that the axioms do
not lead to contradiction, are so obviously true that not even the
sceptics can doubt them'. A meta-mathematical argument will be 'a
concatenation of self-evident intuitive (inhaitlich) insIghts.
Arithmetical truth - and, because of the already accomplished
arithmetizatIon of mathematics, all sorts of mathematical truths -
will rest on a firm, trivial, 'global' intuition, and thus on
'absolute truth'.	 (Page 20)
Von Neumann has written (Benacerraf 1964):
N The leading idea of Hubert's theory of proof is that, even if the
statements of classical mathematics should turn out to be false as
to content, nevertheless, classical mathematics involves an
internally closed procedure which operates according to fixed rules
known to all mathematicians and which consists basically in
constructing successively certain combinations of primitive symbols
which are considered 'correct' or 'proved'. 	 This construction-
procedure, reover, is 'f unitary' and directly constructive...
although the content of a classical mathematical sentence cannot
always (i.e. generally) be finitely verified, the formal way in
which we arrive at the sentence can be... We must regard classical
mathematics as a combinatorial game played with primitive
symbols.. ."	 (Page 50)
One can see here how devastating Godel's proof was for both formalism
and logicism together. A formalist approach to the nature of
mathematics is, however, far from dead, as will be discussed below.
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2.3	 Intuitionism
The two main exponents of Intuitionisni are Arend Heyting and
L.E.J.Brouwer. Heyting, firstly, writes (Benacerraf 1964):
H The intuitionist mathematician proposes to do mathematics as a
natural function of his intellect, as a free, vital activity of
thought. For him, mathematics is a production of the human mind.
He uses language, both natural and formalized, only for
communicating thoughts, i.e., to get others or himself to follow his
own mathematical ideas. Such a linguistic accompaniment is not a
representation of mathematics; still less is it mathematics
itself... I must... make one remark which is essential for a correct
understanding of our intuitionist position: we do not attribute an
existence independent of our thought, i.e. a transcendental
existence, to the integers or any other mathematical objects. Even
though it might be true that every thought refers to an object
conceived to exist independently of it, we can nevertheless let this
remain an open question. In any event, such an object need not be
completely independent of human thought. Even if they should be
independent of individual acts of thought, mathematical objects are
by their very nature dependent on human thought. Their existence is
guaranteed only in so far as they can be determined by thought.
They have properties only in so far as these can be discerned in
them by thought. But this possibility of knowledge is revealed to
us only by the act of knowing itself. Faith in transcendental
existence, unsupported by concepts, must be rejected as a means of
mathematical proof. As I will shortly illustrate mure fully by an
example, this is the reason for doubting the law of the excluded
middle.	 (Page 43)
Brouwer writes (Benacerraf 1964):
1 The... point of view that there are no non-experienced truths and
that logic is not an absolutely reliable instrument to discover
truths, has found acceptance with regard to mathematics much later
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than with regard to practical life and science. Kathematics
rigorously treated from this point of view, and deducing theorems
exclusively by means of introspective construction, is called
intuitionistic mathematics. 	 In many respects it deviates from
classical mathematics. In the first place because classical
mathematics uses logic to generate theorems, believes in the
existence of unknown truths, and in particular applies the principle
of the excluded third expressing that every mathematical assertion
(i.e. every assignment of a mathematical property to a mathematical
entity) either is a truth or cannot be a truth. In the second place
because classical mathematics confines itself to predeterminate
infinite sequences for which from the beginning the nth element is
fixed for each n. Owing to this confinement classical mathematics,
to define real numbers, has only predeterminate convergent infinite
sequences of rational numbers at its disposal. Out of real numbers
defined in this way, only subspecies of 'ever unfinished
denumerable' species of real numbers can be composed by means of
introspective construction. Such ever unfinished denumerable
species all being of measure zero, classical mathematics, to create
the continuum out of points, needs some logical process starting
from one or ire axioms. Consequently we may say that classical
analysis, however appropriate for technique and science, has less
mathematical truth than intuitionistic analysis performing the said
composition of the continuum by considering the species of freely
proceeding convergent infinite sequences of rational numbers without
having recourse to language or logic. 	 (Page 78)
Hence while intuitionistic mathematics appears to have much to recommend
it from the point of view of secure foundations, the fact that it has to
rely on a process that excludes so much of mathematics that undoubtedly
works, ought to be at least a cause for concern. In order to meet the
requirement of a paradox free mathematics, so much has to be excluded
from 'mathematics', one is led to question the value of the exercise.
To conclude that classical analysis has less truth than intuitionistic
analysis makes one doubt this use of the term 'truth'.
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A further objection can be made in the role of language for
intuitionistic mathematics. According to Heyting the language used does
not represent the mathematics. It is merely a method of communicating
thoughts. Heyting then goes on to deny any transcendental nature to
these thoughts. There must, therefore, be serious doubts about the
possibility of sharing the same mathematical thoughts. If there is no
certainty that the thoughts are common due to transcendental necessity,
and no certainty that the language used will convey the thought,
communication becomes at least unreliable.
According to the intuitionists, intuition is an introspective experience
that provides an Infallible guarantee of the truth of mathematical
propositions. It has been suggested that intuitionistic mathematics can
be a fruitful basis for mathematics education. Hence it is important to
consider the way In which we use the term 'intuition' in mathematics
education. Despite Heyting's denial, there is a definite platonic ring
to the idea that introspection leads to universals, infallibly. We
certainly do not use the term in the same way. Firstly, we recognise
that there is a strong possiblity that the student, when encouraged to
use his/her intuition, will make a mistake. We are not depending on the
Infallibility of the step. Secondly we are, I suggest, expecting that
our students will use their accumulated mathematical experience, often
in an informal imaginative way, to determine how to proceed at a
particular juncture.
	
We are concerned with processes, hypotheses,
suggestions, relational thinking, not an Infallible awareness of truth.
2.4 Lakatosian View of Mathematics
Lakatos' view Is not merely a fourth movement but is a radical
alternative to the other schools of philosophy of mathematics. He
characterises the work of the three traditional schools as attempts to
reorganise mathematics on a Euclidean basis, and clai to show the
inevitable failure of such a programme. His alternative is to reject
even the attempt, and to adopt a quasi-empirical ideal for mathematics.
His historiographical book "Proofs and Refutations" (Lakatos 1977) takes
Euler's rule for the relationship between the vertices, edges and faces
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of polyhedra, and traces the history of the development of a proof. In
doing this he attempts to show, firstly, the heuristic as distinct from
the deductive process of the growth of mathematical knowledge, and
secondly the quasi-empirical nature of mathematical knowledge, in that
counter-examples lead to the adaptation of the proofs, axionE or
definitions in the theorem, i.e. the re-transmission of falsity rather
than the transmission of truth.
In his article A Renaissance of Empiricism in the Recent Philosophy of
)tathematics" (1978) Lakatos explains the difference between Euclidean
and quasi-empirical syste, and also the distinction between empirical
and quasi-empirical. He writes:
Whether a deductive system is Euclidean or quasi-empirical is
decided by the pattern of truth value flow in the system. The system
is Euclidean if the characteristic flow is the transmission of truth
from the set of axiox 'downwards' to the rest of the system - logic
here is an organon of proof; it is quasi-empirical if the
characteristic flow is the retransmission of falsity from the false
basic statements 'upwards' towards the 'hypothesis' - logic here is
an organon of criticism. But this demarcation of patterns of truth
flow is independent of the particular conventions that regulate the
original truth value injection into the basic statements. For
instance a theory which is quasi-empirical in my sense may be either
empirical or non-empirical in the usual sense. . ."	 (Page 29)
Lakatos explains why Euclidean theories must fail, in another article,
entitled "Infinite Regress and the Foundations of Xathematics" (1978).
He writes:
"From the seventeenth to the twentieth century Euclideanisin has been
on a great retreat. The occasional rearguard skirmishes to break
through beyond the hypotheses, towards the peaks of first
principles, all failed. The fallible sophistication of the
empiricist programme has won, the infallible triviality of
Euclideans has lost... These four hundred years of retreat seeme to
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have by-passed mathematics completely. Euclideans here retained
their original stronghold. The mass of eighteenth-centtry analysis
was of course a set-back. But since Cauchy's revolution of rigour
they headed slowly but safely towards the peaks." (Page 10)
He continues:
"No Euclidean theory, however, can ever stand up to sceptical
criticism. And the most incisive sceptical arguments against
mathematical dogmatism came from the self-tormenting doubts of the
dogmatists themselves: 'Have we really reached the primitive terms?
Have we really reached the axioms? Are our truth-channels really
safe?'	 These questions played a decisive role in Frege's and
Russell's great enterprise to go back to still more fundamental
first principles, beyond the Peano axioms of arithmetic. I shall
particularly concentrate on Russell's approach, showing how he
failed in his original programme, how he finally fell back on
Inductivism, how he chose confusion rather than facing and accepting
the fact that what is interesting in mathematics is conjectural."
(Page 11)
Lakatos goes on to trace the history of Russell's work:
"We all know how the brief Euclidean 'honeymoon' gave place to
'intellectual sorrow', how the intended logico-trivialization of
mathematics degenerated into a sophisticated system, including
'axioms' like that of reducibility, infinity, choice, and also
ramified type theory - one of the most complicated conceptual
labyrinths a human mind ever invented."	 (Page 18)
Russell himself wrote (1959):
"The splendid certainty, which I had always hoped to find in
mathematics was lost in a bewildering maze." 	 (Page 212)
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Lakatos describes the options open to Russell. It is always possible to
maintain a Euclidean programme, in the sense that one can hope that the
axioms that one has had to use may later be shown to be reducible to
self-evident axioms. Russell at first held this hope and then despaired
of it. He rejected turning to postulationism, which involves shifting
the self-evidence from the axioms to statements which one wants to
derive. Russell turns instead to a dogmatic assertion of the inductive
principle, as the only way out.
Lakatos' attack on inductivism in mathematics, following Popper's attack
in science, is well known. Basic statements, no matter how many, can
never prove an axiom.
Lakatos continues (1978):
"Let us now draw some of the conclusions Russell refused to draw.
The infinite regress in proofs and definitions in mathematics cannot
be stopped by a Euclidean logic. Logic may explain mathematics but
cannot prove it. It leads to sophisticated speculation which is
anything but trivially true. The domain of triviality is limited to
the uninteresting decidable kernel of arithmetic and of logic - but
even this trivial kernel might sometime be overthrown by some
detrivializing sceptic criticism."	 (Page 19)
To return to Lakatos' quasi-empirical programme, we will look at the
development of theories, the methodology of the programme, and the
nature of falsifiers.
2.4.1	 The Development of Theories
Lakatos (1978) compares the Euclidean and the quasi-empirical programme
in the way that theories develop. He writes:
N The development of Euclidean theory consists of three stages: first
the naive prescientific stage of trial and error which constitutes
the prehistory of the subject; this is followed by the foundational
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period which reorganizes the discipline, trims the obscure borders,
establishes the deductive structure of the safe kernel; all that is
then left is the solution of problems inside the system, mainly
constructing proofs or disproof s of the interesting conjectures...
The development of a quasi-empirical theory is very different. It
starts with problems followed by daring solutions, then by severe
tests, refutations. The vehicle of progress is bold speculations,
criticism, controversy between rival theories, problemshifts.
Attention is always focussed on the obscure borders. The slogans
are growth and permanent revolution, not foundations and
accumulation of eternal truths.
The main pattern of Euclidean criticism is suspicion: Do the proofs
really prove? Are the methods too strong and therefore fallible?
The main pattern of quasi-empirical criticism is proliferation of
theories and refutation." 	 (Page 29)
2.4.2	 Methodology
The distinction between the two types of theories is seen in their
methodologies:
"The methodology of a science is heavily dependent on whether it
aims at a Euclidean or quasi-empirical ideal. The basic rule in a
science which adopts the former aim is to search for self-evident
axioms - Euclidean methodology is puritanical, antispeculative. The
basic rule of the latter is to search for bold, imaginative
hypotheses with high explanatory and 'heuristic' power, indeed, it
advocates a proliferation of alternative hypotheses to be weeded out
by severe criticism - quasi-empirical methodology is uninhibitedly
speculative." (ibid page 29)
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2.4.3	 Falsifiers
The role of formalization in mathematics, for Lakatos, is to extend the
testability of a theory.	 He discusses falsifiers in the informal
theories and the formal axiomatizations.	 He also discusses, in the
extracts following, the question of a dividing line between science and
mathematics. It is clear, and will be further discussed later, how
significant these areas are for mathematics education, if one follows
Lakatos' view of mathematics. He writes:
N1f mathematics and science are both quasi-empirical, the crucial
difference between them, if any, must be in the nature of their
'basic statements', or 'potential falsifiers'. The 'nature' of a
quasi-empirical theory is decided by the nature of the truth value
injections into its potential falsifiers. Now nobody will claim
that mathematics is empirical in the sense that its potential
falsifiers are singular spatio-temporal statements. But what then
is the nature of mathematics? Or, what is the nature of the
potential falsifiers of mathematical theories?... Let us first take
comprehensive axiomatic set theories. Of course, they have
potential logical falsifiers: statements of the form p & not-p. But
are there other falsifiers? The potential falsifiers of science,
roughly speaking, express the 'hard facts'. But is there anything
analogous to 'hard facts' in mathematics? If we accept the view
that a formal axiomatic theory implicitly defines its subject
matter, then there would be no mathematical falsifiers except
logical ones. But if we insist that a formal theory should be the
formalization of some informal theory, then a formal theory may be
said to be 'refuted' if one of its theoreme is negated by the
corresponding theorem of the informal theory. One could call such
an informal theorem a heuristic falsifier of the formal theory."
(Page 35)
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Lakatos suminarises his philosophy of mathematics as follows:
"The gravest danger then in modern philosophy of mathematics Is that
those who recognise the fallibility and therefore the science-
likeness of mathematics, turn for analogies to the wrong image of
science. The twin delusions of 'progressive intuition' and of
induction can be discovered anew in the works of contemporary
philosophers of mathematics. These philosophers pay careful
attention to the degrees of fallibility, to methods which are a
priori to some degree, and even to degrees of rational belief. But
scarcely anybody has studied the possibilities of refutatlons (in
mathematics). In particular, nobody has studied the problem of how
much of the Popperian conceptual framework of the logic of
discovery in the empirical sciences is applicable to the logic of
discovery in the quasi-empirical sciences in general and in
mathematics in particular. How can one take fallibilities seriously
without taking the possibility of refutations seriously?... It will
take more than the paradoxes and Godel's results to prompt
philosophers to take the empirical aspects of mathematics seriously,
and to elaborate a philosophy of critical fallibilism, which takes
inspiration not from the so-called foundations but from the growth
of mathematical knowledge." 	 (Page 42)
2.4.4 Lakatos' View and Mathematics Education
Before proceeding to examine some of the criticisme of the Lakatoslan
view of mathematics, some preliminary remarks are appropriate here on
the significance for mathematics education. Lakatos is proposing a
fallible view of mathematical knowledge, whereby what is interesting is
conjectural. Inspiration is not to be found in looking at thoroughly
axiomatized systems, but in the growth of mathematical knowledge.
Speculative hypotheses, courageous conjectures and testable statements
are the order of the day In mathematics. If we look at the way we teach
mathematics, these ideas do not usually find a place.
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Jack Easley wrote, in 1967:
"From the critics (of the new maths) we may also learn that the
really new venture for mathematics curriculum reform lies in the
area of heuristic procedures. If mathematics educators learn to
apply the insights into mathematical inquiry which Polya and Lakatos
have set forth, at the level in the teaching of mathematics on which
the growing edge of the student's understanding happens to lie, the
interest and achievement of students may be expected to increase
markedly."	 (Page 228)
Even stronger support comes from Joseph Agassi (1980) whose article "On
Mathematics Education: The Lakatosian Revolution" states in its title
the position of the writer.
2.5 Some criticisn
It is interesting to note that Lakatos spent much of his time developing
his Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes, whereas 'Proofs and
Refutations' stands as his illustration of this theme in mathematics
(Lakatos 1977). It is not developed to the same extent in his writing
on mathematics. Indeed, Feyerabend in his book 'Against Method' (1975)
hardly mentions mathematics at all, he refers to 'Proofs and
Refutations' only once, and uncritically, and does not discuss
Philosophy of Mathematics as such at all.
In his philosophy of science, whilst Lakatos rejects the idea that we
can ever know that we are nearer to truth, he maintains some objective
standards of rationality in two ways, by his distinction between
internal history and external history, and in the identification of a
research programme as a progressive one or a degenerating one. Both of
these standards have been strongly criticised as being untenable (e.g.
Bloor 1976). In his philosophy of mathematics, however, he appears to
be quite happy to leave mathematics as conjectural. Indeed, he openly
attacks the idea that truth has anything to do with mathematics. In the
introduction to 'Proofs and Refutations' (1977) he writes:
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"For more than two thousand years there has been an argument between
dogmatists and sceptics. The dogmatists hold that - by the power of
our human intellect and/or senses - we can attain truth and know
that we have attained it. The sceptics on the other hand either
hold that we cannot attain truth at all (unless with the help of
mystical experience), or that we cannot know if we can attain it or
that we have attained it. In this great debate, in which arguments
are time and again brought up to date, mathematics has been the
proud fortress of dogmatism. ... Most sceptics have resigned
theielves to the impregnability of this stronghold of dogmatist
epistemology. A challenge is now overdue." 	 (Page 5)
The book is a case study of the history of mathematics as an informal,
quasi-empirical affair, without his usual scientific distinctions
between internal history, which is a reconstruction exhibiting the
objective application of the particular methods of the particular
research programme, and external history which is secondary, and looks
at the reasons f or errors, sociological factors not related to the
rational growth of the theory etc.
Davis and Hersh (1981) have described the book as follows:
"It would be fair to say that in 'Proofs and Refutations' Lakatos
argues that dogmatic philosophies of mathematics (logicist or
formalist) are unacceptable, and he shows that a Popperian
philosophy of mathematics is possible. However, he does not
actually carry out the program of reconstructitg the philosophy of
mathematics with a fallibilist epistemology." 	 (Page 348)
The editors of Lakatos' book, John Worrall and Elie Zohar add their own
comments in the form of Editors' footnotes scattered throughout the
book. In these footnotes they reveal their unhappiness with Lakatos'
world of uncertainty. For example, they write:
"This historical note, we believe, underplays the achievements of
the mathematical 'rigorists'.	 The drive towards 'rigour' in
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mathematics was, it eventually transpired, a drive towards two
separate goals, only one of which is attainable. These two goals
are, firstly, rigorously correct arguments or proofs (in which truth
is infallibly transmitted from premises to conclusions) and,
secondly, rigorously true axio, or first principles (which are to
provide the original injection of truth into the system - truth
would then be transmitted to the whole of mathematics via rigorous
proofs). The first of these goals turned out to be attainable
(given, of course, certain assumptions), whilst the second proved
unattainable. N	 (Page 56)
This view is quite surprising given that they were editing Lakatos'
work. The force of Lakatos' view of mathematics is that if there is
anything that is of that nature in mathematics then it is at best
uninteresting, and may at any time be refuted.
Michael Hallett (1979) attempts to take Lakatos' methodology of
scientific research programmes into mathematics, in two articles in the
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Hallett takes an idea of
Hubert's and adapts it, calling it Hubert's criterion, for
interpreting the expression 'mathematical progress'.
"Hilbert's criterion states that a consequence of t' provides
support for T' if it is used to solve an 'important' problem and
likewise was not used in the construction of T'." 	 (Page 10)
He compares this with the methodology of scientific research programmes
principle:
"The similarity with XSRP is quite clear. XSRP states that a
consequence of T' provides support for T' providing it is true and
was not used in the construction of T'." (Page 10)
Hallett claims that this criterion can be applied to the actual history
of mathematics, and attempts to give an example using Cantor's
introduction of transfinite numbers as an Instance of mathematical
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progress. Hallett needs something like Hubert's criterion because an
analogue of empirical data in science is needed in mathematics. Hallett
uses problem solutions as this analogue. His programme is interesting
but there are not yet enough developed examples on the lines of this
article to discuss its validity. One wonders whether, had Lakatos lived
longer, he would have returned to mathematics and attempted to complete
his programme. It may be that he could not see a way to reflect his
MSRP in mathematics and this is why he never returned to it. Hallett's
article concludes with a view similar to that mentioned above (Grabiner
1974 Page 364), presumably a Kuhnian influenced view, that 'mathematics
is that area of human activity which has at once the least destructive
and still the most fundamental revolutions'. Hallett writes (1979):
"Another curious feature of theoretical rivalry in mathematics is
that it appears to be resolved much more rapidly than rivalry in
empirical science.	 Is this because there is no genuine rivalry
between programmes in mathematics? 	 Or is it that, because
programmes do not need to wait for empirical support, heuristics are
much more quickly exhausted in mathematics than in physics?"
(Page 155)
In a review article of the collected Philosophical Papers of Lakatos,
Ian Hacking (1979) compares the significance of 'Proofs and Refutations'
to some of the classics of philosophical literature. He also highlights
the debt Lakatos owes to Wittgenstein. Hacking writes:
"It is seldom noted how useful it is to read the dialogue in company
with Vittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Xathematics
(Lakatos put some rude and somewhat idiotic interiections about
Vittgenstein into his later publications, but he read the Remarks
carefully when writing 'Proofs and Refutations'). Where
Wittgensteln gives hypothetical illustrations about following rules,
diverging practices and concept formation, Lakatos gives real life
examples. Vittgenstein's book is, in this respect, like a bestiary
compared to Lakatos' natural history." (Page 391)
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2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter the schools of thought in the Philosophy of Xathematics
have been examined, including the use of extracts by many of the
philosophers concerned. It can be seen that the Euclidean view cannot
ultimately be refuted, in the sense that the apparent failures of those
programmes grouped under the term Euclidean can be corsidered as
temporary. For example, the logicists can maintain that eventually
axioms such as the axiom of choice may be shown to be reducible to self-
evident axioms. This belief in the certainty of mathematical knowledge
forms the hard core of this paradigm. Lakatos' view is hence a real
alternative, as its hard core is the uncertainty of mathematical
knowledge and Is thus a competing paradigm.
It has been suggested here that Lakatos appears to have been content to
leave mathematical knowledge in a more uncertain state than scientific
knowledge. As It stands, his view is, I suggest, in accordance with the
'relativist' view discussed in Chapter 1.
2.7 Summary of Section 1
In this first section, I have attempted to examine the current situation
in the philosophy of mathematics, against its natural background of the
nature of knowledge in general, and scientific knowledge in particular.
I have attempted to show:
(a) that views of the nature of mathematics are best seen as falling
into two camps, the Euclidean camp and the Lakatosian camp;
(b) that the Lakatosian alternative is in accordance with relativist
views of knowledge
(C) that maintaining a particular view of mathematics entails a view of
knowledge that Is appropriate;
(d) that an epistemological committment has great significance for
mathematics education.
This last point forms the focus of the following section.
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SECTION 2
111€ CONSEQUENCES OF THEORY FOR THE PRACTICE
OF J(ATEEXATICS EDUCATION
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GRAFTER 3 - £ REV 1EV OF TEE LITERATURE
In the last two or three years there has been a growing interest in what
is being called the Theory of Mathematics Education. Before this,
mathematics education texts would in general refer briefly, if at all,
to the aims of mathematics education before passing on to aspects of the
methodology. A brief discussion of this follows, in 3.1. The main part
of this review is in three parts: The Philosophy of Mathematics as it
Affects Teaching in 3.2, Alternatives of Ways of Teaching as Connected
with Philosophy in 3.3, and Similar York in Science Education in 3.4.
3.1 Aims of Mathematics Education
In an unpublished paper (Lerman 1980) I attempted to summarise the
theoretical perspectives of some of the main mathematics education
texts. In the absence of a thorough rationale for mathematics education
- a task of which this thesis forms a part - and in recognition of the
need to make some reference to why one teaches mathematics, many authors
attempt to depend on criteria such as usefulness, beauty, or a tool of
science (e.g. Watson 1976 page 122 and Mathematical Association 1974
page 186).
That such criteria are inadequate on their own is pointed out by, for
example, David Wheeler (Land 1963):
w We cannot go to the stake for mathematics as 'the arithmetic of
everyday life'; the amount of mathematics that is necessary, or even
marginally useful, in everyday life is progressively diminishing -
and it can certainly be taught to most children before the age of
eight or nine.	 (Page 140)
In one sense this is true in that, for example, whereas one had to
calculate the change to be given to a customer in a shop, today, simply
pressing another button on the cash register causes the amount of change
to appear on the display. In another sense quite the opposite is the
case. Skills are even less adequate today than perhaps they were some
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decades ago. The essence of the 'skills' required by the s:hool-leaver
is adaptability of their mathematical knowledge.
Others suggest that mathematics serves wider purposes. such as
developing powers of reasoning, or as a means of identifying
intellectual ability in general (e.g. Freudenthal 1973 page 82).
The former claim has had doubts cast on its validity by e.g. Morris
Kline (1973):
"Another argument advanced by the advocates of the new mathematics
is that their emphasis on logical structure teaches students to
think deductively.... It is not the kind of thing that is useful in
everyday life. The big problems and even the little ones that human
beings are called upon to solve in life cannot be solved
deductively."	 (Page 45)
A more telling criticism is made by Hirst (1974):
"... take something like the ability to solve problems. What is
meant by this phrase? Obviously one begins by asking what problems:
moral problems, scientific problems, mathematical problems? Clearly
these are very different in nature. Can we assume that the ability
to solve mathematical problems is the same as the ability to solve
problems in morals? What is more, even to understand a scientific
problem, as distinct from a moral problem, presupposes a great deal
of scientific knowledge." 	 (Page 20)
One often comes across instances of the latter claim, that mathematical
ability is taken as a sign of general intellectual ability. The
injustice is obvious.
Two important points arise from this kind of treatment of the aims of
mathematics education. The first Is that an inadequate justification
leads to questions about the necessity of teaching mathematics at all.
Far more important, though, and conceptually prior to the first, is that
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one's view of what mathematics is, or why it should be taught, or not,
and what purpose it serves, are major determining influences on the
curriculum decisions made, methods of teaching adopted, research areas
designated as important etc. Hence the importance of the kind of study
carried out in this thesis, it is proposed.
Whether one accepts the necessity of arguments like Hirst's (1973 Ch. 3)
about the way we structure knowledge, or not, there can surely be no
doubt that quantification and other processes that are distinctly,
although not necessarily exclusively, mathematical, are a sufficiently
large a part of the nature of our existence and civilization that
mathematics should be a fundamental part of education.	 -
3.2 Philosophy of Xathematics as it Affects Teaching
As may be seen in historical studies such as Howson's (1982), attitudes
to the nature of mathematics have always played a major cart in the
determining of the mathematics curriculum. The only difference today is
that the situation in relation to what is mathematics is very complex,
as discussed in Section 1 of this thesis.
In more recent times, considerations of the effect of philosophy of
mathematics on teaching, although still few in number, have become
explicit, as can be seen from the following studies.
As mentioned above, in 2.4.4, Easley suggests that applying the insights
of Lakatos and others would increase students' interest and achievement
(Easley 1967). Also Agassi (1980) refers to the effect of a teacher's
philosophy of mathematics in his article.
Rene Thom (1973) has written:
all mathematical pedagogy, even if scarcely coherent, rests on
a philosophy of mathematics.	 (Page 204)
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Reuben Hersh (1979) criticises formalism in school matheratics. 	 He
writes:
"The criticism of formalism in the high school has been primarily on
pedagogic grounds: 'This is the wrong thing to teach, or the wrong
way to teach'. But all such arguments are inconclusive if they
leave unquestioned the dogma that real mathematics is precisely
formal derivations from stated axio. If this philosophical dogma
goes unchallenged, the critic of formalism in the school appears to
be advocating a compromise in quality: he is a sort of pedagogic
opportunist, who wants to offer the student less than the 'real
thing'. The issue then, is not, what is the best way to teach, but
what is mathematics really all about... controversies about high
school teaching cannot be resolved without confronting probleme
about the nature of mathematics."
	 (Page 18)
In considering curriculum development in mathematics, Jere Confrey
(1980) suggests that there are three theories of knowledge: absolutism;
progressive absolutism, as exemplified by Popper; and conceptual change,
based on the work of Stephen Toulmin (1972). She describes how each
theory of knowledge brings with it a commitment to particular curriculum
decisions. She writes:
"If the curriculum theorist accepts a curriculum change theory of
knowledge in mathematics, then the question is what are the
impications for the first task in curriculum design: the
determination of content. This can be answered at two levels:
1. The basic tenet is that what one teaches ought to reflect the
theory of knowledge which one thinks is most appropriate and
adequate for that discipline. This means that one ought to select
content which accurately portrays the particular discipline
involved. For mathematics, it means that mathematics ought to be
portrayed evolving, growing, and changing, not as static Immutable
truths.
2. An analysis of particular concepts in the discipline yields a
variety of ways of conceiving of a particular concept, as well as a
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variety of ways in which those concepts develop. Therefore, the
curriculum theorist must also consider alternative conceptions of
particular concepts to assess their appropriateness for inclusion as
content." (Page 13)
This theme of conceptual change theory of knowledge and its influence on
the mathematics curriculum is investigated further by Marilyn Jickson in
her unpublished PhD dissertation (1981). Within the wider framework of
the social context of the classroom, she discusses teachers' perceptions
of the nature of mathematics. She examines the alternatives, and
arrives at two, which she calls a positivist approach and a conceptual
change approach. She then examines the curriculum process in the light
of these two approaches, by researching two major school mathematics
programmes, the School Mathematics Project and Nuffield Mathematics.
She concludes that both are instances of a positivist approach, both are
unsatisfactory, and much work is needed to develop alternative
materials.
Together with Alan Bishop, she made an overall study of the social
context of the mathematics classroom, presented to the Cockcroft
Committee (Bishop and Nickson 1983). They point out:
"There is much public concern expressed about teachers' and
prospective teachers', knowledge of mathematics, but research into
the social context makes plain the need to focus more on the
attitudes and perceptions of teachers with respect to the
mathematical content of the curriculum. 	 (Page 62)
The developments mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, that
indicate a growing interest in what is being called the Theory of
Mathematics Education, are in three main areas: research in the social
context of mathematics education, as described above; research into a
constructivist psychological view of learning, in particular in
mathematics; and the initial discussions held at the Fifth International
Congress on Mathematical Education in Adelaide, August 1984 (ICME V)
-59-
towards a new international group for the study of the Theory of
Mathematics Education (T)[E).
At the 1983 meeting of the North American Chapter of the International
Study Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, the theme of
"Research in Mathematics Education from an Epistemological Perspective"
was adopted for the conference. Several papers were presented relating
directly to this theme, discussing the influence of a constructivist
view of knowledge on the teaching of mathematics. This view will be
examined in detail in Chapter 5, on learning theories. The relevance of
this view from a philosophical perspective can be seen from the
following extract from a paper presented by both of the editors of the
proceedings of the above conference, Hersovics and Bergeron, at the 8th
International conference for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, in
Sydney, August 1984 (Herscovics and Bergeron 1984):
"A constructivist perspective of the teaching of mathematics
focusses on the learner and the question "How can we guide him in
the construction of his mathematical schemas on the basis of his
existing knowledge?" is at the very heart of this approach. It is
the prime concern which leads the teacher in the choice of his
pedagogical interventions. Thus, to begin with, he has to determine
what kind of knowledge can be used as a foundation for the building
of the intended concept, and so ascertain that such a basis is
present in the student. He must then take care that each step in
his proposed construction is accessible to the pupil.
In contrast, a formal approach to the teaching of mathematics
concentrates more on the transmission of knowledge than on its
reconstruction by the pupil... A formal perspective of the teaching
of mathematics is fostered by a formal perception of mathematics
which is characterised by an emphasis on the form of mathematical
expressions."	 (Page 190)
At a short conference held after ICME V, Prof. Hans-Georg Steiner
initiated discussions on IKE. 	 The mini-conference was subtitled "A
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needed comprehensive approach to basic problems in the orientation,
foundation, methodology and organization of mathematics education as an
interactive system comprising research, development and practice." This
thesis is intended to be a contribution to this approach.
3.3 Alternative Ways of Teaching. as Connected with Philosophy
Little has been written which identifies what goes on in the classroom
and relates it to a theoretical perspective, and in particular to a
philosophy of mathematics. As described above, the reverse has been
recognised, at least since Rene Thom, if not before.
Blaire (1981) discussed the relationship between philosophies of
mathematics and what he termed perspectives of teaching. He identifies
four movements of mathematics teaching:
"(1) The teaching of mathematics as an art-form;
(2) The teaching of mathematics as a game (or family of games)
(3) The teaching of mathematics as a member of the natural
sciences;
(4) The teaching of mathematics as technologically-oriented."
(Page 148)
He goes on to consider and then reject the idea of mathematics as a
language as a fifth perspective. He relates these movements to four
schools of the philosophy of mathematics, and claims that teachers use
one or other perspective as suits the subject matter or when influenced
by other external pressures.
In an article published shortly after (Lerman 1983), I criticized this
approach on the grounds that:
(a) schools of thought in the philosophy of mathematics fall into two
distinct movements, not four or five;
(b) the influence of an epistemological position adopted on the
teaching of mathematics is much stronger than Blaire makes out;
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(c) an awareness of the consequences of episteilogical commitments can
lead to significant changes in school mathematics.
Brown and Cooney (1982), in an article concerned with research on
teacher education, argue for a programme towards teacher education
similar to that for learners of mathematics. They write:
"Mathematics educators are interested in how learners construct,
interpret, and utilize the mathematical knowledge taught in
classrooms. Similarly, we shall subsequently argue that such an
orientation leads us to consider how teachers construct, interpret,
and utilize the pedagogical knowledge taught in teacher education
programs."	 (Page 14)
They mention further that the inclination of a teacher to teach in a
particular way, to use one kind of content or approach or another, can
depend significantly on their view, not just of the nature of
mathematics, but of the nature of knowledge. However, the practical
consequences of the possible different orientations is not developed in
that article.
Plunkett (1981) discusses the idea that how one teaches mathematics is
determined by one's view of the nature of mathematics. He identifies
two views: the ontological one, whereby mathematics is taken to exist,
and the alternative, which is to see mathematics as a creation of the
human mind:
"with no existence other than in the minds of people..." (Page 46)
He goes on:
"If one sees mathematics as a body of knowledge (about the world, or
platonic ideals, or formal systems) then one will be led to a view
of teaching in which knowledge is passed (poured?) from the knower
to the ignorant. What is to passed can be prescribed in a syllabus
and tested in an exam. The most convincing argument against the
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value of this view, in my opinion, is that by and large people do
not pass exa, and even those that do seem in a year or two to have
been (cognitively) quite unaffected by their learning experience.
If, however, one approaches mathematics as a set of human
activities, one will try to introduce these activities to children.
The aim will be to help them to experience them and enjoy them."
(Page 46)
Within the scope of an article, the possibility for the development of
ideas is limited, but nevertheless the nature of mathematical knowledge
is more complex, as is the nature of the connection with the teaching of
mathematics. Davis & Hersh (1981) point out that neither the
'ontological' nor the 'creation of the human mind' images of
mathematical knowledge are adequate alone, but that what we have can
best be described as a process of negotiation between the two views.
In a paper presented to the North American Chapter of the International
Group for the Psychology of Mathematics Education, Cooney (1983) reports
on a project being conducted In this area. The project concerns the
beliefs about mathematics, and about the teaching and learning of
mathematics, of four teachers, who are then observed in their teaching,
after which interviews are held with the teachers and their students.
His initial conclusions from the results so far, are related to the gap
between the researchers' understanding of the concepts used, in the
sense of the intended programme of the teacher educators, and that of
the teachers. This , he suggests, is illustrative of a major concern
for teacher education, namely:
"It appears that we cannot assume (do we?) that the conceptual
models presented in our teacher education progran are the same
models the students take with them Into the classroom." (Page 169)
A related study, and part of the same project, was carried out by Alba
Gonzalez Thompson, and reported recently (Thompson 1984). The
investigation attempted to examine teachers' beliefs about mathematics
and mathematics teaching and connections with teachers' behaviour, by a
-63-
case study of three Junior high school teachers, observing and
interviewing the teachers. She concludes:
"Although the complexity of the relationship between teachers'
conceptions of mathematics and mathematics education cautions
against making conclusive statennts, the findings support the
original assumption that led to this investigation. That is,
teachers' beliefs, views and preferences about mathematics and its
teaching, regardless of whether they are consciously or
unconsciously held, play a significant, albeit subtle, role in
shaping the teachers' characteristic patterns of instructional
behaviour. In particular the observed consistency between the
teachers' professed conceptions of mathematics and the manner in
which they typically presented the content strongly suggests that
the teachers' views, beliefs and preferences about mathematics do
influence their instructional practice.N (Page 125)
The work of Cooney referred to above, and this by Thompson, using a case
study thodology, indicate the potential significance of a more
thorough understanding of epistemological alternatives for mathematics
and hence mathematics education, and of the nature of the connections
with teaching behaviour. Within the context of such an analysis, case
studies, group studies and others will, it is proposed, provide many
valuable insights into the teaching of mathematics. What is missing,
however, in the interesting and important work carried out so far, is an
analysis of those alternatives, from the nature of mathematics itself,
and resulting from this analysis a discussion of the nature of the
connections with teaching. Without this, there is no complete picture
of the way one can relate one person's views with another, or with the
range of possibilities that exist for such views, and indeed the actions
of the teachers.
3.4 Similar Work in Science Education
Within the scope of this thesis, and this literature review in
particular, any investigation of parallel work in other disciplines must
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necessarily be limited. It is, however, of interest to note one trend,
at least, in curriculum discussions regarding science education. Two
articles have appeared recently in the Journal of Curricu.um Studies,
both dealing with discovery learning in school science.
The first, by D. Royce Sadler (1982), looks at some of the limitations
and implications of the principles of induction and hypothetico-
deduction. He suggests that the move towards discovery learning in the
60's has largely stagnated, due to several factors, including the time-
consuming nature of such a programme. He then examines some of the
pitfalls of these two principles. He concludes:
Nm this paper, I have tried to show that inductive and hypothetico-
deductive reasoning, principles which once featured so prominently
in a number of curriculum developments but are now more or less
taken for granted in a much less extreme form, will not always
proceed smoothly. Evidence has been drawn from the literature on
the cognitive processes involved in human decision-making, Judgement
and evaluation to show that there do exist some Identifiable human
tendencies which can lead to bias in perception and interpretation
of data. That these tendencies are not intuitively obvious can be
explained, at least in part, by our Innate capacity to cope with
ambiguity in daily living, and by the checks and balances built into
the procedures of normal scientific research.
At a time when there are renewed calls for a return to inquiry-based
learning in the classroom, hard thinking tempered with some caution
is required in finding out where and in what ways inductive and
hypothetico-deductive principles can be used to advantage." (Page
50)
Whilst this analysis of the situation in science education is extremely
important, what is missing is the theoretical perspective which has led
to the introduction of discovery learning into the classroom, whether of
the inductive or of the hypothetico-deductive form, which view of the
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philosophy of science is reflected in this approach, and. hence where
next to proceed, i.e. the consequences of the views.
This kind of analysis is provided by the second article, by Harris and
Taylor (1983). They examine the inductive tradition from Bacon to Xiii,
and the critique of Hume. They propose that the hypothetico-deductive
tradition was given its main impetus by Popper, although they point out
the difficulty of following a strict Popperian programme in schools. They
next examine two different curriculum programmes of secondary science,
for the ways that they use discovery learning, and they also identify
the links with a child-centred view of education as a whole. They
conclude:
"Paradoxically, it is the education of science teachers rather than
the education of children where the philosophy of science matters.
We would like to encourage teachers to be more critical of the
assumptions on which many science curricula are based. We suggest
that science teachers be encouraged to take an interest in the
philosophy of science. It is our hope that they may approach their
task with a greater appreciation of the intentions of curriculum-
designers and be less likely to accept naive approaches to discovery
learning - less likely to waste the time of children with undirected
experimenting, and less likely to deceive them with oversimplified
Justifications.	 (Page 288)
The former analysis is analogous to the criticisms of school mathematics
without the fundamental challenge of the implicit formalist or platonic
assumptions underlying the syllabus and the ways of teaching. The
latter analysis does not make the same mistake, and hence is a more
thorough perspective on the issue of discovery learning in school
science. Just as in mathematics, this kind of approach, viewing the
issue of science as a whole, and not piecemeal, is essential when
considering aspects as fundamental as the role of discovery learning,
and one can expect an increase in the literature on this.
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3,5 Conclusion
Clearly there is a growing interest in relating the way of teaching
mathematics to the beliefs about mathematics held by the teacher, but
little research, either of the theoretical alternatives as regards views
of mathematics, or of the strong connections between views, curriculum
choices, and ways of teaching, or indeed attempts to identify teachers'
views and classroom styles. This thesis is an attempt to further
research in this area, by attempting to establish the philosophical
alternatives, identifying the nature of the connections between
epistemological view and practice, and by initiating attempts at
identifying both in practisitig teachers.
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CHAPTER 4 - THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TEACHERS' VIEWS AN])
TEACH:ERS' ACTIONS
The examination and discussion of epistemological alternatives in
mathematics, in Section 1, has led to the proposition that there are two
identifiable positions, the Euclidean programme and the relativist,
Lakatosian view. It was also suggested that the adoption of an
epistemological position may have a direct bearing on important and
fundamental aspects of mathematics education, in particular syllabus
content and teaching behaviour. This latter will be examined here,
In 4.1 the nature of the connection between views and actions is
discussed. In 4.2 it is proposed that in this context teachers' actions
can be described by a one-dimensional continuum, whose ends reflect the
philosophical alternatives as outlined in Section 1. These two ends are
outlined in 4.2.1 and 4.2.2. In 4.3 four situations that occur in
mathematics teaching are described, with the intention of highlighting,
through them, the proposed differences in possible teacher actions.
4.1 The Connection Between Views and Actions
Teachers and teaching may be seen as the mediating stage between the
context, which is specifically the pupils, but which clearly reflects
the school, parents and society as a whole, and the intended result
which is, specifically, here, the mathematics learning of those pupils.
Thus the influences on teachers are from varied sources and are often
conflicting ones. They include pupils demanding interesting relevant
work, whilst expecting difficult and tedious work; parents expecting
success in external examinations, relevance to the real world of work,
in order to help their children obtain the few jobs that there are
available, and also perhaps hoping for some similarity with the
mnathematics they knew at school; local education authorities expecting
cost-effective examination entrance and success rates, backed by the
headteacher's concern regarding examination results being a significant
factor in the standing of the school in the area; other departments
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within the school requiring particular mathematical skills at stages
that suit their own courses, but that often conflict with the
mathematics department's own programme, and also the common problem of
pupils being able to recognise that a learned procedure can be used in
other subjects, and the implied criticism of the mathematics department
as a consequence; commerce and industry criticising school for the
irrelevance of the school mathematics syllabus content and the poor
ability of school mathematics graduates, even those that have secured an
external qualification in mathematics; and many others. Teachers have
to respond to these demands, in attempting to secure the mathematical
learning of their pupils. It is proposed here that the beliefs and
values that teachers hold, regarding education and regarding
mathematics, are significant factors in determining how teachers respond
to these pressures in the context in which they work. In relation to
mathematics, it has been proposed that an epistemological view involves
a committment, and that teachers respond and react, at least partly, as
a consequence.
It must be said that this is not necessarily the case, in the sense that
the relationship between views and actions, taken together with the
other factors relating to teacher behaviour, may be different. It may
be the case that views do not determine actions, rather that they are a
gloss to the actions of a teacher. A teacher may behave in particular
ways that are determined perhaps by pragmatic decisions, and the views
either bear no relation to the actions, or are construed as to represent
or justify the actions. This point is clearly vital to this thesis,
since a case is being made that the two alternatives for teachers' views
are reflected in the alternatives for teachers' actions. The arguments
put forward here are in support of the idea that there is a connection,
and that the connection is a direct one, from views to actions and the
reverse, in relation to the nature of mathematics and the teaching of
mathematics. Were this to be a discussion about theories of education
in general, and the practice of teachers, the problem would perhaps be
much greater. Similarly if one were discussing a person's view of the
meaning of life, and how this affects, determines, or is determined by,
the way that he or she lives their life, the connection would be complex
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and thus difficult to evaluate. However, in this present work, one is
dealing with a subject, mathematics, that has a considerable body of
well-established results, generally accepted by the community, and in
that sense objective. There are certainly values involved in one's
views of the nature of mathematics, but it is not of the same kind as
the two instances above, which are in a sense, nothing but values, views
of 'good', 'just' etc. Mathematics teachers, and of course others, have
to deal with this collection of stuff we call mathematics, whatever it
is, and indeed are not generally called upon to consider their views or
values in relation to mathematics. Thus the way one has learnt
mathematics, the way one's teachers presented it, the degree to which
one enjoys it, the way one relates to the certainty or otherwise of it,
the way one uses it or perceives how others use it, the extent of one's
reading around it, the way one uses it In school in relating to pupils
and indeed staff etc., are the determinants of a person's view of the
nature of mathematics, whether coherent or conscious or not. Concepts,
ideas and theories are determined by their use, by the complex rules,
customs and procedures of the 'language game' of mathematics. Thus,
theories and practices are necessarily inter-related.
As discussed above, there are many other factors that influence teachers
and contribute to determining teacher behaviour, for example the
authority relationship within the mathematics department and the school.
The complexity of the influences that affect mathematics teacher
behaviour thus forms a central focus of the study in Section 3.
4.2 A Continuum of Mathematics Teachers' Actions
If schools of thought on the nature of mathematics can be seen to fall
Into two camps, the teaching behaviour of mathematics teachers cannot be
so simply divided. Nevertheless, it is hypothesised that the
philosophical positions described above can be seen to be reflected in
two stylized teaching patterns, which, whilst not representing the
behaviour of any single teacher, can serve as opposite ends of a
continuum, within which teachers will fall. 	 It Is proposed that a
meaningful perspective on mathematics eduaction is provided by this
-70-
nxidel. The two hypothesised ways of teaching that serve as the two ends
of the continuum will now be described in some detail, followed by a
discussion of four hypothetical situations that can and do occur in
mathematics education, which will help to highlight the significance of
this perspective of alternatives of ways of teaching mathematics.
4.2.1 Xathematics from a Euclidean View
It may be seen that the adoption of a Euclidean approach to mathematics
implies the tendency to see the teaching of mathematics as a process of
bringing pupils to see the certainty and timelessness of its results,
and the deductive nature of its methods. This means that, in doing
mathematics, the correct methods of deduction must be applied, and that
provided the questions are set out correctly, the desired result of the
right answer will be achieved. There is no 'purpose' in the sense of a
particular problem to be solved. It is the method that is of central
significance, or the particular section of the body of mathematical
knowledge that is considered as essential knowledge for the school
mathematics syllabus. Provided the methods and the content have been
thoroughly learnt, and tested by repeated exercises, mathematics has
been successfully conveyed. The psychological overview is one of the
conveyance of knowledge, in its most efficient form. Xathematics is
seen as a steadily accumulated body of knowledge, linear, hierarchical,
dependable, reliable and value-free. Concepts do not develop, they are
discovered.
Syllabus content, by this view, is a question of selecting a broad range
of subjects, so as to give a foundation in many areas of mathematical
knowledge, emphasising the common structure and methods used throughout
mathematics. The approach of the teacher is essentially geared towards
an esoteric view of mathematics. Pupils are given to understand that
not only is the teacher in the position of having the knowledge that the
pupil is required to learn, but that the teacher also has the knowledge
of the relevance, significance, justification and reason for learning
those things. Hence it is not appropriate for the pupil to ask why a
particular topic is on the syllabus, what relevance a piece of
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mathematics has to the real world, or what applications there are to
parts of mathematical knowledge. This is perhaps why so many teachers
find it so uncomfortable to be asked such questions. It is somehow not
satisfactory to answer in the mode described here, but there is no other
answer. The teacher is conveying the view that one learns the systems
of mathematics and then one learns to apply them, some time in the
future, during employment, retraining in industry or some other later
process. This probably characterises most university courses as well.
It is certainly not the role of school mathematics to concern itself
with uses or applications. The topic of percentages, for example, is
taught in the classroom by teacher exposition, practised by pupils
through many exercises, and it then can be applied by pupils in any one
of the various situations in which it is applied: bank interest; VAT
calculations; errors in engineering calculations etc. This is the view
of the teaching process as a consequence of seeing mathematics as a body
of knowledge, in this Euclidean sense.
Since mathematics is independent of the context of its discovery, or the
sources of inspiration of the discoverer, those being the external
history of mathematics, the more familiar and acceptable sociology of
mathematics, presenting the problem to pupils in an historical context
Is not relevant. If it Is included, it is merely in the form of spice
in a cake.
On the other hand, there are positive consequences to the adoption of
this perspective of mathematical knowledge in the sense of the
achievement of specific aims, or at least designing research towards the
improvement of the realisation of specific aims. An examination that is
geared towards new forms of questions whose essential style and content
are familiar from every previous examination, is far easier to prepare
one's pupils for sitting, than one that may consist, partly at least, of
open-ended investigations. Education towards the successful application
of heuristics, problem-solving methods, is well known to be far more
problematic than a research programme aimed at the successful teaching
of fraction addition, for example (e.g. Lowenthal 1984).
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4.2.2	 )1thematics From a Lakatosian Alternative View
It is interesting to note that, although Lakatos does not appear to have
written anything directly related to school mathematics education, his
book 'Proofs and Refutations' (1977) is written as a classroom dialogue,
in which the ideas of the students and the discussion between them
describes the stages of the development of a proof for Euler's relation
for the faces, edges and vertices of polyhedra. The teacher's role is
to propose the initial problem, and adjudicate in the disputes, at times
summarise the arguments put forward, but is not in the position of
knowing the answers any more than the students. This leads one to
wonder what are the consequences for the teaching of mathematics if one
accepts his description of the nature of the process of the growth of
mathematical knowledge, and the relative state of the notion of
certainty or proof in mathematics.
The adoption of this view implies the tendency to see the teaching of
mathematics through a problem-soving perspective. Without the context
or purpose of particular parts of mathematics, that is, the problems
that inspired that work, it is at least very difficult for pupils to
find meaning in mathematics. The psychological overview is one of
pupils constructing their own knowledge, by comparing a new problem,
idea, object, hypothesis against their existing experience, and
conceptual system. Hence pupils, by this hypothesised view, must be
encouraged to propose ideas and suggest methods; they must be led to
test these conjectures themselves, to try to generalise their methods,
compare them with other possibilities and search out other problems of a
similar nature that may have been previously solved. In this view,
unless the motive or goal in the form of a particular problem, has been
set, mathematical methods or knowledge of mathematical systems is
isolated, lifeless and, most important in this context, not
representative either of the nature of mathematical knowledge, or its
growth, or indeed of the learning process.
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Construction of the syllabus, according to this view, is also quite a
diffferent process. Mathematical knowledge as a whole can be seen as a
library of accumulated, tested and relatively reliable results of the
work of people inspired by interesting problems, abstract, real world,
or somewhere between the two. This library has to be theoretically
accessible to everyone, for one to be able to say that mathematics
education is going on, to whatever degree of ability and understanding
one's pupils are capable of attaining, i.e. as appropriate in particular
instances. Hence the emphasis is on processes of mathematical thought,
and content that is appropriate for the development of these. When a
pupil is aware, by his or her own attempts to solve a given problem,
that information is needed, or other solutions of a similar problem
would help, then accumulated knowledge becomes relevant and accessible.
The history of mathematics, by this hypothesised view, becomes an
integral part of learning mathematics in school. The historical
development of the topic 1 the original problems that inspired the work,
provide collective meaning, in the sense of the understanding and
progress of the mathematical community and society in general (e.g.
Kline 1972), and can often provide or assist individual meaning, as in
the case of the geometrical interpretations of the foundations of the
calculus, for example.
School mathematics is seen as a del of all mathematical activity, and
not as a matter of acquiring certain skills and knowledge, which are
then suddenly applicable.
4.3 Four Situations in Mathematics Teaching
Within the context described here, It is instructive to examine some
issues in the teaching of mathematics and Identify the different
strategies or attitudes that could be adopted. The alternatives will be
outlined, and will be seen, it Is proposed, to clarify the whole view of
teaching behaviour of this thesis. The first is a consideration of what
one does with novel pupil Ideas, discussed through a fractions problem.
The second is an illustration of the significance of one's views when
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making curriculum content choices, through the question of the role or
place of geometry in the school curriculum. The third deals with an
aspect of teacher-pupil interaction, namely 'discussion', and identifies
different approaches to what it might mean, from different theoretical
perspectives. The fourth situation looks at an element of school
mathematics considered to be most important, investigations, and the
possible pitfalls if one is unaware of the significance of
investigations. These four situations are not intended to be exhaustive
of all mathematics teaching, but are four of the broad types of issues
that are faced in mathematics education.
4.3.1	 A Fraction Problem
In an unpublished paper, Alan Bishop (1Q77) reports on a lesson he gave
to pupils familiar with fractions, but not experienced in combining
them. He asked the class for a fraction between 1/2 and 3/4. A pupil
answered "2/3", and when asked to give his reasoning, the pupil replied
that 2 (the numerator) is between 1 and 3, and 3 (the denominator) is
between 2 and 4. At this stage it may be seen that the teacher has two
choices. The first includes such options as saying that the method is
wrong, although that particular answer is right; pointing out that
another example such as 1/2 and 1/3 will not yield to that method;
asking the class if anyone has a better way of solving the problem;
asking the class for a counter-example; noting that the particular
method works for that particular sort of example, but that there is a
much better method that works for all examples, etc.
All these are one choice, namely that there is a particular method, or
there are particular methods, for solving that problem, that the teacher
knows the correct method or methods, and that the pupil's role is to
either arrive at that method, or to wait long enough so that the teacher
will show the class how to solve the problem.
The second choice open to the teacher is, firstly, to perhaps express
inner surprise that the answer is correct although the method was
unexpected; second, to make the class check that the answer is correct,
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and to congratulate the pupil; thirdly, to encourage the class to look
for other examples and to use the method to solve them, until counter-
examples appear, or in this case instances that do not appear to yield
to the suggested method, to attempt to extend. the method, adapt it,
alter it, or if necessary reject it. It happens that in the example
given here, the method can be extended, with a collection of rules to
cover the different sorts of possible questions that may arise.
In this choice, the teacher is aiding the class to do mathematics, to
make and test hypotheses, generalise and so on. By receiving credit for
the novel suggestion the class gain the impression that mathematics is
something they can do, and not that they have to wait to be shown the
given, fixed, correct methods by the teacher. The teacher's question is
a genuine one, in the sense that answers are treated as valid by the
teacher, it is not a matter of guessing what answer is in the teacher's
mind. It can be seen how this exchange between teacher and pupils
reflects the process of the growth of mathematical knowledge according
to the view described as Lakatosian (Lakatos 1978):
"The basic rule... is to search for bold, imaginative hypotheses
with high explanatory and 'heuristic' power, indeed, it advocates a
proliferation of alternative hypotheses to be weeded out by severe
criticism..."	 (Page 29)
4.3.2 The Debate over Geometry in the School Curriculum
The place of geometry in the school mathematics curriculum remains a
subject of much discussion (e.g. Zeitler 1983, Fielker 1983. Tahta 1980,
Gattegno 1980, Hilton 1984). The term 'Euclidean' has been used in this
thesis to describe those philosophies which aim at the Euclidisation of
all of mathematics, i.e. which aim to eliminate all contradictions and
other problems in the foundations of mathematics by basing mathematical
knowledge on axioms which are intuitively obvious, or at least
consistent, and by using methods of deductions that avoid such
difficulties. Euclidean geometry provides the model because of its
apparent structure of truth flowing downwards from intuitively obvious
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axio, and definitions. Clearly then, geometry itself is a revealing
area of discussion for school mathematics, in relation to views of the
nature of mathematics. One is forced to consider the nature of proof,
its role in mathematics in general, and its place in school mathematics.
One confronts in a very direct way the problem of stages of development
of children's intellectual growth , and when for example, they might be
able to be expected to understand the significance of proof. Different
examination syllabuses place emphasis on different approaches to
geontry, namely the traditional Euclidean approach or through
transformation geometry. The choice made by the teacher as to what is
taught and how, will depend significantly, it is proposed here, upon the
view held of mathematics, and the role of geometry in the teaching of
mathematics.
The school which is the subject of the first-stage study described in
Section 3 is a case in point. The Head of Department did not like
matrices and transformations and hence chose an '0' level syllabus that
treated geometry in a traditional Euclidean way.
In the literature, opinions vary between, e.g. the views of Jean
Dieudonne (in Howson 1981):
"And if the whole programme I have in mind had to be summarised in
one slogan it would be: Euclid must go!u	 (Page 102)
"With regard to geometry, I understand that much research and
experimentation has been going on... concerning the methods by which
this teaching of geometry as a part of physics, so to speak, can be
conducted. I think this development should be highly encouraged,
provided it puts the emphasis not on such artificial playthings as
triangles, but on basic notions as symmetries, translations,
compositions of transformations, etc. 	 (Page 104)
to those of David Fielker (1983):
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"Early ideas about number are based on spatial experiences. Our
models for number, for operations, for place value, for algorithms
and for extensions to fractions, decimals and integers are
invariably visual and therefore spatial. Even some of our algebraic
ideas are based on diagrams. And most work in 'modern' algebra
relies on diagrams or on relations and transformations in space.
Even notation is geometrical!
So geometry is perhaps more basic than arithmetic or algebra. It is
also much easier. At least, concepts about space are easy."
(Page 26)
On the basis of these extracts, It would appear that David Fielker's
interest in geometry in the school mathematics curriculum is because of
the power and extent of the intuitive ideas in geometry. Dieudonne's
concern appears to be a strong formalism, in which intuitively powerful
but logically problematic objects such as triangles are to be rejected
in favour of notions such as symmetry which are structure-based.
It may be seen that there is a strong similarity rather than difference,
between the traditional Euclidean school geometry and the Ehrlangen
programme-based ideas proposed by Dieudonne, i.e. that geometry
characterises mathematical knowledge, and the argument is down to a
platonic programme or a formalist one. David Fielker's view, however,
is quite different. He sees the immediacy of the concepts of geometry
for children, and the wide use of spatial notions provides many
meaningful points of contact for pupils, in enabling them to pick up and
play with mathematical ideas and methods. The terms chosen are intended
to reinforce this view of the power of geometry for school mathematics
because this is quite literally what one can do with 'artificial
playthings' such as triangles. These two views are quite different in
the way that they treat the role of parts of mathematical knowledge in
relation to school mathematics, and can be seen, it is proposed, to
reflect the alternative view of the nature of mathematics.
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4.3.3	 Discussion in the Mathematics Classroom
Some considerable interest has been shown in the meaning and
significance of one part of paragraph 243 in particular, in the
Cockcroft Report (1982):
"Mathematics teaching at all levels should include opportunities
for... discussion between teacher and pupils and between pupils
themselves."	 (Page 71)
This interest includes a publication by the Association of Teachers of
Mathematics (ATM 1984), and a number of sessions of the British Society
for the Psychology of Learning Mathematics, in 1984.
'Discussion' is defined in the Pocket Oxford Dictionary, Fifth Edition,
as "Exchange or compare opinions upon (subject)". Whilst no teacher
would be likely to disagree on the need for verbal interchange in the
mathematics classroom, for a discussion to take place implies that more
than one person in the classroom has a valid opinion on the subject, and
that an exchange or comparison of opinions can take place. Again, most,
or at least some, teachers would agree that discussion can and should
take place between pupils, but to recognise that discussion can also
take place between teachers and pupils is another matter.
If the prevailing view is that the teacher has the knowledge, and it is
the role of the pupils to glean that knowledge, 'discussion' as defined
above does not describe what takes place in the mathematics classroom.
Pupils do not have views or opinions about mathematical knowledge, nor
in fact does the teacher. There is mathematical knowledge, the teacher
possesses that knowledge, and his/her job is to convey it to the pupils.
If, however one recognises the nature of pupils' novel ideas, as
described in 4.3.1 concerning finding a fraction between two others, and
in many other instances in the literature (e.g. Duckworth 1972), there
is real discussion taking place in the classroom, examination of pupils'
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ideas on an equal footing, pupil with teacher, and negotiation of
meaning between the participants in that lesson.
It is not clear if the members of the Cockcroft Committee were aware of
the implications of that clause in paragraph 243 that refers to the need
for discussion to take place in the classroom, but it is suggested here
that it serves as another illustration of the significance of an adopted
epistemology for the strategies and criteria used in mathematics
education.
4.3.4	 Attitudes to Investigations
Problem-solving has been described as the focus for mathematics
education in the 1980's by the National Council for Teachers of
Mathematics in the USA. The journals of mathematics education are
indeed full of articles describing classroom experiences of
investigations, or ideas from departments of education. Hersh has
indicated (1979 page 33), that unless one tackles the philosophical
assumptions underlying teachers' attitudes, changes in the curriculum do
no more than shore up the breaches. The result of attempting to
introduce investigations into the curriculum of teacher education, or
into mathematics departments in schools, without a full perspective of
the implications. is often met with resistance, or attempts in the
classroom that do not succeed.	 Two instances of this are described
here.
I observed a lesson given by an experienced teacher, with an able class
of 15 year-olds, in which the teacher, under instructions from the Head
of Department, was to do an investigation. He chose an investigation
described in a journal (Corps 1983), and prepared the mathematical
background and implications of the problem in great detail before the
lesson, and presented the class with the problem at the start. He then
proceeded to wander around the class giving guidance, in the form of
u carry on that way and you'll get the right answer u or u There is an
answer, I assure you, it's here on this piece of paper" or "Nc, not that
way, try thisN , until after about 15 minutes one pupil asked, as if for
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the whole class, for the teacher to tell the method and answer. The
teacher resisted, and managed to encourage the class to continue on for
themselves, but at the end of the lesson, the teacher expressed to me
his doubts about the value of the exercise, whether anything different
or lasting had taken place in that lesson, and whether perhaps it was
better to just get on with the usual mathematics. It was clear that he
had not been given any guidance on why a class should do investigations
at all, or what the pupils and he would gain out of it. In a different
situation this could have been a useful opportunity for a mathematics
department to discuss the implications of the exercise, and learn from
it.
A similar pupil reaction is recorded in the editorial of the first
edition of the magazine 'Investigations" (Smile 1984):
"More and more teachers are wanting to start using investigations.
But there are problems. Children say... What's the point? ... What
should I do?... What's the answer?... This is silly!... I want to do
proper maths!... This won't help me get a job!" 	 (Page 1)
From the Euclidean view of mathematics, investigations are likely to be
seen as playing at doing mathematics, or as suitable activities for just
before Christmas, or after school examinations in the summer. At best,
solving problems may be seen as good training for answering difficult
examination questions. Open-ended investigations, however, are often
considered too open for pupils to make any recognisable progress, or to
see any results. There is of course the important and difficult area of
how to assess investigations. However, investigations can be seen to
represent an alternative perspective on the learning process and on the
nature of mathematical knowledge. Thus one sees the relevance and
importance of investigative work, and the need to develop methods of
working for the teacher and the pupils.
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4.4	 Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to show the connections between views
of mathematics and ways of teaching, this latter being characterised by
a continuum of teaching behaviour, the ends of which reflect the two
perspectives of the nature of mathematics. In the next chapter some
recent and relevant developments in the psychology of mathematics
education will be examined.
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CHAPTER 5 - SOJE RECENT DEVELOPXEJTS II JIATHEJIATICS LEARNING THEORIES
Research in the psychology of learning mathematics is clearly not some
independent occupation, unrelated to the views and prejudices of the
researcher. An image of human behaviour as mechanistic, or
alternatively as organismic, will determine the hypotheses, methodology
and conclusions of any research on learning. Development of a theory of
mathematics education must be influenced by, and in turn influence,
research on the psychology of mathematics learning.
In this chapter, a recent development in research into the psychology of
learning mathematics will be discussed, namely the constructivist view.
In 5.1 a brief overview of research in the recent decades is given, with
a view to identifying the stimulus for new directions of interest.
Section 5.2 describes the development mentioned above. This view will
be seen to have close links with the philosophical perspective developed
in this thesis.
5.1 An Overview of Research Directions
Mast research in psychological aspects of mathematics education in
recent times has been from a cognitive perspective rather than a
behaviourist one. The emphasis has shifted from the 1950's and before,
when much research focused on applications of behaviour analysis and
reinforcement theory In the classroom. Recent decades have rather
focused on the non-observables of thinking, reasoning etc., exhibiting a
concern with what is to be learnt, with hierarchies of difficulty and
complexity, and with the development of teaching materials and methods
of assessment to best aid the progression of the individual up the
hierarchies of mathematical concepts. The predominance of the cognitive
perspective is described, for example, by Greer (1981):
"Since then cognitive theories have virtually wiped the board.TM
(Page 19)
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The achievements of cognitive psychology have been characterised and
also criticised by Resnick and Ford (1984):
"The old learning psychology had much to say about how to arrange
conditions of learning; but it was weak in its ability to describe
the content of learning. Cognitive psychology, by contrast, offers
rich descriptions of the content and processes of performance in a
subject matter. But up to now it has said almost nothing about how
competence is acquired."	 (Page 244)
Greer too, indicates the limitations on much of research (1951):
"Having achieved predominance, Cognitive Psychology is now
undergoing something of a crisis of confidence."	 (Page 19)
"While there is plenty of current research on mathematical topics...
there is little by way of general theory. Signs of increasing
interest among cognitive psychologists in mathematical thinking can
be detected (though it still looks suspiciously as if they are
motivated more by convenience than by interest in the subject
itself). TM	(Page 20)
Today, several years on from Greer's observations, there is much genuine
interest in mathematical thinking.
Robert Davis (1983) describes this as a paradigm shift:
"An earlier paradigm focussed on teaching and learning whereas the
emerging paradigm focuses on the processes of thinking about
mathematical problems."	 (Page 254)
Elsewhere, Davis (1984) outlines some of the weaknesses of the old
paradigm, and signs of optimism in the new. In doing so, he identifies
the essential starting point for the new directions in psychological
studies of teaching and learning mathematics:
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". . .by omitting the postulation of a theory (or conceptualization)
of human information processing, the 1950's paradigm at:em pted what
has never really succeeded: an empirical science without a
postulated conceptual foundation. TM	(Page 372)
In a review of a recent book by Steffe, von Glasersfeld et al. (1983),
Carpenter describes the difference between the two major research
perspectives (1985):
"Probably the most important approach to the study of children's
thinking is information processing... The basic assumption
underlying information-processing theory is that thinking involves
symbolic manipulation. The goal is to construct precise models of
sequences in which discrete pieces of information are processed for
a particular problem situation. Although the information-processing
approach is used to model complex thinking processes, it is
essentially mechanistic in nature. Steffe and. his associates view
thinking processes from an organismic perspective and describe
thinking in global terms. It is not simply that their analysis is
not as precise as an information-processing analysis; they do not
believe that thinking can be broken down into component parts that
can be specified as a sequence of discrete acts.	 They rely on
constructs like intent and meaning, which are not read:.y analyzed
into information-processing terms." 	 (Page 74)
Carpenter describes the foundation of the differences between the two
approaches as being a philosophical one and suggests that usefulness in
explaining children's thinking may be the criterion for which model to
adopt. 'Usefulness' is, however, a notion that involves making
judgements, an exercise which is involved with values, beliefs and
philosophy. This does not invalidate the idea of comparing the two
approaches using a number of criteria, including usefulness, but merely
identifies the limits of the comparison.
The latter approach, that of the organismic perspective, or
constructivist view, will now be examined in more detail.
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5. 2 Construct ivism
The central theme of the constructivist view has been described by von
Glasersfeld (1974) as:
"A person's representation of the environment, his/her knowledge of
the world, is under all circumstances the result of his/her own
cognitive activity." 	 (Page 22)
Before examining some of the research from this perspective, it is
important, given the nature of this thesis, to trace the origins of
constructivisa in Piaget's own writing.
For Piaget, constructivism describes the process whereby new structures
are formed, and hence forms a central theme of his genetic epistemology.
He summarises his theory, and attempts to demonstrate the failures of
alternative episteniclogies, in the final chapter of his book "The
Principles of Genetic Epistemology" (1972). He states the problem as:
"... does genesis correspond to a hierarchy or even a natural
interdependency of structures; or does it merely describe the
temporal process by which the subject discovers these structures as
pre-existing realities? The latter alternative involves the view
that these structures are preformed: either in the objects of
physical reality, or as a priori in the subject himself, or in the
ideal world of possibility in a Platonic sense. Now, through its
analysis of genesis itself, genetic epistemology has tried to show
the inadequacy of these three hypotheses, and to make a case for the
view that genetic construction in its wider sense is an effectively
constitutive construction." 	 (Pages 88-89)
Starting with the Platonic view, Piaget takes the case of mathematical
knowledge, and the idea that it exists for all time independently of
mathematicians. He writes:
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"Both history and psychogenesis seem to show, first, that the
hypothesis of such a permanent existence... adds nothing to logico-
mathematical knowledge itself and in no way modifies it: and,
second, that the subject does not possess any cognitive procedure
enabling him to arrive at such entities, assuming that they exist;
the only known methods of logico-mathematical knowledge being those
which occur in its construction and are thus self-sufficient."
(Page 89)
As regards the view that structures are preformed in the objects
themselves, Piaget writes:
"Objects certainly exist, and they involve structures which also
exist independently of us. But objects and their regularities are
known to us only in virtue of operational structures which are
applied to them and form the framework of the process of
assimilation which enables us to attain them." 	 (Page 91)
In dealing with the third possibility:
"The a priorist hypothesis, which locates such predetermination
within the subject rather than in objects... It seems genetically
clear that all construction elaborated by the subject presupposes
antecedent conditions." 	 (Page 91)
Piaget gives one or two examples of a priori forms which proved too
strong and were shown to be constructive progressions of more basic
structures. He thus claims:
"So it seems that if we wish to arrive at an authentic a priori, we
must progressively reduce the 'intension' of the initial structures
until what remains qua antecedent necessity is reduced to a simple
functioning. It is from the latter that these structures
originate... Clearly, then, this functional a priorism in no way
excludes but rather lenfis support to the theory of continuous
construction of new structures."	 (Page 91)
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These arguments of Piaget's, putting forward his justification of a
constructivist epistemology are summaries of developed arguments from
elsewhere in his writing. The implications of Piaget's work for
education has been extensively researched, developed and criticized.
Recent research, however, has taken up the consequences of Piaget's
epistemology rather than the details of his description of developmental
stages.
Von Glasersfeld (1983) writes:
"This view of knowledge, clearly, has serious consequences for our
conceptualization of teaching and learning. Above a.l, it will
shift the emphasis from the student's "correct" replication of what
the teacher does, to the student's successful organizaticn of his or
her awa experience."	 (Page 51)
He criticizes a large part of educational research as:
"... setting tasks, recording solutions, and analysing these
solutions as though they resulted from the child's fumbling efforts
to carry out operations that constitute an adult's competence."
(Page 61)
He proposes instead that the 'teaching experiment' in particular, as
developed by Steffe, appears most fruitful for fostering self-awareness
which he suggests Is the key to successful operational constructions.
He examines the method of clinical interviews, and claims that what is
happening is that the researcher is developing a model of the conceptual
organization of experience of the child, but from conceptual elements
that are the researchers, and then trying for a "fit", which he
distinguishes from a "match", with that of the child.
He maintains:
"The teaching experiment, as I suggested before, Is, something more
than the clinical interview. Whereas the clinical interview aims at
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establishing "where the child is", the experiment ai at ways and
means of "getting the child on"... In order to formula:e any such
hypothetical path, let alone implement it, the experimenter/teacher
must not only have a model of the student's present conceptual
structures but also an analytical model 	 of the adult
conceptualizations towards which his guidance is to lead.N
(Page 62)
It is not clear if there is an operative difference between 'fit' and
'match', but this aside, the methods of clinical interview and the
teaching experiment are proving interesting and potentially valuable
research tools, and in this context, viable ways of identifying pupils'
conceptual structures and paths of progression. As mentioned above, von
Glasersfeld refers to Steffe's teaching experiments, and his discussion
of clinical interviews is with reference to the work of Jere Confrey.
Some recently published work of these two will now be described.
5.2.1	 Steffe's 'teaching experiment'
The work of Steffe and his colleagues has been particularly in the area
of young children's counting strategies and methods. It is fully
described in a recent book (Steffe 1983) and reviewed by Carpenter
(1985) as mentioned above.	 In a recent article (Cobb 1983), Cobb and
Steffe describe their approach and method.
They write in the summary of the article:
"The constructivist teaching experiment is used in formulating
explanations of children's mathematical behaviour. Essentially, a
teaching experiment consists of a series of teaching episodes and
individual interviews that covers an extended period of time -
anywhere from 6 weeks to 2 years. The explanations we formulate
consist of models - constellations of theoretical constructs - that
represent our understanding of children's mathematical realities.
However, the models must be distinguished from what might go on in
children's heads.N	 (Page 83)
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They characterise the similarities between constructivist and non-
constructivist teaching experiments as that both are long-term studies,
both are concerned with the change from one state of knowledge to
another and in particular how children do it, and both are generally
working with qualitative data. The difference, they maintain, is their
view that:
"... it is not the adult's interventions per se that Influence
children's constructions, but the children's experiences of these
interventions as interpreted in terms of their own conceptual
structures.	 In other words, the adult cannot cause the child to
have experience qua experience. Further, as the construction of
knowledge is based on experience, the adult cannot cause the child
to construct knowledge. In a very real sense, children determine
not only how but also what mathematics they construct.
Consequently, we do not attempt to study children's construction of
preselected processes in Instructional contexts.	 Instead, we
attempt to understand the constructions children make while
interacting with us."	 (Page 88)
They go on to give an example of some work with a six-year-old boy,
Jason. Their description highlights the essence of their teaching
experiment method, in that they have developed a conceptual model of the
stages of knowledge growth in counting, but their emphasis is on
analysing Jason's conceptual understanding and giving him new tasks to
extend his experience. They then use his progress to further elaborate
their model of counting types. They end with an interesting note that
teachers, when given the researcher's model of counting types, will
construct their own understanding of children's mathematical realities,
and research in how to help teachers is of "critical importance" (Page
93).	 The authors claim also, that their method is consistent with
Lakatos' methodology of scientific research programmes (Page 92).
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5.2.2	 'Clinical Interviews' as used by Jere Confrey
In two recent articles, (1983(a), 1983(b)), Confrey describes some work
done educating mathematics teachers with a view to their re-evaluating
their teaching styles and philosophies, and also a course for young
women in high school who have experienced difficulties with mathematics.
In both, the clinical interview plays a major part in her research on
students' mathematical thinking. Elsewhere (1981(a), 1981(b) pages 128-
129) Confrey describes in detail her perception of the clinical
interview, its value as an educational tool, and proposes directions for
the development of the method.
She describes the usual interpretation of the clinical interview as
(Confrey 1981(b)):
"... task-oriented, flexible interviews between a student and
interviewer wherein the interviewer is expected to follow and pursue
the student's thinking, asking questions until the student's reasons
for response are understandable to the interviewer." 	 (Page 6)
She expresses her dissatisfaction with these aims, and her criticisms
include the need for "dynamic intervention" (page 7), and the need to
"know not only how the student got the answer but also why the answer
was given" (page 8). This latter concern stems from Confrey's view of
the growth of knowledge as influenced by Toulmin, Quine and Lakatos
(pages 9-14).
Her own view of the clinical interview is thus:
"A clinical interview aims to examine students' understandings of
propositional knowledge, concepts, processes and reasons ior
believing in those concepts and processes. It can be based on a
change perspective through which the interviewer attempts to
ascertain what a student believes, why s/he believes, how s/he came
to believe it and what predictions s/he might make as a result of
-91-
those beliefs. Both the interviewee and the intervIewer assume
active roles in the process, with the student for the most part
guiding the inquiry. At times, the interviewer strives to clarify
the meaning of the interviewee's statements, while at other times,
s/he is more interactive, actively hypothesizing about the
implications of the student's responses, posing new questions to
test those hypotheses."	 (Pages 14-15)
5.3 Summary
Without entering into a comparison of the merits of clinical interviews
as against the teaching experiment, it seems clear that research from
the constructivist perspective is proving very valuable in providing
information and Insights of how children construct their knowledge, with
the role of the teacher integrally Involved. Whereas much research on
mathematical thinking is descriptive, and the task of the teacher to
Intervene and assist children's conceptual growth at least unclear, this
approach has the interventions of the researcher built in to the work.
For Steffe and his associates, it is clear that the researcher must be
in the role of teacher (Cobb 1983). SimIlarly, Confrey has emphasised
the need for the researcher to understand "the influence which the
context of classroom instruction has on ... performances" (Confrey
1982, page 27)
In this chapter I have attempted to survey some of the recent
developments in research from a cognitive psychology perspective of
mathematics learning and teaching. The links of these new directions
with the philosophical view outlined in this thesis as the
relativist/Lakatosian position are, I suggest, strong, and the
elaboration of the alternatives of epistemological positions and the
consequences outlined in this thesis provides, I propose, a much needed
philosophical background and context, to this research.
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SECTION 3
A STUDY OF TEACHERS' ATTITUDES
AND VATS OF TELCRIJG
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CHAPTER 6 - THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE STUDY
6.1 Background and Rationale of the Study
In this thesis thus far, I have attempted to establish a strong
resonance in the reader for the position that there is a significant
correspondence between the alternative philosophical views and different
ways of teaching described in Section 2. The two stages of the study
form an attempt to examine some of the consequences of this
correspondence.
Attempts to examine these ideas empirically lead immediately to several
research questions:
(a) Since teachers' views are likely to be 'scarcely coherent', is it
possible to determine their philosophical position in relation to
mathematics?
(b) Is it feasible to identify a tendency towards a particular way 	 of
teaching of any individual teacher?
'Sc? Will any attempt to investigate (a) and (b) result in a clear
correspondence between views and teaching, and if not, will it be
possible to attribute this to any identifiable causes?
Despite these difficulties, it is proposed here that the contribution to
the theory of mathematics education developed in this thesis has direct
implications in mathematics education in general and in what goes on in
the classroom in particular. Consequently it is important to begin to
address these issues, and this is the aim of the study. At the very
least, any such study will indicate some areas where further research is
valuable.
The development of the first stage of the study is discussed in the
remainder of this chapter. In Chapter 7 the results are presented and
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discussed, from which arises the programme for the second stage of the
study. Chapter 8 describes and discusses the results of stage 2.
Thus the questions for this first stage are:
(i)	 can one design an instrument that will examine and identify
teachers' views of the nature of mathematics and mathematics
education?
(ii) can one determine a criterion of 'open' teaching that is observable
in a mathematics lesson, and find a suitable instrument of
classroom observation to focus on that criterion?
(iii)what is the nature of the match between (i) and (ii)?
6.2 Methodology
The methodology adopted for this first stage study is described in
detail below, in sections 6.3 and 6.4, but, in outline, it was as
follows:
(i) It was decided to develop a questionnaire, as the most appropriate
method of examining teachers' views. It was felt that completing a
suitable questionnaire would be less pressured than a direct
interview, considering the difficulty of the area.	 .:h thorough
planning and pilot field work of the questions, and careful analysis
of the responses, the questionnaire could prove a suitable instrument
for this purpose. It was also decided that a short interview with each
teacher, to allow them to comment on the questionnaire. to record
information on the teacher's background, training and experience,
and to establish a personal rapport before observing lessons, would be
appropriate.
(ii) An aspect of teaching method that is at least a necessary component
of 'open' teaching, is the type of questions the teacher asks, the type
of pupil interventions that are encouraged and elicited by the teacher,
and the way he or she responds to novel interventions from pupils. This
was adopted as the focus f or observation. It also decided to adopt one
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of the observation schemes that have been developed, rather than attempt
to devise a new one, at least at the initial stage of the study.
It was decided to carry out a study initially in a single s:hool, with
all the teachers in the mathematics department who were repared to
participate.
6.3 Method of Examination of Teachers' Views
6.3.1 Questionnaire Development
Post, Ward and Wilison (1977) recorded results of a study aimed at
observing differences in views about mathematics teach:rig between
teachers, principals and university faculty. They used a questionnaire,
the Mathematics Inventory for Teachers assembled by Bracht (72), which
was given to teachers to answer directly, and to principals and
university mathematics educators to answer:
H•• 
.as they believed an ideal mathematics teacher would.0 (Page 332)
The results and conclusions are interesting and bear on this study in
one aspect in particular, which will be discussed in more detail in the
review of this first stage study, that of the constraints cn a teacher
by virtue of working within a wider organization.
The use of a questionnaire for the purpose of examining teachers' views
see most appropriate and hence it was decided to develop a
questionnaire for this study. The Bracht questionnaire was considered
not ideally suitable for this study for the following reasons:
(a) the statements appeared to be more relevant to north American
schools,
(b) there was not enough orientation towards determining attitudes to
the nature of mathematics itself,
(C) arising out of the situation in North American schools in the 1970's
the study was partly directed at identifying cognitive as against
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behaviourist objectives in teachers' views. 	 This emphasis is not
considered relevant as a focal point of this study.
It was decided to use a Likert scale, as in the above study, but
modified by the addition of a "no view" option, as in informal pre-
testing of the questionnaire a number of the teachers put no mark rather
than be forced into an opinion. There are clearly advantages and
disadvantages of including this option, and this will be discussed in
the results and conclusions of the first stage study, in Cha p:er 7.
Thus, a questionnaire consisting of 35 statements was developed, and
refined through informal testing and discussion with individual
teachers, colleagues and supervisors. Initially, a group of constructs
of aspects of secondary mathematics education was drawn up. under the
headings of mathematics education, and mathematics, that involved
teachers making principle decisions, either overtly or otherwise, about
their teaching views and about mathematics. These constructs are set
out in table 6.3.1(a)
Some of the statements designed to examine these constructs proved to
contain more than one idea that required comment. For example, the
first draft of the questionnaire contained a statement relating to
syllabus content, as follows:
"Public examination syllabus, style etc. should be decided by
experts not actively involved with teaching, e.g. mathematics
professors, mathematicians in industry etc., but with consultation
with teachers."
Clearly statements like these required considerable revision, in order
that they would be unambiguous, and that one could estimate likely
teacher responses.
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Table 6.3.1(a) Questionnaire Constructs
(a) mathematics education:
I	 who determines syllabus content
ii	 active/passive learning, creative/non-creative learning
iii aims of mathematics teaching
iv the esoteric nature of mathematical knowledge
v	 purpose in learning mathematics
vi attitudes to discovery learning at secondary level
vii alternative models - acquiring skills to be appl:ed later
- developing ways of thought appropriate
to all mathematical work
viii attitudes to open-ended questions, investigations etc.
ix problem-solving skills
(b) mathematics:
i	 role of proof in mathematics
ii the certainty or otherwise of mathematical knowledge
It was also decided to mix the statements, rather than keeping together
things that related to the same construct. For example, in dealing with
(a) ii, whether learning Is seen as an active process on the part of the
learner, or a passive one, a creative one or otherwise, five statements
were to be used:
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"5. Learning mathematics in school is essentially an active process.
6. Learning mathematics in school is mainly a passive process.
7. Creative work in mathematics only takes place at the frontiers of
mathematical knowledge.
8. Creative work in mathematics takes place in all learning.
9. Expecting pupils to be creative in mathematics is unreasonable
and doesn't warrant use of precious lesson time."
It became clear that this arrangement encouraged people to make a choice
between alternatives, whereas they might wish to answer "agree" to more
than one statement relating to a particular aspect of mathematics
teaching, e.g. 5 and 6 above.
The third change was in deciding to ask teachers filling in the
questionnaire to make an ordering of importance of aims of mathematics
education, rather than further agree/disagree marks. It seemed more
appropriate to reveal teachers' views by asking which aim was a priority
and which least important. Otherwise it was highly likely that all
teachers would agree with all the aims, even though some they considered
less important than others.
Based on the arguments of this thesis, a method of assessment of answers
to the questionnaire was developed. Answers were to be given a
numerical value according to their correspondence to the ends of the
continuum described in Chapter 4. The scale of marking is from 1 to 4,
with 2o assigned to "no view" statements. Possible criticisms of the
designation procedure are discussed in Chapter 7. Some statements were
not assigned numerical values In this first stage study. This was
because they appeared to be not sufficiently discriminating, but were
retained for completeness. The examination of all the items for their
discriminatory facility was developed in the second-stage study. The
items not assigned marks in the final questionnaire were items
1,2,8,16,20.	 As a result, the range of marks was from 30 to 120,
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although it was recognised that in practice few teachers conmit
themselves to "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" very often,
perhaps due in part to an awareness or self-consciousfless of a
university-based researcher asking the questions. Hence in practice the
expected range is closer to 60 to 90.
Table 6.3.1(b) is a breakdown of the items of the final version of the
questionnaire, into the two alternative views, called here 'absolutist'
and 'fallibilist', assuming an "agree" response was given:
Table 6.3.1(b) Items as 'Fallibilist' and 'Absolutist'
Fallibilist	 Absolutist
Section (a)	 2,7,10,11,12,14,15,23	 4,5,6,8,9,lô,18,19,21,
24
Section (b)	 31,33,34	 29,30,32,35
Table 6.3.1(c) is a breakdown of the items according to the constructs.
The ordered pairs after each construct indicate the number on the first
draft of the questionnaire as the first term of the pair, and the item
number on the final draft as the second term of the ordered pair. Where
a blank occurs, the final item does not correspond to any item on the
first draft.
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Table §.3.1c) Items by Constructs
Ims
(a) Mathematics Education
1	 who determines syllabus content 	 (1,1) (2,7) (3,13) (4,16)




iii aims of mathematics teaching 	 (10,25) (11,26) (12,27)
(13,28)
(14,3)iv esoteric nature of mathematical
knowledge
v	 purpose in learning mathematics





vii alternative models - acquiring skills (20,5)
- developing ways (21,11)
of thought





I	 role of proof in mathematics	 (30,29) (31,33)
ii	 the certainty or otherwise of	 (32,30) (33,31) (35,32)
mathematical knowledge	 (36,34) (34,35)
Note: Each ordered pair represents, as the first term, the number of
the item in the first draft, and as the second term the number of the
item in the final questionnaire.
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The first draft of the questionnaire, the final farm of the
questionnaire as used in the two stages of the study, with the columns
for teacher responses, and also the marking scheme, form Appendix A.
The items as they appear in the final form are listed in table 6.3.1(d).
Table 6.3.1(d) The Final Questionnaire
Section 1 - Mathematics Education
1) The examination syllabus largely determines the school syllabus.
2) Learning mathematics is esentially an active process.
3) It is a consequence of the nature of mathematics itself, that pupils
will more often wonder about the purpose of a topic in mathematics than
in, say, geography.
4) Discovery methods of learning mathematics are relevant for the
earliest concepts only, e.g. addition, volume etc.
5) School mathematics can be seen to provide the basic skills and
techniques of mathematics, to be extended into applicable mathematics in
work or college situations.
6) The major value of teaching problem solving skills is to enable
pupils to tackle unusual exam questions.
7) The examination syllabus should not be the main factor in determining
the school syllabus.
8) Learning mathematics in school is mainly a passive process.
9) Creative work in mathematics only takes place at the frontiers of
mathematical knowledge.
10) Discovery methods would be useful for older pupils f time and
syllabus permitted.
iLi The process of doing mathematics in school can be seen to be a model
of all mathematical experiences: industry, research, daily life etc.
12) Creative work in mathematics takes place in all learning.
13 Teachers should be able to influence public examination boards in
the style of examination, syllabus content etc.
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14) Discovery learning of mathematics is relevant for all stages of
school mathematics.
l5 The development of problem-solving skills in pupils should be seen
as an essential part of school mathematics.
16) Public examination syllabus, style, etc. should be decided by
experts.
17) Expecting pupils to be creative in mathematics is unreasonable and
doesn't warrant use of precious lesson time.
If an intelligent pupil were to ask the purpose of a topic in
mathematics, I would answer:
18) Mathematics can be seen to be, like chess, a game with rules that
have to be learnt.
19) The applications of mathematics follow once mathematical knowledge
is acquired.
20) Mathematics is training you to be logical.
21) This topic is on the syllabus, so you can rely on its importance.
In the following statements, the term 'open' is used to describe
questions such as "how could we add 1/2 and 1/3" to pupils who have not
learnt the algorithm, since the question could be answered in many ways.
22) Asking open questions is essentially just a useful device in
teaching.
23) Asking open questions is vitally Important as It gives pupils the
opportunity for creative thought.
24) There are no open questions since both teacher and pupils know that
there is always only one correct way to solve any problem.
Please give an order, 1 to 4, to the following aims:
25) My main aim is to try to enable every pupil to leave school with
some public examination success in mathematics, GCE, CSE etc.
26) My main aim is to try to enable every pupil to become a
mathematician to their level of ability, i.e. to be able to think
mathematically where applicable.
27) My main aim is that school mathematics should be seen by pupils (and
parents, employers, etc.) to be relevant and applicable to the real
war 1 d.
28) My main aim is to enable pupils to appreciate and enjoy mathematics
for its own sake.
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SecUon 2 - Mathematics
29) Once a mathematical structure has been developed, and a theorem
formulated, its proof is a technical detail, although it may be years
till its discovery.
30) Mathematical truths are not susceptible to revolutionary change in
the way that scientific truths are, e.g. relativity.
31) Mathematical knowledge is close to scientific knowledge in the sense
that conclusions are tested for their truth.
32) Mathematical truths have an inevitability about them. A world with
different mathematical truths is inconceivable.
33) The generation of a proof is a highly creative part of mathematics
since it can lead to new structures, reformulated hypotheses, etc.
34) Mathematical knowledge is hypothetical and potentially subject to
refutation or adaptation.
35) Mathematics is essentially hierarchical and cumulative. Although
progress does go on making earlier work more rigorous, generally new
knowledge builds on former work.
6.3.2 Validation of Marking Scheme
The marking scheme was tested in two ways:
(a) For corroboration of the numerical values and their place in the
continuum, the questionnaire was given to a teacher who had not been
involved at all in the development of the questionnaire, but whose
views were assessed to be close to the 'open' end of the continuum. He
was asked to answer in that vein, and he scored close to the
maximum, a high degree of corroboration.
(b) For further corroboration and also to test for the questionnaire's
ability to distinguish between teachers' views, rather than ist
gaining a similar mark, the questionnaire was given to six teachers
in the school in which the above-mentioned teacher was Head of
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Department.	 He was asked to order the teachers accord:ng to the
continuum, and his knowledge of the teachers, arid this ordering was
comnared to their marks on the questionnaire. The results are 	 given
in table 6.3.2.
Table 6.3.2 Correspondence of Marks & H.O.D.'s Predictions














As a result of these pilot tests, the questionnaire was adopted as an
instrument for the purposes of the study. Further weaknesses, if any,
would be revealed In the analysis of the results of the questionnaire
from the teachers in the main study, and In conversations with the
teachers in that school.
The questionnaire was given out to the teachers at a short lunchtime
meeting, which was also the first time that there had been any contact
between the researcher and the teachers, although there had been two
discussions with the Head of Department on previous occasions to obtain
agreement from the department to carry out the study. After a brief
introduction, the research was described as being into teachers' views
about teaching mathematics and, through observation, Into different ways
of teaching. The teachers were then asked them to take the
questionnaire In a philosophical frame of mind, i.e. with answers that
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reflected their beliefs about mathematics education, rather than just
the character of the particular school in which they were teaching.
6.3.3 Interview
In order that the mathematical and educational background of the
teachers could be recorded, and in order to establish a rapport with the
teachers in the main study, it was decided to conduct short interviews
with each teacher, after completion and marking of the questionnaire.
This also gave opportunity for some discussion, or at least
clarification, of apparent contradictions in answers. In an attempt to
avoid influencing teachers' views with revelation of the views of the
researcher, it was decided to avoid discussion in the interviews. The
interview was also used as an opportunity to emphasise that no
judgements were being made as to 'good' or 'bad' teaching, only attempts
to identify different ways of teaching.
6.4 Method of Observation of Teaching
Before either choosing an existing observation tool, or developing a new
one, it was clearly necessary to determine some focus of attention in
pupil/teacher interaction, and a suitable classroom context, which in
some fairly reliable way revealed something of different approaches to
teaching, again on the hypothesised continuum of teaching outlined in
Chapter 4. This necessarily meant making some choices, with the
inevitable restrictions and drawbacks this implied.
As a classroom context, it was decided to choose a situation where most,
if not all lessons were taught by a class teacher dealing with the whole
class. The major reason for this choice is that observing lessons where
the emphasis is on individualized learning is very problematic, from the
point of view of analysing the kinds of teacher/pupil interaction. It
involves following the teacher around and listening in to individual
conversations in an intrusive way, or setting up a video system and
recording lessons.
	 It was	 felt that the less intrusions into the
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classroom the better, as far as attempting to identify different ways of
teaching is concerned.
The classroom incident discussed In 4.3.1 in which the two alternative
teacher strategies in response to the unexpected pupil reply to the
question of finding a fraction between two others, led to the idea that
teachers' reactions to pupils' answers, and in particular to novel or
challenging ones, and also teacher willingness to stimulate and
encourage independent thought, are at least necessary indicators of an
'open' way of teaching, if not sufficient. Hence it was decided to
focus on the occurence or otherwise of these interactions,
It has to be recognised that observations of these aspects of classroom
activity involves relatively high inference judgements, with the
consequent limitations of the impossibility of replaying or verifying
the subjective Judgements of the observer. Neverthless, as a first
approach at researching these issues, it was decided to proceed with
this focus of attention for the study.
There are clearly restricting implications of the choice of classroom
context and focus of attention for observation. A school that has not
chosen an individualized programme of mathematics Is making a particular
statement, possibly, about its view of mathematics educa:ion. Also
there are connections between the two aspects of the particular focus of
attention, in that a teacher who regularly stimulates a class with
challenging open-ended questions is quite likely to get, and to be able
to deal with, novel pupil reactions. Nevertheless, it was assumed, for
the purposes of this study, that a school with a sizeable mathematics
department, would contain teachers with a cross-section of beliefs, and
also a variety of approaches to ways of teaching. The validity of this
assumption will be discussed in Chapter 7, with the results of the
study.
An alternative approach to Investigating teachers' views and their ways
of teaching is the case study method, as described above in Section 3.3
in work being carried out in the USA. The emphasis in those programmes
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as in the present one, is on qualitative information, but the major
difference is that this study results out of an attempt to examine
thoroughly and completely the alternatives of approaches to the nature
of mathematics, and the nature of the possible connections with teacher
actions. Consequently it seems appropriate at this stage to take a
whole department in a school and look at the variations in views and
ways of teaching at some depth rather than a small number in great
depth. Again, this aspect will be discussed in Chapter 7.
The observation tool to be used would need to reveal the aspects of
classroom interactions discussd above. The options appeared to be the
Systematic Classroom Analysis Notation programme, SCAN, developed at
Nottingham University (Beeby 1979), or the Interaction Analysis
Drogramme of the Five State Project used in the USA in the 1960's (Five
State Project 1963). The SCAN programme is a well-developed,
sophisticated and complex one that provides the observer with
considerable information of the classroom interactions. The particular
information relating to the focus of attention of this study would then
need to be extracted. The latter programme is much less complex, and
the researcher is immediately involved with decisions as to the type of
teacher talk or pupil talk that is taking place. For this reason it was
decided to use the Interaction Analysis at the initial stage of the
study, and if the results of the whole study were such as to suggest
further work using this approach, it might be appropriate to use SCAN
for the greater amount of information it would provide surrounding the
specific focus of attention.
The instrument, reproduced as Appendix B, is based on Flanders work
(Flanders 1962). It uses 10 categories of behaviour, 1 to 6 fr the
teacher, 7 to 9 for pupils, and 0 for general chaos, organization or
silent work.
Teacher categories 3 and 4 are described respectively as:
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"Confronting, seeking: remarks, usually questions, which invite
extensive participation: classifying information, a series of steps,
a single step requiring selection and organization of material."
and
"Soft or hard challenging, jolting: remarks absurd, controversial or
questions of comprehensive nature or completely undirected to invite
significant participation: in noting relationships, application, in
making grand leaps in system development."
Consequently, tally marks, the method of recording incidents, in these
categories are the centre of interest of the study as far as teacher
talk is concerned. These are taken every 3 seconds.
The pupil categories 8 and 9 are similarly revealing, being:
"Independent, active: remarks by student either as invited and
iving	 re than one step ahead, or a single powerful step, or
without invitation, to raise a question and being willing to treat
it himself."
and
"Curious, creative: remarks by student in which present topic
related to other areas of mathematics or to applied fields, to ncre
fundamental concepts, or to a wider family of topics. A fresh topic
related to present topic."
The tally marks, which are taken every three seconds, are ordered pairs
of numbers identifying the categories describing the classroom
interactions are recorded in the lesson, and afterwards transferred onto
& 10 by 10 matrix. The style of lesson is immediately obvious, in that
markings in categories 3,4,8 and 9 can be seen in contrast to the
markings in other categories.
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Skill in using the tool was developed on video recordings of mathematics
lessons.
6.5 School Selected
A school was chosen for the study, which commenced in January 1984, with
the usual confidentiality assured and agreed at the beginning. The
mathematics department consisted of 7 full-time mathematics teachers,
one teacher who was full-time in the school but gave half-time to the
mathematics department, and 4 part-time teachers, The mathematics
course used is geared to an '0' level specific to that school, and
described by the Head of Department as a mixture of modern and
traditional mathematics.	 None of the teachers was known to the
researcher.
Each teacher was aked to provide up to three classes for observation,
and which the teacher felt comfortable teaching, since discipline
problems would be an interference to the observation aims. Also, the
individual approach to teaching would be revealed more easily in
situations in which the teacher felt more relaxed, rather than under
stress to maintain control. This inevitably would affect the results,
perhaps mostly in the sense that teachers might feel more ab.e to invite
and cope with challenging and stimulating interactions in c.asses where
control is not a problem. This will be considered further with the
results of the study.
Five lessons of each class were to be observed 1
 In order to build up a
picture of ways of teaching which balanced out over time in lessons for
quiet work, revision, going over homework, etc.
Nine teachers agreed to participate in the study, a total of 16 classes
were observed, and 80 lessons in all.
The results of the study, and a discussion of the method used, the
research tools, possible explanations of the results etc. follow in
Chapter 7.
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CHAPTER 7 - RESULTS OF THE STUDY
The results of this first stage study are presented here in Section 7.1.
First, two tables are presented, the first summarising details of the
teachers in the study, and the second showing the questionnaire results
within the constructs as outlined in Table 6.3.1(a). This is followed
by a short profile resulting largely from the brief interview, the
questionnaire results, and specific comments from the observation
instrument, with respect to each of the nine individual teachers,
assigned letters A to I, will be presented, in sections 7.1.1 to 7.1.9,
whilst the full mark sheet of the questionnaire, and the tally sheets
from the classroom observations, form Appendix C.
A full analysis of the implications of the results will follow in
Section 7.2.
7.1	 Results
The categories of Interaction Analysis that form the focus of the
classroom observation are:
"Teacher Categories:
3. Confronting. seeking: remarks, usually questions, which invite
extensive participation: classifying information, a series of steps, a
single step requiring selection and organization of material.
4. Soft or hard challenging. lolting: remarks absurd, controversial or
questions of comprehensive nature or completely undirected to invite
significant participation: in noting relationships, application, in
making grand leaps in system development.
Pupil Categories:
8. Independent, active: remarks by student either as invited and moving
more than one step ahead, or by a single powerful step, or without
invitation to raise a question and being willing to treat it himself.
9. Curious. creative: remarks by student in which present topic related
to other areas of mathematics or to applied fields, to more fundamental
concepts, or to a wider family of topics. A fresh topic related to
present topic.
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Table 7.1(a) The Teachers
Teacher Age Years of Experience Training Questionnaire 	 . of DII f.
Teaching Mathematics	 Mark	 Classes Cbs.
A	 34	 13(inc. 6 as H.O.D.) BSc Maths	 86½	 2
PGCE
B	 42	 1	 BSc Science	 77½	 3
PGCE
C	 46 4 full, 6 part-time MA Maths 	 83½	 1
PGCE
D	 27	 5	 BScMaths	 77	 2
PGCE
E	 36	 4 part-time	 BSc Maths	 65	 1
F	 28	 6	 BSc Maths	 82½	 1
PGCE
G	 50	 3 part-time	 BSc Sociology 73	 1
H	 38	 3	 BSc Metallurgy 85½	 3
PGCE (primary)
I	 35	 2	 BSc ChemIstry 79½	 2
PGCE
Note: Teacher G had taught sociology full-time for several years. and
was now teaching that part-time. Teacher H had taught in primary
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A few remarks only will be made in relation to the breakdown of teacher
scores within constructs. In other circumstances, it is proposed, a
full analysis of this table could be carried out. However, there are a
number of aspects that limit the value of this exercise at this stage,
with these particular results:
(a) if one is going to carry out this exercise, it is perhaps more
appropriate to first examine the character of the items in the
questionnaire for their ability to serve the purpose required, before
the above analysis, since if a number of items are not in the most
suitable form, the detailed analysis would be invalid. This examination
of the items would require a larger sample than the group of teachers
here, and forms one of the possibilities for the second-stage study.
(b) the intention at this stage is to gain an overall picture of the
views of teachers, particularly in some sort of ordering, rather than a
detailed determination of views.
Some of the constructs have a number of items relating to them, whilst
others have only one or two. Clearly these former will thus contribute
a large amount to the overall score. It might be desirable to balance
out this difference, but there is a danger of the size of the
questionnaire becoming too unwieldy. There is however only a weak match
between the ranking of the overall scores and a ranking of any of the
large contributors of marks. These are (b)ii with five items, (a)ii and
iii with four items each, and (a) v, vi and viii with three items each.
This may be due to what Thom termed teachers' 'scarcely coherent'
philosophy of mathematics (Thom 1973 page 204). It might equally be due
other factors, such as the teachers completing the questionnaire in a
short space of time, under some pressure etc. Similarly, there is oniy
a weak match between the ranking of the two separate sections of
constructs, (a) and (b). Indeed, in one case, teacher F actually scores
highest in section (a) and lowest in section (b).
These results might indicate a need for further work on the
questionnaire, and this Is discussed at the end of this chapter.
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7.1.1 Teacher A
Teacher A, the Head of Department, was a mathematics graduate, had taken
a Postgraduate Certificate in Education, and had taught for 13 years,
including six at this school as Head of Department.
He considered himself a traditionalist with regard to mathematics,
choosing for example an '0' level syllabus that treated geometry in a
"Euclidean manner", as he did "not personally like matrices". He was a
strong disciplinarian with school pupils. He was fairly firm and rigid
with his department (the researcher's observation), setting out syllabus
and targets for each class, choosing textbooks for the department, and
comparing test and examination marks with the same sets in previous
years. He said that he called meetings of the mathematics department
staff when necessary, which he said generally meant when there was
administration to be dealt with. In brief talks with the headmaster, it
was clear that Teacher A had full support in his approach from the
headmaster, who on a number of occasions emphasised the success of the
department. The school overall had good examination results in
mathematics and generally in other subjects, compared to other secondary
schools in the area, and is considered by local parents to be one of the
st popular, and 'best' schools in the area.
With regard to the questionnaire, Teacher A said he recognised "certain
standard items which demanded standard answers" but that he had "tried
to answer honestly".
The teacher offered two classes to be observed, a top stream set in the
fourth year, preparing for an early '0' level at the end of the fourth
year, and a bottom set in the fifth year.
Teacher A scored 86 marks on the questionnaire, the highest total of
all the teachers in the study. The answers exhibited a number of
contradictory views, for example he agreed with item 29 regarding proo.ts
in mathematics as technical details once a theorem has been formulated,
and also agreeing with item 33 regarding proofs as a highly creative
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part of mathematics.	 He agreed with both constructs of alternative
deis for learning mathematics, as acquiring skills to be applied later
and as developing ways of thought appropriate to all mathematical work.
In the interview, when asked if he wanted to discuss the answers given
to the questionnaire, he declined.
As regards the lesson observations, in the Fourth Year set, on only two
occasions throughout the lessons observed did the teacher ask a question
other than a category 2 question. These were both of category 3, and
neither were responded to by pupils at other than category 7. There is
a concentration on the 'lecturing' element of the tally sheet matrix,
(5,5) and a heavy concentration on the sequences (1,2) 2,7) (7,1),
which represents a cycle of: recognition of pupil response, onto a
simple question, receiving a simple reply, and acknowledging that reply.
The only other elements with a large number of entries are those that
transfer to or from the lecturing element.
In the Fifth Year set, the teacher avoided almost all talk, choosing to
lecture briefly, (5,5), ask only one or two simple questions, and then
set class work, with little or no summary talk at the end. It seems
likely that this pattern was adopted because of potential behaviour
problems, although in all the lessons observed the teacher clearly had
the class completely under his control. There were no entries in the
matrix for category 3 or 4 questions or 8 or 9 pupil responses.
General comments about the match or otherwise between teachers' results
on the questionnaire and their ways of teaching will be made below, but
it is perhaps significant in this particular instance to note that the
teacher's comment on standard questions may have been part of the
cause of his mark being the highest of all the teachers in the sample.
Certainly his teaching did not match his responses to some of items on




Teacher B was a mature man in his probationary year of teaching. He had
originally taken a combined honours degree in Physics and Chemistry, and
then worked for many years as a maintenance engineer in industry. He
had decided to change career to teaching, and had taken a full-time
Postgraduate Certificate in Education in secondary mathematics. He
emphasised in his interview that because of his own work experiences, he
wanted "pupils to be able to use their mathematics", and as such his
main concern was "to try to make" his "pupils understand mathematics,
with the emphasis on understanding".
He offered three classes for observation, two first year classes, one in
the top ability band and the other in the bottom ability band, and a
second year bottom ability set.
Teacher B scored 77½ on the questionnaire.	 At the end of the
questionnaire, he wrote:
"In my view very few pupils are natural mathematicians therefore it
is essential to provide more links between allied scientific
subjects and real life situations. This is particularly relevant to
less able pupils."
In the interview, his only further comment on the questionnaire was that
he had found section 2 "very difficult". This is reflected in his "no
view" response to 3 of the seven questions. Surprisingly perhaps, given
his expressed opinion, he had a "no view" response to item 5, which
suggests that school mathematics provides the skills to be applied
later, and a "disagree" response to the other related item, no. 11, that
school mathematics is a model of all mathematical work.
As may be seen from the tally sheets, in his two bottom band sets, he
did not ask questions of any category other than 2, nor did he receive
any pupil reponses at any category other than 7. With the first year
bottom set there was a considerable amount of teacher and teacher/pupil
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talk, of either lecturing (5,5) or short questions and answers (1,2)
(2,7) and (7,1). In his first year top band set, ne asked 3 questions
of category 3, but received replies from the class at category 7. There
was a considerable amount of teacher talk and teacher/pupil talk, as
with the other set, and in the same manner. The second year bottom set
spent most of the lesson working alone, there was much less teacher
talk, due probably to fear of indiscipline. In the interview, the
teacher had commented that he allows "quite a high level of noise" in
his lessons, so long as there is work going on.
7.1.3 Teacher C
Teacher C read mathematics at Cambridge, took a postgraduate Certificate
in Education, and then taught for four years at a girls' private school.
She stopped teaching for a number of years, for family reasons, and had
then returned to part-time teaching. She was in her seventh year at
this school.
This teacher offered just one class for observation, a top third year
set, heading for O' level at the end of the fourth year.
Teacher C scored 83 on the questionnaire. She did not wish to comment
further on the questionnaire, in the interview. There are few apparent
contradictions in her answers. The only notable one is in disagreeing
with both itei 9 and 12, the first of which suggests that creative work
only takes place at the frontiers of knowledge, and the second which
states that creative work takes place in all mathematics learning. In
her interview, she commented that she has a very "pure mathematics view
of the subject" due probably to her particular university experience,
and also her private school teaching, she said.
As can be seen from the tally sheet of the class observed, there is a
considerable amount of teacher talk, and teacher/pupil dialogue. Whilst
she often set the class some work, it was for a short time on each
occasion, and they were quickly brought back together. This teacher
asked a number of questions at level 3 and some responses from the
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pupils were at level 8. There were also a large number of simple
questions and answers, as seen again from the concentration of marts in
(1,2) (2,7) and (7,1).
7.1.4 Teacher D
Teacher D had graduated in mathematics, obtained a Postgraduate
Certificate in Education, and was now in her fifth year of teaching, all
at this school.
She offered two classes for observation, the top set in the Fifth Year,
who had all taken '0' level the previous June and were now preparing for
an Alternative Ordinary level in Pure Itathematics, and a Second Year
class, which was fourth set in ability, out of eight sets.
Teacher D scored 77 in her questionnaire. She scored fairly low in the
second section, on mathematics. She also commented in her interview
that she found that section very difficult. This was her only comment
on the questionnaire.	 She was second in the department in
responsibility. In the course of this study, it was revealed that a
number of the teachers felt that they did not have much influence in the
decisions on the mathematics curriculum and the style of teaching in the
department. This teacher said that she would perhaps teach differently
if she had more control over her own teaching. She also said that in
her teaching she liked to ask lots of questions of the pupils, and that
learning often took place best when they were first passive, and then
proceeded by discovery.
In both classes observed, there was a great deal of teacher talk and
teacher/pupil talk. In the Second Year class, there were a small number
of questions of category 3, and some of these were responded to at level
8. In the fifth year set there was just one quest.ion at level 3,
although there were three interventions from pupils at level 8. One of
these was an attempt by a pupil to offer a solution to a new problem, to
which the teacher replied that pupil6 should not attempt questions that
they had never seen before.
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At the end of the observation period, teacher D volunteered the
information that she had been very hesitant at being observed, and that
she had noted that she tended to talk much more than usual as a
consequence of the presence of the researcher.
7.1.5 Teacher E
Teacher E graduated in mathematics, and then worked as a mathematician
in a scientific research establishment for four years. After having a
family, she began part-time teaching, and was now in her fourth year of
this, but her first at the school of the study. She taught Sixth form
and one low ability 1st Year class, this latter she offered for
observation. She was very hesitant in the interview, and not very
enthusiastic about being observed, but said she wanted to participate in
the research.
She scored 65 on the questionnaire, expressing "no view" seven times,
and no "strongly agree" or "strongly disagree" responses at all. In
particular, she had "no view" on 4 of the seven items in the second
section. She had no comments to make on the questionnaire, when
interviewed, except to say that in secondary schools, where there is any
discovery learning, it is guided discovery, which, she said, "is not
quite the same thing".
Her lessons were almost completely taken up with trying to gain control
of her class and she was obviously embarrassed at being observed in
this. Her tally sheet is included here in the Appendix, but cannot be
used for drawing any conclusions about her teaching, for this reason.
7.1.6 Teacher F
Teacher F graduated in mathematics, took a Postgraduate Certificate in
Education, and had been teaching for 6 years full-time. He considered
huielf to be a Pure Mathematician, and as evidence he offered his great
interest in chess and in computing, during his interview.
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He offered just one class for observation, a Third Year class, set 3 of
eight in ability, lie said that he bad some difficulty in controlling
his classes, and this was the reason that he would only offer one class
to be observed. He added that it was not the case that this class was
particularly well-behaved, but he felt that they and he could "handle
being watched, and anyway it will be interesting to see the way they
react".
Teacher F scored 82½ on the questionnaire. He commented in the
interview that he had enjoyed completing the questionnaire, found the
questions stimulating and difficult, and felt that he wanted to discuss
most of them. With the initial policy f or the interview in mind, that
of not revealing the views of the researcher, no opinions were offered,
but he was encouraged to comment as he wished. He said that apart from
agreeing that proofs are a creative non-trivial part of mathematics, he
sees mathematics as a certain body of Indubitable knowledge. However,
in relation to mathematics education, he felt more 'open' in the sense
that pupils have to be involved in the process of learning, themselves.
He saw many tensions and contradictions in his own views. He said that
his main aim for lessons was to get the pupils to practice their
acquired knowledge.He was more prepared to use the "strongly agree" and
"strongly disagree" responses than any other teacher in the group.
As may be seen from his tally sheet, there were no entries in the 3 and
4 columns and rows, nor in the 8 and 9 columns and rows., His lessons
were not unduly noisy or undisciplined. There were a large number of
simple questions and replies, and also quite a lot of 'lecturing'
recordings.
7.1.7 Teacher G
Teacher G graduated In sociology, but over a number of years of teaching
had begun to teach more mathematics, She said that her own mathematical
knowledge resulted only from her own 'A' level passes in separate Pure
and Applied Mathematics. This meant that she felt very insecure in her
teaching of mathematics, and thus nervous of being observed. 	 She
-121-
suggested that through her sociological training she was very aware of
the ethos of the school, which she described as being "traditional", and
also of the framework set within the mathematics department. She added
that she, in particular, due to her limited knowledge of mathematics,
was very influenced by the programme set by the Head of Department. She
also said that she had had no observation of her mathematics lessons
before, which she regretted, but that this made her even more nervous of
the researcher.
She offered just one class for observation, a Second Year, fifth set of
eight.
Teacher G scored 73 on the questionnaire. She wrote, at the end of the
questionnaire:
"I feel the ideas underlying this questionnaire do not come to grips
with the actual day to day classroom situation."
In the interview she explained that she meant that the questions were
clearly theoretical, whereas what actually happened in the classroom was
quite different. She offered answers, rather than "no view", to most of
the second section, and in nearly every case took a fallibiist view of
mathematical knowledge. She did not, however, feel tat learning
mathematics is creative, nor did she feel that discovery learning is
relevant for concepts other than the earliest in mathematics.
Her tally sheet shows an emphasis on 'lecturing' and on simple questions
and answers.	 There was one question recorded at category 3, and no
pupil reponses other than category 7.	 She commented after the
observation that she had tended to talk too much, out of nervousness.
7.1.8 Teacher H
Teacher H graduated in metallurgy. After having a family she took a
Postgraduate Certificate in Education in primary teaching. She taught
mathematics in a preparatory school, and had been in the school of the
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first-stage study for 3 years, with responsibility for comp..tirig. This
was taught at CSE and '0' level in the 6th form only. The remainder of
her time was taken up with teaching mathematics. In the in:erview, she
said that in her view, mathematics was a tool of the sciences, and of
the real world, and that this was her view of teaching.
She offered three sets for observation, a Second Year top set, a Third
Year low ability set, sixth out of eight, and a Fifth Year set 2,
preparing to take '0' level later that year.
Teacher H scored 85 on the questionnaire. She offered "no view" for
all the items relating to aims, numbers 25 to 28. She expia.ned that it
depended entirely on which level of ability one was teaching, and
therefore she could not give a general answer. She said that she
recognised that there were some contradictions in her answers, but said
that this was due in part to her 'tools' view of mathematics, and in
part to her strong religious views as far as truth was concerned.
In her Fifth Year set there was a particularly high concentration of
marks in the lecturing element (5,5), although it is also quite high in
both the other classes. There are also a large number of entries in the
short simple question and answer categories. In the Second Year class
there was one entry In the category 3 and one response in category 8.
In the Fifth Year there were two entries in each of these, but none at
all in the third year class.
7.1.9 Teacher I
Teacher I graduated in Chemistry, worked as a University lIbrarian, and
then taught Chemistry for 8 years, which she stated she found "very good
and very valuable". She took a Postgraduate Certificate in Education in
secondary mathematics, and was now in her second year of teaching at
this school. She stated in the interview that her aim was to keep her
pupils "switched on" in their learning. She considered mathematics as a




7.2.1 Some General Comments
The teachers in the study represented a fairly wide range of backgrounds
and preparation for the teaching of mathematics, including graduates of
mathematics, sociology, physics, chemistry and metallurgy. Xst but not
all had completed a Postgraduate Certificate in Education in Secondary
Mathematics. Some had come straight into teaching after university,
others had been in industry or other employment before teaching. There
were teachers in their first years of teaching, and others with many
years of experience in schools. One would, I suggest, have expected, or
have good reason to expect, quite a wide variation in views about
mathematics and mathematics education, and in ways of teaching.
The marks on the questionnaire range from 65 to 86w. When seen against
the full range of possible marks 30 to 120 this represents a uniformity
of views, but when one notes that only two teachers used the categories
"strongly agree" or "strongly disagree t' more than four times in total,
the more realistic range of 60 to 90 becomes more appropriate here.
Within this range, the spread of marks is quite wide. Neither the upper
end, nor the lower end, were gained by either of the teachers who made
wide use of the strongly held views categories. These latter were
teachers F and H, whilst the maximum mark was obtained by teacher A and
the minimum by teacher E.
As regards the Interaction Analysis, the picture is different. The
tally sheets for each class may be seen as giving a general and fairly
vivid picture of the kinds of classroom interaction taking place in any
particular classroom. The density of the tally marks in any square of
the matrix indicates the frequency of that category of teacher or pupil
behaviour and one can soon gather an impression of the character of
Darticular classes and teachers. Also, one can use the number of
entries for more detailed numerically-based analysis, by comparing
percentages of particular categories, or by counting the number of
instances of incidents considered important. It was decided that the
percentage work, carried out in the original Flanders work, is not valid
here, for two reasons: firstly there is a predominance of s 0,0) entries
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in all the lessons, due presumably to British ways of tea:hing which
include individual pupil work in almost every lesson. ad sotimes
quite a considerable amount of individual work; and secondly because the
focus is on specific incidents, that is the occurences, or lack of
occurences, of entries in columns and rows 3,4,8 and 9. This was the
focus of attention for the study, that is, those categories that are
hypothesised as identifying 'open' teaching, or at least indications of
necessary conditions for 'open' teaching. The table shown below, 7.2.1,
shows the number of tally marks in these categories, for each teacher,
in each class observed, over the total of lessons.
Clearly, considering that these totals are for all five lessons of each
class, they are very small iii all cases except Teacher C. There were no
marks for any teacher, or any pupil, in categories 4 or 9.
This suggests that there is a very uniform pattern of teacher/pupil
interaction in this school, with these teachers, and during the
particular lessons observed. The teachers, with the possib.e exception
of Teacher C, do not, in general, ask any questions of any greater depth
than immediate recall or simple deduction. The pupils, perhaps for
reasons connected to the teaching method, do not respond to the few
category 3 questions with an equal number of category 8 answers, i.e.
they do not rise to the challenge of those few questions that are more
extending than recall or simple questions.
	 They also do not ask
questions or make contributions to the lessons, at these levels.
Hence if the focus of attention for the study is valid as an indicator
of teaching methods, there is a uniformity close to the 'closed' end of
the continuum, despite a fairly wide range of marks showing the views of
these teachers about the nature of mathematics and mathematics
education. This uniformity is most evident in those categories which
describe and identify more open-ended questions from teachers and novel
ideas from pupils, categories 4 and 9 respectIvely, in which there are
no marks at all, for any of the teachers, in any of the classes
observed.
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TABLE 7.2.1	 Tally niark totals in Categories 3,4,8 and 9
Category 3	 Category 4 Category 8	 Category 9
	
Teacher A (1)
	 3	 0	 0	 0
	
(2)	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
Teacher B (1)
	 0	 0	 0	 0
(2) 0	 0	 0	 0
(3) 3	 0	 0	 0
	
Teacher C (1)	 13	 0	 7
	
Teacher D (1)	 5	 0	 3	 0
	
(2)	 1	 0	 3	 0
	
Teacher E (1)	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
Teacher F (1)
	 0	 0	 0	 0
	
Teacher G (1)
	 1	 0	 0	 0
	
Teacher H (1)
	 1	 0	 1.	 0
(2) 0	 0	 0	 0
(3) 2	 0	 2	 0
	
Teacher I (1)
	 5	 0	 4	 0
	
(2)	 3	 0	 1	 0
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It is clearly important to try to identify the possible causes of this
uniformity. One can, I suggest, learn much about the influences and
pressures on teachers, that significantly affect the ways that they
teach, from such an analysis.
A strong candidate for explanation of this uniformity may be that the
ethos of the school and the particular mathematics department may be the
most significant factors in determining the way that teachers teach.
This was mentioned by one teacher directly, Teacher G, and indirectly
through the criticisms of the Head of Department by some of the teachers
in the study. There is also some evidence in other research to support
this. Thompson (1984>, in discussing the results of her case studies of
teachers' attitudes to mathematics, concludes:
"... teachers' beliefs, views, and preferences about mathematics and
its teaching, regardless of whether they are consciously or
unconsciously held, play a significant, albeit subtle, role in
shaping the teachers' characteristic patterns of instructional
behaviour... Teachers possess conceptions about teaching that are
general and not specific to the teaching of mathematics. They also
have conceptions about their students and the social and emotional
make-up of their class. These conceptions appear to play a
significant role in affecting instructional decisions and behaviour.
For some teachers, these conceptions are likely to take precedence
over other views and beliefs specific to the teaching of
mathematics." (Pages 124-125)
Post et al (1977) report a similar conclusion:
"By virtue of working within a larger organization - in this case
the school - constraints are placed on an individual teacher's
decision-making power. This tends to result in an apparent within-
school conformity of thought and idea." (Page 339)
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The results of this present first-stage study seem to suggest an
apparent within-school conformity of ways of teaching in sz:te of some
quite wide variation in teachers' views. For example, ite ii stated
"The process of doing mathematics in school can be seen to be a model of
all mathematical experiences: industry, research, daily life etc." Four
teachers agreed, four disagreed and one had no view. Thus the
conformity has not shown itself in thought and idea, as suggested by
Post, but in the ways of teaching.
7.2.2 The Research Tools
The focus of attention chosen for observation by Classroom :nteraction,
i.e. those categories that are proposed as identifying necessary
components of 'open' teaching, is discussed first, follcwed by the
questionnaire and the interview.
(a) Lesson Observation
It is undoubtedly difficult to identify when 'open' teaching is taking
place, since the content or format of a lesson do not necessarily
distinguish these ways of teaching by thenelves. Investiative work,
for instance, can be going on in the classroom arid the teachers still be
presenting a view of mathematics as a certain and defin:e body of
knowledge of which he or she has possession, and the purpose of the
investigation is to discover the right way to do it, or to get the
teacher to give the right answer and the correct method. Similarly, the
lesson may have a more formal appearance, perhaps even a drill exercise,
but in context, where the approach is one whereby pupils are actively
involved in the processes of doing mathematics, hypothesisLng, testing,
etc., and the particular lesson is aimed at the acquisition of skills
required, and seen by the pupils as needing to be acquired. to be able
to continue with their mathematical work. It is however more likely
that a teacher using a more 'open' way of teaching would use
investigative, problem-solving materials and methods. Similarly, it is
also likely that some, at least, of the lessons would be individualised
learning, if not the whole approach. 	 This school was chosen in the
-129-
knowledge that the overall programme was not one of in:viduaiised
learning, although it was not known whether any investigative work took
place at some stages in the school mathematics. For practical reasons
of the ease of observation and reliability of judgements of categories
of teacher-pupil interactions, it was decided to observe iS a school
using more traditional classroom techniques. It seemed possible that
within such a system there would be opportunity for variety in ways of
teaching of individual teachers. By focusing on those categories of
teacher and pupil behaviour which were proposed as revealing an 'open'
approach, the intention was to be able to identify any tendency in this
direction on the part of the teachers.
The results of the study do not suggest that this assumption was
incorrect. It is proposed here that one could not maintain that the
uniformity that appears amongst these teachers is as a result of the
inapplicable nature of the assumption. One could attribute the lack of
teacher questions of categories 3 and 4 to factors other than the
school, such as lack of skill on the part of the teachers themselves.
The size of the group of teachers observed in this study, 9 in all,
would tend to suggest that this is not the case. Taking the study to
other schools with different programmes of school mathematics, as well
perhaps as using a different observation scheme with more details being
picked out, such as SCAN 'Beeby 1979) would test this further, and this
is thus one of the options for a second stage study.
(b) Interview
The interviews were short, and intended to record the mathematical
background, teacher training, and teaching experience, and to give the
teachers the opportunity to expand on any comments about the
questionnaire, and any contradictions in answers. The interviews were
not recorded, and this is a disadvantage. Notes were taken, and in a
few instances, verbatim comments were written down and are included in
section 7.1. The original intention was to not permit the interviews to
become a substantial part of gathering information on teachers' views,
and this was maintained, despite it becoming obvious after a few
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interviews that a different approach could be taken. Thus, :.early the
Interviews could have been expanded into a major part of t research,
as it has in other research reported here, and this cou.: entail a
restructuring of the study towards a sociological stu y of the
influences, relationships, power-structure etc. within the department
and the school. This is an important option for further research.
(c) The Questionnaire
Specific comments on the questionnaire will be made first, fc:.lowed by a
discussion of its overall value.
Some of the statements could have been improved, e.g. one cou.d maintain
in items 13 and 16 that teachers are experts and hence the statement can
have different meanings. The great majority of the stateme.ts however
did not appear to create any problems of interpretation &r lead to
confusion. The questions were sorted out by the researcher and not on
any statistical basis. This is a possible source of criticism. Hence
further work could go on in the direction of refining the questionnaire.
Factor analysis is one possibility, although it is a highly subjective
method because of the choice of correlates.
	
Another more objective
possibility is Item Analysis. 	 In both these, and other te:hniques, a
wider sample of completed questionnaires would be required
	
c1 this is
again an option for further research. As a method of examining
teachers' views, or revealing the implications of teachers' views to the
teachers themselves, or in initial teacher training in order to deal
with this area of teachers' views of mathematics, this questionnaire may
have value, and hence further development of it would be impertant.
The marking scheme, allowing for example 1 for strongly agree, 2 for
agree, 2 for no view, 3 for disagree and 4 for strongly disagree, can
be criticised for implying that the gap between strongly agree and agree
is the same as between agree and disagree. This is probably not the
case. For a mark of 1 to distinguish between strongly agree and agree,
and for the same amount to show a change to disagree is difficult to
Justify.	 However, if one restricts one's analysis to exclude the
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strongly held views, for the reasons discussed 1i 7.2.1, this problem is
avoided, Any further use of the marking scheme with the questionnaire,
using the strongly held views as well, would have to take this into
account. Similarly, assigning a mark of 2 to 'no view' is appropriate
when not using the strongly held views categories, but more suspect when
these are included.
On the question of the 'no view' category, the problems s.iggested in
6.2.1 stand here, in that including this option has disadvantages, as
does not including it. Forcing teachers to make a chcice by not
allowing this option results either in a false set of answers, or at
least a number of statements which are suspect, or, as was found in the
earliest pre-tests, teachers make that choice for themselves by choosing
not to answer. Including the option provides a possible easy way out
for teachers who do not want to answer a particular item, which could
happen for many reasons, e.g. unwilling to commit themselves, unwilling
to think the statement through because of tiredness, etc. It was
decided on balance to include this option, but the reservations recorded
here, stand.
The general value of this research tool will best be discussed from two
possible criticisms, that of the value of a questionnaire f or thIs
stated aim, and the relevance of assigning a mark to a teacher's view.
The problem, firstly, is that to get at the views of teachers on aspects
of their work that are more theoretical and philosophical, without
alienating the teachers from the task,. making them feel that their
knowledge is inadequate to answer the question, or allowing the response
that the teacher does not have a view of the nature of mathematics, is
very difficult. If teachers generally hold views that are scarcely
coherent, direct questions about their philosophical opinions are quite
likely to lead to one or other of these negative responses. A major
influence in this thesis is the desire to examine and analyse the
options open to teachers as to the nature of mathematics, and to make
explicit the implications of holding those alternative views. As a
consequence, general vague questions about teachers' attitudes that
might be used in order not to alienate those teachers are not
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appropriate in this context. If the alternatives are delireated, the
questionnaire would need to be constructed to reflect th:s, or the
questions asked in an extensive interview, with all the dangers outlined
above that this might imply. Consequently, with the reservations put
forward here, and others that may be proposed, it still seems
appropriate to use a questionnaire of this type, for this purpose.
Finally there must be some doubt as to the significance of assigning a
mark as an overall representation of a teacher's view of mathematics and
mathematics education. This criticism can be accepted. without
completely rejecting the idea of evaluating a teacher's answers. Within
the context of the continuum outlined in 4.2, marks can provide a
ranking of a number of teachers that might be significant. A mark could
also provide an indication of the position of an individual teacher,
without too much value being placed on the exact numerical value.
7.2.3 Discussion and Rationale of Second-Stage of the Study
Three main Items emerge from the first stage of the field study, as
potential areas of a second-stage:
(a) further examination and improvement of the questionnaire, since the
questionnaire could have applications and uses in a variety of
areas: In revealing teachers' views of the nature of mathematics
and mathematics education; perhaps as an Introduction to these
issues in initial training and in-service training of mathematics
teachers; research on teachers' views other than the present one
(two research students so far have used this questionnaire in their
own work, in 1985/86 academic year).
(b) further work based on the hypothesis that the depth of teacher
questions (categories 3 and 4), of pupil responses (categories 8 and
9) and teacher reactions to those responses, are significant
indicators of the different ways of teaching mathematics discussed
in this thesis.
(c) further research to examine the hypothesis that other factors, which
may be called the specific school context, are stronger determinants
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of mathematics teacher behaviour than teachers' views of the nature
of matnematics. For example, a further stage of study could be to
probe the teachers in this school, perhaps by interviews, to reveal
some of these influences.
For the second-stage of the study, it was decided to focus on (a),
further work on the questionnaire. It has been proposed that the
questionnaire is an instrument that could be used in at least three main
areas: other research on teachers' attitudes to mathematics; use with
students in pre-service training; and use with teachers in in-service
courses. Hence, with these applications in mind, and in particular its
use with students, it was decided to further examine the questionnaire.
For this reason also, the audience that was chosen for this, was a large
group of Postgraduate Certificate in Education students, of Secondary
Mathematics.
It was also decided to interview a small sample of the students who,
after analysis of the questionnaire, were seen to be at the two extremes
of the range. This exercise was designed to examine the possible
reflection of views of mathematics in the practical field of the conduct
of lessons. It was clearly even xre important to avoid the 'specific
school context' in this exercise with students, since their inexperience
in teaching combined with their concern with being assessed by tne
teachers of the school and their tutors would be likely to result in
teaching behaviour that was not of their own free choosing. Thus it was
decided to provide some stimulus material such as a video-tape or audio-
tape extract of a mathematics lesson, and interview the students to
identify their impressions of the lesson. If there were clear
differences in the types of criticisms and comments on the lesson, that
corresponded to the results that the interviewees obtained on the
questionnaire, this would be quite strong information in support of the
value of the questionnaire, and slightly weaker support for one of the
hypotheses of the thesis, that there is a correspondence between views
of mathematics and ways of teaching.
The full description of the second-stage study follows in Chapter 8.
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ChAPTER 8 - THE SECOJD-STAGE STUDY
8.1 The Programme of the Study
The intention of this second stage was, as described in 7.2.3, to
examine further the questionnaire, for its usefulness in distinguishing
the views of teachers, and the possible reflection of those views in the
framework of the continuum of 'open' - 'closed' ways of teaching. The
study formed two parts:
(a) First, the questionnaire was given to a larger sample. It was
decided, f or this purpose, to use a group of Postgraduate Certificate of
Education in Secondary Mathematics students at the beginning of the
second term of their course. The reasons for this decision were: this
was a large group, in one place, and hence distribution, completion and
collection of the questionnaire would be convenient; the follow-up work
would be facilitated considerably by virtue of the group being together,
in a place where video facilities would be available, and suitable times
not difficult to arrange; the students would be likely to have a
positive attitude to the study, and, finally, this group would be free
of the influence of the 'specific school context' described in the
preceding chapter. In addition, it emerged after discuss-on with the
tutors of this group that the tutors would wish to use the fact that all
the students had completed the questionnaire to initiate some work on
attitudes to the nature of mathematics, after the completion of the
study. This in itself would be a use of the questionnaire, as suggested
in 7.2.3. A possible disadvantage of using this group would be that
they might be conscious of what they imagine they 'ought' to say, as
students, and as the particular students of their particular tutors.
The questionnaire was completed by the students at the beginning of the
second term, in January 1986, after the Christmas holiday and after a
first term in which the latter part had been stent on teaching practice.
Thus it was hoped that these influences were still fairly weak. The
first stage of the study also revealed that the teachers were aware of
the 'expected' answers, and conscious of the university-based
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researcher, and hence these influences will always be prese:, to some
degree. The results were then be subjected to Item ALalysis, a
statistical technique which is described fully below, :i 8.3, to
identify the items in the questionnaire that do distinguis teachers'
views, within the assumptions at the foundations of the cons:ruction of
the questionnaire.
(b) Second, a small sample of the students was shown a videc extract of
a mathematics lesson, and asked to comment on it. The students were
chosen in two groups, one from amongst those scoring highest on the
questionnaire, and the other from amongst those scoring lowest. It was
decided to choose an extract that showed an experienced, able teacher,
teaching in a stimulating but relatively 'closed' way. It wcld then be
interesting to note any differences in reactions to the lesscns, and in
particular any correspondence. This is described in 8.4 below.
8.2 The Questionnaire
At a meeting with the tutors of the group of students, arrar.einents for
the administration of the questionnaire were outlined. The last half-
an-hour of a seminar was to be used, each tutor-group would complete the
questionnaire in the group, without any discussion, and then return them
all to the tutor, who would pass them to the researcher. As
introduction to the work, the following was given to each tu:cr, to reaa
out to the group:
"This questionnaire is being developed, as part of Steve's doctoral
thesis, to examine teachers' and student teachers' views of
mathematics and mathematics education. It is not meant to be
related to your teaching practice experience at all, but to your own
views of mathematics teaching.
Please fill in your name on the cover. Most of the :tems simply
require a tick in an appropriate column. There is space at the end
of the questionnaire for any comments you may wish to make after
completing it.
The questionnaires will be treated with complete confidence and in
any reporting, no names will be mentioned.
-l3-
Thank you for your cooperation and help in this research.N
In all, 42 students completed the questionnaire, out of a group of 48,
these 6 others being absent on that occasion. The sample consisted of
24 women and 18 men, of whom 33 were mathematics graduates. the others
having at least one year of degree level mathematics in their
qualifications. 17 of the sample were aged over 22, and had thus had
other experience beyond university, 	 including having children,
employment in industry or business, etc.	 The results of the
questionnaire are given in Table 8.2.
It was decided to use exactly the same marking scheme as was used in the
first-stage study, which includes no marks for items 1,2,8.16 and 20.
These were originally included in the questionnaire for completeness,
but were not assigned marks as they were considered not sufficiently
discriminating, from the informal and pilot testing. For the Item
Analysis, since the role of the particular statistical technique is to
examine just this, these items were given marks and included in the
analysis, to corroborate or contradict that view of those items.
Many more 'strongly agree' and 'strongly disagree' responses were given,
and hence the range of possible marks from 30 to 120 is more appropriate
here than it was with the teachers in the first- stage stuay. It will
be seen that the marks were from 68½ to 100, which, it may be suggested,
is quite a wide spread, as compared with the spread of marks of the
teachers in the first-stage study, which was from 65 to 86½, although
this may be simply due to a larger sample. The extension of the top
mark from 86½ to 100, whilst the bottom mark is very close, together
with the mean and median marks being 85, almost the maximum mark of the
first group, suggests that the students who completed the questionnaire
in this second-stage are generally closer in views to the 'fallibilist'
or 'open' end of the continuum.
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Many students wrote comments at the end of the questionria.re. These
comments have, where appropriate, been grouped together be.ow. They
consisted of some general comments, as in (ii) on whether the
questionnaire was descriptive or prescriptive of schools today. and in
(iii) on the difficulty of wording, and some specific comments on
particular items, as in (i) and (iv).
	 Finally, the remainder are
grouped in (v).
(i) Six students wrote comments on item 16 "Public examination syllabus,
style etc. should be decided by experts.", to the effect that 'experts'
could be interpreted in various ways.
e.g. "I agree that syllabuses should be decided by experts - but
experts of the children and what they are going to use in life, not
experts of mathematics (university professors etc!)"
"Experts = teachers/pupils etc. or do you mean experts in the sense
of highly successful mathematicians - My answer makes the first
assumption"
(iUSeveral were confused as to whether the questionnaire was to be
completed in the light of how schools are today, or what the person
thought schools should be.
"'en I started the questionnaire I was in doubt about wether I was
to give what I thought actually happens in school or what I thought
ought to happen in school - especially question no. 2 and 8, and 4,
11,12."
"Many questions are ambiguous - Does it require what we think the
case should be or how we act within current constraints."
It bad been the intention of the phrase "...your own views of
mathematics teaching" in the instructions to be read out by each
tutor, that there would not be this confusion. On refiection, it
could have been made more clear.
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.ili) Some students found some of the wording difficult.
"I, as a mathematician feel that the questionnaire was written in a
difficult language and was not as concise as it could have :een. Was
it possible to have produced the statements in a more simple manner."
"You need a degree in English to understand some of these questions,
something I do not possess."
"Found some of the wording a bit misleading and some questions
tended to lead towards a 'correct'ish response. Generall y there were
words which I didn't know the true meaning of!"
(iv> One student questioned some of the section 2 itema.
"Question 29 - Not a theorem until proved.
Question 32 - Different truths between different athematical
structures (e.g.Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometry). However within
the formal structure provable statements are inevitable."
v Various other individual comments such as:
"Questionnaire very thought provoking - makes one stick to
conclusive ideas about aspects of mathematics and mathematics
education without being able to "straddle the fence". Questions
themselves are very pertinent and don't sidestep the issue."
"You obviously have a high regard for us, your s..bects, and
expect us to have deep philosophical thoughts. None the less it is
interesting and makes me think a lot more than I normelly (SIC)!"
"Would have liked to expand on some answers - Quite frustrating!"
These comments, taken together with the results of the Item Analysis,
contribute to the review of the wording of the questionnaire which
follows.
8.3 ltsm Analysis
This procedure, described in, for example, Allen and Yen l979), is a
screening technique. It is an approximate method for examining the








the mean mark of groups of the sample, in their ranked order, for each
Item, and plotting these means. Where the graph shows a decreasing
function, the item is a good discriminator, where the graph is fiat, it
is not, and where it is erratic, some error in construction the item,
due perhaps to poor wording for example. has been the liely cause.
Seven groups, each containing six people, were used, In order to strike
a balance between too few groups and too large ones, with the constraint
of the factors of the size of the sample, 42.
	
The table of means, and
the graphs for all 35 items, form table 8.3(a) and figure 8.3b).
As mentioned above, marks were given for the items which were not
included in the results of the questionnaire, either in the first-stage
study with the teachers in the school, or with this larger sample of
PGCE students. This is to enable a proper examination of the
discriminatory facility of those items also. The marks given for those






















Thus the Item Analysis was applied to all 35 items in the questionnaire.
The items which are shown as being good discriminators, for this sample,
may be seen from table 8.3(a) and figure 8.3(b) to be as follows:
3,4,5,6,9, 10(weak), 11, 12, 14, 1?, 18, 19,21(weak),22,24,25,26,27.28,29,30,
31,32,33,34.































































































































































































































594.98 * 6 = 3569.88
Gp. 1
	 Gp. 2	 Gp. 3	 Gp . 4	 Gp. S	 Gp.	 Gp.7
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Each item which was not a good discriminator is listed :'eiow, and
tentative reasons for this inadequacy are given in each case.
1) "The examination syllabus largely determines the school sviabus."
This is one of the items originally excluded from the marks. 	 It
probably falls into the category mentioned by a number :f students
as derending for a response on whether one thinks in ter of 'does'
or 'should', and since interpretations will differ, this .tem is not
useful in this form. It could be changed to become 'shcld largely
determine' in the wording, and the item might then be	 re
discriminating.
2) "Learning mathematics in school is essentially an active process."
This item is probably misunderstood for one of two reasofls, again on
the should/is alternative, and also on the possible confusion in the
meaning of 'active process'. I intended this to be taken, together
with item 8, a 'passive process', to be a choice between either a
Piagetlan view or an empiricist or platonic view of the learning
process. It may be that if this is explained more in the statement,
such as for example "Children learn mathematics by a passive process
of the absorption of knowledge", it could be used.
7) "The examination syllabus should not be the main factor in
determining the school syllabus".
This item clearly states 'should', and so fails for a different
reason to the allied item 1. There are two parts to zhe graph of
this item which show increases, whilst overall there is a
decrease.Perhaps this has suffered from an aberration of the
particular sample. 	 One might have expected a gener& agreement
across the population. 	 Its reason for failure to discriminate is
not clear.
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8) "Learning mathematics in school is mainly a passive process."
This has been discussed with item 2 above.
13) 'Teachers should be able to influence public examinatic: boards in
the style of examination, syllabus content etc."
The graph of this item shows simply that almost everyone agrees, and
thus it is not a good discriminator. 	 -
15) "The development of problem solving skills in pupils shcuid be seen
as an essential part of school mathematics."
Again, this item gained general agreement.
16) "Public examination syllabus, style etc. should be decided by
experts,"
As discussed above, a number of students specifically mentioned this
item as ambiguous, focusing on the word 'expert'. This item could
possibly be improved by writing 'mathematics experts'.. Clearly.
though, all the items refering to decisions about the school
mathematics syllabus, the examinations, who decides, and which
influences which, need rephrasing.
20) "Mathematics is training you to be logical."
This is the fifth item that was originally excluded from the marking
scheme. There is no doubt that learning mathematics trains one to
be logical in a mathematical sense, but there are other senses to
the term logical, and this may be the cause of the failure of this
item. The sense of the intention of this item may better be
conveyed by "Mathematics is the best subject to train you to have a
logical mind."
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23) "Asking open questions is vitally important as it gives Duils the
opportunity for creative thought."
This item has general agreement amongst the sample. ThS is true
also of the teachers in the first-stage study. This be a sign
of familiarity with the 'correct' responses.
35) "Mathematics is essentially hierarchical and cumulative. Although
progress does go on making earlier work more rigorous, generally new
knowledge builds on former work."
Answers to this item are erratic.
	 It is not simp.v a poor
discriminator.	 The intention of this statement was to offer a
cumulative view of mathematical knowledge, whose altern.tive is a
Kuhnian view. In a more straightforward sense of absolute truths or
fallibility, this idea is covered in the more successful itern 29 to 34,
and thus could be omitted.
In conclusion to this discussion of the questionnaire, most cf the items
are sufficiently discriminating to be valuable, and some of the others
could perhaps be adapted to be included. All the Items which had
originally been excluded from the marking of the questionn.ire showed
themselves to be poor discriminators. Since the 'stronglY agree' and
'strongly disagree' marks have been included as significant in this
sample, as these were used often by the students in their responses, the
early criticisms of the validity of the marking scheme apply. However,
as discussed earlier, the value of the questionnaire is not in the
assignment of a specific mark as an indication of the views of an
individual.
With this criterion established, it can be proposed that the
questionnaire's overall value has been corroborated by this statistical
exercise.
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8.4 The Programme for the Interviews
After examination of many video-recordings of mathematics lessons, one
was chosen which was deemed suitable, from the following points of view:
(a) the extract lasted 5 minutes, which seemed an adequate amount of
time for impressions to be formed, without providing too much
information,
(b) the extract was 'complete' In the sense that it covered the
introduction to some work, the development, and an ending, when the
pupils worked alone,
(C) one's initial reaction to the classroom, the pupils and the teacher
was one of an attractive situation,
(d) the teacher's choice of introduction was a novel and interesting
one, which tended to mask a quite didactic way of teaching.
The extract chosen
	 was of the introduction to the solution of
simultaneous equations to an average ability third year set. 	 The
teacher put up on the blackboard:
c = cups of coffee
t = cups of tea
7c + 2t = 38.
She then proceeded to invite the class to offer possible solutions to
the prices of a cup of tea and a cup of coffee, given that the equation
meant that seven cups of coffee and two cups of tea could be bought for
38p.
It is to be noted that no students noticed the major error made by the
teacher here, in her definitions of the variables c and t. It is not
surprising, given incidents like this, that pupils have difficulties
with the concept of variable.	 However, this was not the focus of the
interview.
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After receiving several suggestions. including one or tw incorrect
ones, she then put up another equation, saying that someo.e else had
bought some cups of tea and coffee. This was
2c + 3t = 23.
She invited the class to say which answer given for the first equation
fits the second. One student offered the correct answer, and the lesson
ended when the teacher asked how the pupils could satisfy thenelves
that this was the only one that fitted, and she asked them to try some
of the other solutions to the first equation.
The example the teacher used is an interesting and 'real' one, in the
sense that it is probably meaningful to the pupils to buy cups of tea
and coffee and pay an overall price, although the answers are extremely
unreal for the prices of tea and coffee in 1988. The lesso: was a very
recent one. On the other hand, bringing some cups to the table, giving
the total price, and then asking for possible answers for prices is not
a usual situation. However, the friendly way the lesson is conducted,
and the interesting choice of model, even with its mathematical flaw,
for the simultaneous equations masks the quite didactic teaching method
used, and this was the main reason this extract was chcsen for the
interviews.
An interview protocol was developed, and tested on a collea gue. The full
protocol is given in figure 8.4. After an assurance of confidentiality,
the programme of the Interview, namely to show an extract of a
mathematics lesson and ask the interviewee for comments, was clearly
stated. Then, to allow that idea to be absorbed, and to help the
interviewee relax, a question was asked regarding the interviewee's
teaching practice period. After a short exchange, the interviewee was
drawn back by a repeat of the programme for the interview, and the video
was then shown.	 Immediately afterwards, a cassette recorder was
switched on and the interview took place. Questions were asked only
when it was felt that the interviewee needed prompting, and as can be
seen from the complete transcripts, which form Appendix D, phrases used
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by the interviewee were generally repeated. Occasionally :t was felt
that the interviewee needed to be focused on the way ir which the
teacher had chosen to deal with the topic, and a suitable cestion was
asked. Vhen the interview finished of its own accord, te tape was
switched off, and a final question asked, to bring the interviewee out
of the session.
Figure 8.4 Interview Protocol
Thanks ± or helping me with my research. Let me just say first of all
that this whole interview will be treated in complete confidence. I
would like to record our conversation on tape, but I'll erase it
afterwards if you wish.
In a few moments I'm going to show you a video of an extract of a maths
lesson, and then I'm going to ask for your comments and views on it.
Just before we start, though, tell me how does it feel now that you have
I inished.your teaching practice?
(short conversation)
O.K. Let's have a look at this video of part of a niathema'ics lesson,
and afterwards I shall ask you what you thought.
(video)
(switch on cassette recorder)




What's it like to observe a lesson now, after all your teaching practice
experience?
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8.5 Results of the Interviews
Four students were interviewed, A and B had scored the lowest 	 rks In
the questionnaire, and C and D had the two highest marks, of the whole
group. it can be seen that A felt that the teaching methd was too
open-ended, and that the teacher would have been more successful if she
had directed the class more. She said "I think it would have been
better if she had given them more hints, more guidance. It was much too
open-ended."
Interviewee B felt that the amount of direction given by the teacher was
about right, but that she could have asked more direct questions of the
pupils, in particular the pupils who were perhaps not paying attention,
or had not understood. He said "She could have prompted others who were
just quiet, or she could probably see that some of them weren't even
following the class, following the lesson. So I mean she could have
prompted them to attention. Sort of re-focused their minds on the
lesson as opposed to their own things. Yeah, I think that was the main
thing... From the beginning I thought there was too much silence, too
little interaction."
C was not too clear at first as to what she didn't like about the
lesson, but it emerged that she felt that the teacher didn't do enough
with the idea. She said "When she went on to the second I said well
alright she's going to link it up now, and all she did was to say if I
wrote that and that equals that, which one of these will fit in? You
know what she could have done, she could have said - she could have done
the second equation exactly like the first, and let them throw out about
10 different solutions, and then say, right, now what do you notice?
And if that goes, then say this is what we mean when we say solving
equations simultaneously. N
D liked the idea for introducing simultaneous equations, and also liked
the way that the teacher encouraged all answers even the ones that
turned out to be wrong. She picked on the idea that the teacher was
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very directed. "I don't think she was too open. In some ways she was
very directed. She knew what she wanted but on the other hand she did
accez't - she did encourage all the possible solutions" She then wer on
to suggest the same approach as C suggested with the second e:uation.
Both interviewees C and D seemed to have been concerned with pupils
getting to grips with the meaning of solving equations simltaneous1y,
each equation having at least a large number of solutions cn its own,
but there being just one solution that fitted both. Their appreciation
of some aspects of the teacher's approach, and way of teaching. did not
preclude their criticism of the teacher, in terms of their view of the
aims of teaching mathematics, that is, to introduce the students to the
concepts involved. The other interviewees, A and B appeared t3 have been
both mostly concerned with whether the teaching method was detailed
enough to elicit the right answers from the pupils. They too were
obviously impressed with some aspects of the lesson, in the main the
choice of model for simultaneous equations, and the teacher's openess to
wrong answers, but were also critical of other aspects. They were both,
however, very concerned that the teacher had not been explicit enough
about the procedure that the pupils must learn, in order to find
different solutions to the first equation.
8.6 Conclusions of Second-Stage Study
The Item Analysis has enabled the items in the questionnaire to be
examined in detail for their discriminatory facility, and a full
discussion of appropriate changes to the items was carried out.
The interpretation of the interviews described here appears to lend
weight to the hypothesis that the questionnaire distinguishes and
identifies a fallibilist view of mathematical knowledge, tc.gether with
an 'open' way of teaching mathematics
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CHAPTER 9 - S1J)(]IART, REVIEW AND LIIITATIONS
AND
IIPLICATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
9.2. Sunniary and Review
This thesis consists of three sections, an examination of the situation
in the philosophy of mathematics, some proposals regarding the
connections with the teaching of mathematics, and field study in two
parts, to examine some of the consequences of the thesis in the practice
of mathematical education.
In the first section, it was proposed that a relativist view of
knowledge, in the sense of the 'strong programme' in the sociology of
knowledge, far from being restrictive, or even destructive, to the
progress of thought, is a challenging and dynamic one. From an
absolutist view, truths are to be discovered, although there are
conflicting and competing ways of establishing that a belief or theory
is true. There are of course revolutions in absolutist thought, but
these are seen as the replacement of erroneous theories by at least
closer approximations to the truth, with the model of a critical
experiment which distinguishes the two. 	 It can be suggested that an
absolutist view has a stultifying effect because of the implicit self-
justification of progress towards truth. On the other hand, a
relativist approach which sees all knowledge as a social construction,
and hence fallible, can be seen to place power in the hands of people,
in the sense of determining what is progress, rather than within
knowledge qua knowledge. An examination of the situation in the
philosophy of mathematics followed, which suggested that Lakatos
maintained this position in relation to mathematics, if not science, and
that this may be seen as a Wittgensteinian view also.	 It was also
proposed that different epistemologies may be seen to provide different
for	 of social control, viz, the teacher as possessor of knowledge, or
as participant with pupils in the language game called mathematics.
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In the second section, a review of the literature revealed the need for
an examination of competing perspectives of the nature of .athematics
and how they relate to the teaching of mathematics. ft was then
hypothesised that the two views of mathematics, absolutist and
fallibilist, can be seen to be
	 reflected in the teaching of
mathematics. One can portray ways of teaching mathematics as a
continuum, with the two extremes being an 'open' teaching approach.
where children's learning is seen as the creative process oi conceptual
growth, with the teacher as facilitator in this, mirroring the process
of the growth of knowledge, or a 'closed' approach, whereby the teacher
sees him/herself as the possessor of absolute knowledge which the
children are to acquire, through some adequate form of explanation.
Finally, it is suggested that some recent developments in research in
mathematics learning theories, namely in the constructivist view, can be
seen to reinforce and support the hypotheses of this thesis, that there
are two competing views of the nature of mathematics, and that these are
connected with and reflected in alternative ways of teaching
mathematics, in the sense that an epistemological perspective brings
with it consequences for the practice of mathematics education.
In the third section, a study was carried out that attempted to examine
soi of the consequences of the thesis for the teaching of mathematics.
In the first stage, a questionnaire was developed to identify teachers'
views of mathematics and mathematics education, containing 35 iten, and
marked on a Likert scale, and an observation tool adopted, a Flanders
instrument. These were then used with the teachers of a particular
comprehensive school, with the intention of examining teachers' views
and observing their teaching behaviour from the 'open'-'closed'
perspective, focusing on the kinds of questions teachers asked, the
kinds of responses and ideas that pupils put forward, and the ways that
the teachers reacted to these. 9 teachers participated,. and a total of
16 classes were observed. It was found that there was a considerable
uniformity of ways of teaching, although quite a variation of teachers'
views. Hence it would seem that there are other factors that may be
more significant in determining the way that mathematics teachers
behave. On the basis of the interview data, one could bypothesise that
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school-context factors are more likely to influence ways of teaching
than attitudes to the nature of mathematics.
Three alternatives were indicated as possible areas of a second stage
and of the three it was decided to further examine the questionnaire,
and to attempt to observe teachers' ways of teaching, whilst avoiding
the influence of the specific schcol context. There were two stages to
this. In the first part the questionnaire was given to a larger sample,
42 students of a Postgraduate Certificate of Education course, and the
results examined by Item Analysis. This enahled a discussion of each
Item in the questionnaire, for its ability to discriminate. In the
second part, a small sample of the students was interviewed, after each
had seen an extract of a mathematics lesson on a video-tape. The
students were asked for their view of the way of teaching they observed.
By this method it was hoped that one could avoid the influence of the
specific school context, and still provide some information that was
concerned with the reflection of views with ways of teaching
mathematics. The two students who scored highest on the questionnaire
criticised the teacher for being too 'closed' in her teaching, whilst
the two students who scored lowest on the questionnaire considered that
the teacher was too 'open'. One can hypothesise from these Interviews,
that there is a strong correspondence between the views of those
interviewed, as Identified by the questionnaire, and the kinds of
comments and criticisms they made of the mathematics lesson extract they
observed, in the context of the hypotheses of the thesis and the study.
9.2 Limitations of the Research
The investigation of the teachers' views and ways of teaching in a
particular school in the first-stage of the field study necessarily
meant making decisions about which school to use, that had implications
for the research. Reasons have been given for the choice made, of a
school that did not have an individualized programme for mathematics,
that was a fairly large and apparently traditional school in its values,
arid where the way of teaching seemed to be at least mainly 'chalk-and-
talk'.	 Whilst it is quite likely that the hypothesis regarding the
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influence of the school context applies in all schools, the character of
any one school will be a limitation on the research.
The method of classroom observation is of high inference judgements by
the researcher, and not easily open to corroboration by, for example,
another researcher. The system of recording, taking tally marks every
three seconds, and observing ten categories of activities in the lesson,
encourages a uniformity, and an objectivity in the observations.
However, this can be seen as a limitation of the research.
In the second-stage study, similarly, the nature of the group of
students chosen, as well as of the institution and the tutors of those
students, just as of any group that one might choose for this research,
were a factor to be noted as a limitation on the study.
9.3 Implications for Further Research
The implications for further research will be discussed in two sections:
in section 9.3.1 possible extensions of the study in this thesis, and in
Section 9.3.2 more general implications.
9.3.1 Extensions of Present Study
The apparent uniformity of teaching methods found in the first-stage
study, despite the variation in teachers' backgrounds. training,
experience and views as revealed by the questionnaire, led to the
hypothesis that other factors that may be called the specific school
context, are the major determinants in teachers' behaviour, if this is
so, then the influence of the ethos of the school and the mathematics
department could be examined further in at least three ways:
(i)	 The first-stage study, based on the same structure and
methodology, could be extended to take in several schools with
different programmes for the mathematics curriculum. Some light
would then be thrown on the influence of school structure and
approach on mathematics departments and on teachers of mathematics.
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(ii) A more full sociological study could be made c a single
school, with the intention of revealing more informa:ion on tne
various influences bearIng on the teaching of mathematics.
(iii) A third direction, again using the structure 01 the present
study, would be to examine the ways that a teacher varies his or her
teaching methods according to the age, ability and behaviour of the
classes. There was some indication that this takes place in the
data from the lesson observation in the first-stage study. More
information of the lessons would be required if this were the focus
of research, by for example using SCAN. It may well be, for
example, that a teacher committed to an 'open' view of mathematics
teaching, is more 'open' with younger classes, as they are further
from public examinations, and also with better behaved classes, as a
more 'closed' approach is seen as providing the teacher with more
authority.
9.3.2 Other Directions
As mentioned above, the questionnaire could have uses and applications
in other areas of research and in mathematics education in general. It
could prove to be a useful tool in pre-service training to aid and
stimulate reflection on the part of student-teachers, on the
implications of their attitudes to mathematics, as has been indicated in
the students' reactions in the second-stage study. It could also be
used in In-service training as a means of introduction of these issues
to teachers. As has been said, many teachers and of course student
teachers, will be unaware of their views of the nature of mathematics,
and also of the implications of those views, and a questionnaire which
then places them roughly on a continuum could prove a valuable stimulus.
A further possibly fruitful area could be its use as a measure of change
in teachers' views over a period of time. For example, a course that
made explicit the implications of attitudes to the nature of
mathematics, for the teaching of mathematics, would be likely to lead to
changes in the views of teachers, and the questionnaire could be a
useful tool in measurement of that change.
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A further important area of research that is highlighted by this thesis,
is the effect on pupils' conceptions of mathematics as a result of
teachers' views. How much, or how little, pupils' image of the subject
changes with a new teacher holding a different view of mathematics,
and/or a different teaching programme would be a valuable area of study.
An interesting spin-off from the second stage study has been the
educational value of using video extracts of lessons in order to
introduce students to aspects of teaching mathematics. This could
certainly be examined further in pre-service teacher education. Group
discussion on specific incidents and approaches could be enhanced by
using such extracts.
9.4	 Conclusion
This thesis may be seen as a contribution to the Theory of Mathematics
Education. There is interest at the present time in the role of theory
In the practice of mathematics education, and an awareness that there
may be much to be gained by discussion of wider perspectives on our
work. This thesis has attempted to clarify the kinds of alternatives
there are for theories about mathematics, and the consequences for the
teaching of mathematics, and as such attempts to provide a theoretical
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QUEST IOUA IRE - FIRST DRAFT
1) The examination syllabus largely determines the school syllabus.
2) The examination syllabus should not be the main factor in
determining the school syllabus.
3) Teachers should be able to influence public examination boards in
the style of examination, syllabus content etc.
4> Public examination syllabus, style etc. should be decided by experts
not actively involved in teaching, e.g. mathematics professors,
mathematicians in industry etc. 1 but with some consultation with
teachers.
5) Learning mathematics is essentially an active process.
6) Learning mathematics in school is mainly a passive process.
7) Creative work in mathematics only takes place at the frontiers of
mathematical knowledge.
8> Creative work in mathematics takes place in all learning.
) Expecting pupils to be creative in mathematics is unfair to
pupils, and a waste of precious lesson time.
10) Our main aim is to try to enable every pupil to leave school with
some public examination success in mathematics, GCE, CSE, RSA, or
e.g. Herts Achievement.
11) Our main aim is to try to enable every pupil to become a
mathematician to their level of ability, i.e. to be able to think
mathematically where applicable.
12) School mathematics should be seen by pupils to be relevant and
applicable to the real world.
13) One of cur aims is to enable pupils to appreciate and enjoy
mathematics for its own sake.
14) It is a consequence of the nature of school mathematics that pupils
will wonder about the purpose of their work in mathematics as
against e.g. geography.
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if an intelligent pupil were to ask the purpose of a piece cf work, one
could answer:-
15) Mathematics can be seen to be, like chess, a game with rules that
have to be learnt.
16) Mathematics is applicable to all sorts of situations. 	 Once the
knowledge is acquired, applications follow.
17) Mathematics is training you to be logical. Any particular piece of
work is just a logical extension of previous material.
18) Discovery methods of learning are relevant for the earliest concepts
only e.g. addition, volume etc.
19) Discovery methods would be useful for older pupils, if time and
syllabus permitted.
20) School mathematics provides the foundations of mathematical
knowledge, to be extended into useful and applicable skills in work
or college situations.
21) The process of doing mathematics in school is a model of all
mathematical experiences, industry, research, daily life etc.
22) Problem solving is part of school mathematics as It enables pupils
to tackle unusual exam questions.
23) Problem solving is an essential part of school mathematics since it
is an essential aspect of mathematical knowledge.
24) Problem solving is a topic of school mathematics that should be
Included where possible.
25) Asking open-ended questions is a useful device in teaching, e.g. how
might we add 1/4 and 1/3?
26) Asking open-ended questions is essential to enable pupils to think
for themselves, which is an essential part of school mathematics.
27) We never really ask open-ended questions since there is always a
right way to solve the problem, and that method is known by the
teacher in advance, and the pupils know that this is the case.
28) The word 'proof' is best defined as an explanatory process.
29) The word 'proof' is best defined as an explicit process of
deduction.
30) The main work in mathematics is at the level of axioms and
definitions - proofs and theorems are automatic and not as
important.
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31) The main work in mathematics is in developing proofs and finding
counterexamples.
32) Mathematical truths are not susceptible to revolutionar y change in
the way that scientific truths are, e.g. relativity, quantum theory
etc.
33) Mathematical knowledge is close to scientific knowledge in the sense
that conclusions are tested for their truth.
34) Mathematics is essentially hierarchical. Although progress does go
on making earlier work more rigorous, generally growth of knowledge
builds on former work.
35) Mathematical truths have an inevitability about them. A world with
different mathematical truths is inconceivable.










CTION 1	 MATHEMATICS EDUCATION
	 Strongly
Strongly	 No	 Dis-	 Dis-
Agree Agree View agree agree
The examination syUabus largely determines the
school syllabus.
Learning mathematics in school is essentially
an active process.
It is a consequence of the nature of mathematics
itself, that pupils wilL more often wonder about
the purpose of a- topic in mathematic than in,
say, geography.
Discovery methods of learning mathematics are
relevant for the earliert concepts only,
e.g. addition, volume etc.
) School mathematics can be seen to provide the bas
skills and techniques of mathematics, to be
extended into applicable mathematics in work or
college situations.
) The major value of teaching problem solving skills
is to enable pupils to tackle unusual examination
questions.
) The examination syllabus should not be the main
factor in determining the school syllabus.
) Learning mathematics in school is mainly a passive
process.
) Creative work in mathematics only takes place at
the frontiers of mathematical knowledge.
) Discovery methods would be useful. for older pupils
if time and syllabus permitted.
.) The process of doing mathematics in school can be
seen to be a model of all mathematical experiences:
industry, research, daily life etc.
) Creative work in mathematics takes place in all
learning.
) Teachers should be able to influence public
examination boards in the style of examination,
syllabus content etc.
i) Discovery learning of mathematics i.e relevant for
all, stages of school mathematics.
5) The development of problem solving skill.s in




No	 Dis -	 Dis-
gree View gree agreegree I
Public examination syllabus, style etc. should be
decided by experts.
Expecting pupils to be creative in mathematics is
unreasonable and. doesn't warrant use of precious
lesson time.
n intelligent pupil, were to ask the purpose ofa
.c In mathematics, I would answer:
Mathematics can be seen to be, like chess, a game
with rules that have to be learnt.
The applications of mathematics follow once
mathematical knowledge is acquired.
Mathematics Is training you to be logical.
This topic is on the syllabus, so you can rely
on its importance.
•he following statements, the term 'open' is ured
Lescribe questions such as "how could. we add 4 and
.0 pupils who have not learnt the algorithm, since
question could be answered in many ways.
Asking open questions is essentially just a
useful device in taeching.
Asking open questions is vitally important asit
gives pupils the opportunity for creative thought.
There are no open questions since both teacher and
pupils know that there is always only one correct
way to solve any problem.
se give an order, 1. to 4, to the following aims:
My main aim isto try to enable every pupil to
leave school with some public examination success
in mathematics, GCE, CSE etc.
My main aim is to try to enable every pupil to
become a mathematician to their level of ability,
I.e. to be able to think mathematically, where
applicable.
My main aim is that rchooj mathematics should be
seen by pupils (and. perents, employers etc.) to
be relevant and applicable to the real world..
My main aim is to enable pupils to appreciate and.




Once a mathematical structure has been developed,
and a theorem formulated, its proof is a technical
detail, although it may be years till. its
discovery.
Mathematical truths are not susceptible to
revolutionary change in the way that scientific
truths are, e.g. relativity.
Mathematical knowledge is close to scientific
knowledge in the sense that conclusions are
tested for their truth.
Mathematical truths have an inevitability about
them, A world with different mathematical truths
is inconceivable,
The generation of a proof is a highly creative
part of mathematics, since it can lead to new
structures, reformulated hypotheses etc.
Mathematical knowledge is hypothetical and
potentially subject to refutation or adaptation.
Mathematics is essentially hierarchical. and
cumulative. Although progress does go on making
earlier work more rigorous, generally new





Agree kgree View .gree agree
'.1
S - a
s space may be used for making any comments about the questionnaire, your thoughts etc.
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Categories for Interaction Analysis
of Pupil Involvement
-181-
Instrument in use in Five State Project
Minnesota ational Laboratories
cRES FOR ITERACTI3N AIiALYSIS OF PUPIL INVOLVENT
TEACHER
1. Clarifying, encouraging. summarizing:
remarks which recognise student, his participation and ideas by
incorporating them into classroom interaction.
2. Contacting. checking:
remarks, usually questions, which invite limited participation:
asking for information, simple next steps or checkIng student
understanding.
3. Confronting. seeking:
remarks, usually questions, which invite extensive participation:
classifying information, a series of steps, a single step requiring
selection and organization of material.
4. Soft or hard challenging, jolting:
remarks absurd, controversial, or questions of comprehensive nature
or completely undirected to invite significant participation: in
noting relationships, application, in making grand leaps in system
development.
5. informing, lecturing:
remarks, expository, to provide information or solve problems; also
rhetorical questions. These may be continued into a "lecture"
period or be met in rapid discussion. Reading answers.
ô. Directing:
remarks assigning particular taske related to the lesson: homework
assignment, a method of recording data, a type of material to use.
PUPIL
7. Receptive. passive:
remarks by student under direction limited to one-step answers, or
trivial agreement or question initiated without readiness to treat
it himself. Reading book or answers.
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8. Thdependent active
remarks by student either as invited and moving more than one step
ahead, or a single ste p, or without invitation to raise a question
and being willing to treat it hielf.
. Curious, creative:
remarks by student in which present topic related to other areas of
mathematics or to applied fields, to more fundamental concepts, or
to a wider family of topics. A fresh topic related to present
topic.
GENERAL
0. Silence r confusion organization:
behaviour concerned with lesson which cannot be classsif led 1-9.
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EXAX?LE OF CLASSIFICATION OF VERBAL BEEAVIOUR IN THE TEN CATEORES
1. C.arifying. Encouraging. Summar1zirg:
1.1 Statements in recognition of pupil's comment.
1.2 Answers to pupil's question.
1.3 Explaining and amplifying a pupil's answer.
1.4 Encouragement of pupil in developing his own idea.
1.5 Restatement of pupil's answer.
1.6 Praise or comment in response to a pupil's statement, answer or
question.
2. Contacting. Checking:
2.1 Simple passive question requiring a simple passive resonse.
2.2 Question anticipating simple one-step or trivial answers.
2.3 Question where range of possible answers is narrow.
2.4 Drill.
2.5 Request for information requiring simple recall or reQuest for
mere reading from text or notes.
2.6 Checking pupil's understanding, e.g. "Any questions",
"Difficulty anyone".
3. Confronting. Seeking:
3.1 Statements requiring extensive participation.
3.2 Questions requiring independent thought.
3.3 A one-step answer but requiring selection and organization of
material.
3.4 Statement eliciting pupil criticism of own work.
3.5 Broad questions demanding responses similar to 3.1 and 3.2 but
where direction less clearly specified.
4. Soft or hard Challenging. Jolting:
4.1 Questions requiring very deep understanding.
4.2 Controversial questions of comprehensive nature.
4.3 Questions requiring understanding leading to relationships,
applications, or grand leaps in system development.
4.4 Absurd statements requiring deep understanding by pupiis.
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45 Undirected questicns inviting significant participation at a
high level of understanding.
4.6 Statements requiring elaboration on difficult homework.
5. Informing. Lecturing:
5.]. Expression of opinions or facts relating to mathematics.
5.2 Teacher talk, but not inviting participation.
5.3 Rhetorical questions and answers.
5.4 Reading answers to problems (place B with it)
5.5 Reading problems or information from book (place B with it)
6. Directing:
6.1 Express statements or questions requiring delayed pupil
response.
6.2 Entire directions and explanations of assignments.
6.3 Instructions on use of material.
7. Receptive. Passive:
7.]. Pupil response from simple questions.
7.2 Trivial statements, comments, responses.
7.3 Simple question without being able to treat it himself.
7.4 Drill.
7.5 Reading a problem from a book (place B beside it).
7.6 Reading answers to problems (place B beside it).
7.7 Information of simple recall nature including answers to
homework assignment.
8. Independent. Active:
8.1 Answers to difficult questions requiring multiple-step solutions
8.2 Statements made by pupil indicating powerful step or deep
understanding.
8.3 Responses demonstrating selection or organization of material.
8.4 Suggestions of independent nature given without specific request
to explain difficult points.
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9. Curious. Creative:
.l High-level comments showing definite insight.
9.2 Pupil voluntarily relates the material to other areas of
mathematics or to applied fields.
9.3 Pupil presents a fresh topic related to the topic under
discussion.
9.4 An elegant solution suggested through pupil understanding (not
from books).
9.5 Unusual application of topic.
9.6 Unusual generalizations.
9.7 Originality.
9.8 Humor related to subject matter.
0. Silence. Confusion, Organization:
0.1 The first and last entry in each daily classification to ensure
totals in matrix are balanced.
0.2 Writing on board or writing at seats during main lesson
unaccompanied by explanatory comment (place B beside it).
0.3 Recording of data, homework, grades, etc.
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APPEIDIX C
Data of First-Stage Study:
Marksheets From Questionnaire
Tally Sheets From Each Class
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Teacher A	 Questionnaire Results - Score 8ô4
Strongly	 Strongly





































TALLY SHEET FOR IJTERACTIOJ AJALYSIS IN THE XATHEATICS CLASSROOX
Teacher A	 Class - 4th Year Set 1
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TALLY SHEET FOR INTERACTION ANALYSIS IN THE MATHEMATICS CLASSROOM
Teacher A	 Class - 5th Year Set 8
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TALLY SHEET FOR INTERACTION ANALYSIS IN THE MATHEMATICS CLASSROOM
Teacher B	 Class - 1st Year Set R (3rd band)
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TALLY SHEET FOR INTERACTION ANALYSIS IN THE XATHEMATICS CLASSROOX
Teacher C
	
Class - 3rd Year Set 1
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	 Questionnaire Results - Score 77
Strongly	 Strongly
































































TALLY SHEET FOR IJTERACTION IJALYSIS IN THE IATHEMATICS CLASSROOX
Teacher D
	 Class - 5th Year Set 2.
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TALLY SHEET FOR INTERACTION ANALYSIS IN THE MATHEMATICS CLASSROOM
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TALLY SHEET FOR INTERACTION ANALYSIS IN THE MATHEMATICS CLASSROOM
Teacher E	 Class - 1st Year Set K (3rd band)
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Full Transcripts of Interviews
Second-stage Study
Note: Four interviewees, A,B,C,D labelled 'e l" in interviews.
Researcber labelled IRH in interviews.
-213-
INTERVIEWEE A
R. O.K. Whats your first impression of the lesson?
I. One of the things that struck me was the way she had to keep looking
aside, I don't know why, perhaps she had arranged her notes so that she
could keep looking at the class while she was talking. And also it
wasn't very clear how much they knew about simultaneous equations, so
unless she bad done some solving the previous lesson, I thought she
should have given an example, if 3 cups of coffee are 15 pence how much
is one cup? and then go on to 3 cups of coffee and 2 cups of tea.
something like that. Then they would have some idea of what they were
trying to do.
R. And?
I. And I think that once she had started getting them guessing for how
much the tea and the coffee was - I think that was good, but maybe it
went on a bit too long, I think she had too many guesses coming out and
it took quite a long time. After a few guesses she should have
explained what they are, what she was doing.
R. You didn't feel that they knew what they were doing?
I. I think it was clear to most of them but there seemed to be a couple
there that were sitting there trying - not too sure, one was looking
really bored - maybe if she had got them - I don't know how - more
involved, or writing down the numbers, or maybe she could have said O.K.
all do this one. If tea costs 3 pence, work out how much the coffee
costs, something like that, so that they were all writing down the same
answers.
R. So that they get the feel of what they are supposed to do?
I. Yes, so that at least then they would know whether they could do it
or not, in that case, and If people had come up with the wrong answer,
then go through it, explain how you did it and then give them another
one to try and then check that everyone understood that one. But I
didn't think there was much checking on whether people were
understanding. I think from what we saw most people did seem to get the
right answers, even though she didn't really check properly. And - I
think when she put up the other, the second equation, sort of like how
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much would the tea and coffee cost, it was too much of a sort of
guessing game. Maybe that's just the way she introduced it - you know.
. You felt that it was too much of a guessing game if you bring in the
second equation as well?
I. Yeah. Urn. Maybe if she had something like a game, three cups of
coffee plus two cups of tea for 29p and three cups of coffee cost 15p.
work out how much a cup of tea and a cup of coffee is, then from doing
that first example on the board, 3 cups of coffee costing 1r, working
out how much the coffee is, then working out the tea, and then give them
both equations it might be more clear how to work out the two together.
R. What actually gives you the feeling that they weren't entirely sure
what was going on?
I. Well at the beginning the long pause, when she was asking and nobody
was answering and when the first few guesses came out they were sort of
- (laugh) - slightly wrong? And as she was going along, although very -
some of the guesses were very close that was understandable, that they
could be slightly out.
R. You said that maybe that's a way of introducing simultaneous
equations. How do you feel about that way?
I. I think it's good, to guess in that way - but what I've found with
children at school is that if you introduce something like x + 4 = 27
find x. then they have no idea whatsoever, but if you say someone goes
into a shop and buys some eyeshadow - or rather they have two pounds, go
into a shop and buy some eyeshadow, and they have 20p change, how much
did the eyeshadow cost, then they can work that out no problem. And
then when you show them how to write out the equation, they seem to be
able to cope with that. But when it is just letters, unless the letters
mean something to them, they find it very difficult. Well that's with
low ability, I don't know whether higher ability would be able to cope
with it.
R. What did you feel about the ability of this group? Would you call
them low ability, or what?
I, Quite low, average sort of group I'd say. Because I think some of
them were brighter, getting the answer straight away. Their arithmetic
was quite slow. But some of them were quite good.
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L Do you think the particular letters she used, c for coffee, t for
tea, hel ped or hindered? Does that make it more towards the practical
examole you were talking about before?
I. I think, mainly, it really depends so much on what they've done,
sort of beforehand, but if she'd written it all out first. like 3 cups
of coffee plus 2 cups of tea = 29p orsomething like that, then maybe it
would be clearer, and then after giving a few examples, say O.K instead
of writing it all out lets see, c for coffee, t for tea and so at the
same time explain that.
R. Overall then, would you say that was a good way of introducing
simultaneous equations, or would you suggest some other thing that she
could have done, or taught it a different way?
I. I think it was a good way, in that it was something that they all
understood. They would all have bought cups of tea, cups of coffee,
they would all have some understanding of what she was doing, but I
think It would have been better if she had given them more hints, more
guidance.	 It was much too open-ended.
R. Much too open-ended.
I. Well she said tell me how much tea and coffee cost, it took them
much too long to try and work out what she was doing - you know maybe if
she says, well suppose you gave tea some price, can anyone suggest what
price tea could be? And then they said O.K. that's the price of tea, and
now we've got 5 cups of tea, so how much does 5 cups of tea cost? Write
that down. Now if that's how much 5 cups of tea cost, how much have we
got left? So how many cups of coffee do we have to buy? And. so how
much would they cost? And then they would see what they were doing.
R. O.K. Any other comments, on the lesson, or the teacher's style?
I. Well, she seemed very relaxed, which I thought good. She seemed to
have a very good relationship with the pupils, and they seemed very well
behaved. So In that sense the teacher was good. But I think what she
was teaching could have been clearer. It didn't seem as though from
what we were watching, the lesson was too well thought out.
R. OK. Thank you.
I1TE.7IE1EE B
R. Ri ght, what did you think of that lesson?
I. Well, at the beginning, when I saw the pictures on the wall it
looked like a primary classroom, and then I saw it was a secondary
classroom. Well on the blackboard you had pictures from mathematical
journals, you know those pattern things. I felt that a lot of time was
wasted, I mean when you observe you realize how much - well not a lot of
time is wasted, but there is so little interaction going on, most of the
time the teacher is waiting for someone to say something and the kids
are sitting there trying to work out something - I guess that's what
goes on in a lesson anyway. You have to give kids time to think, to
come around to their own ideas. I felt that that way of introducing
simultaneous equations is very good, to show that one equation with two
variables will give you an unlimited number of solutions, and in order
to have one single solution you must have a second equation. I also
noticed that many of them, I think, were thinking about the price of
the coffee first, because that was the first thing that came in and the
tea might be something and a half, you know.
R. You said that you think it is a good way of introducing simultaneous
equations. Why?
I. well because I said it shows that with one eauation with two
variables you get any number of solutions which is something that, I
don't know, some of the kids may not have realized, for them algebra is
just algebra, they can't see the relationship between the number of
variables and the number of equations you have. You might even be able
to see the second of two variables, two equations. Well you start off
with one and then two, and then gradually pick one out, with a third
equation. They have worked their way towards finding out that there
are, that you do need two equations with two variables, to find them
out.
R. Did they find that out from that lesson?
I. Well, it was pointed out to them, I guess some of them got it, the
Dries who were participating, the ones who were finding out the various
solutions to the first equation and then who realized that there was
only one that fits the second equation I don't know if they realized
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that there were an unlimited number of values using just one equation
but they came up with different values, they could have used something
and a half with coffee also something like that. I don't know it just
seerns as though the teacher is there, just talking away, and the kids
are just writing, but only a few of them, unfortunately, st of them
are probably just thinking about their own things. Not really following
wha:'s going on, not really following the thoughts that the teacher has,
R. Did you feel from the extract that you saw that that was something
to do with the way the teacher was conducting the lesson, or the
particular pupils or some other factor?
I. Kaybe. Aaybe I think it's inevitable in a lesson that something
like that happens. But I know that it's probably wrong to accept this.
You have to accept that you can allow a few pupils to just not be part
of the lesson. Ideally you want ev.eryone to be writing, for them to be
learning, for them to be at this next stage. Well I guess they are all
doing their own thing. Of course the teacher could have called them by
name, asked them if they have any ideas, and they might say I don't know
or the teacher might prompt them. Was this an experienced teacher?
R. I don't actually know. 	 What do you think, what's your feeling?
Judging by that extract.
I. I would say she was, I wouldn't say she was a beginner. The way she
sat with them was very good. And also using teas and coffees as opposed
to x's and y's was good.
R. You liked the way she used tea and coffee?
I. Oh yes, at least in terms of objects. Well there was one comment
that. I mean one kid gave a suggestion that was a bit wrong because she
was saying that coffee was dirt cheap and the teacher said that - you
know at least it brings in a bit of .judgement. I thought it was a nice
way of introducing the topic. As I said, my impression throughout was
that there were too many kids not participating, you on.y got a few
taiLing, and they. were always the same ones, the rest did nothing, they
didn't know what was going on. But it's only if they actually say
something that you know if they were paying attention. I won't say that
they you are sure that they are following the lesson, but at least they
are participating in the lesson, and what's being done on the board, as
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op csed. to just thinking about their own things. during the lesson, or
just doodling on a piece of paper or something.
R. What do you think about the degree of direction she was giving
during the lesson? Do you feel it was just about right? r not enough,
or too much?
I. I think it was about right.	 I didn't think it was to little, or
too much or anything.
R. How did you feel about that way of introducing simultaneous
equations?
I. I thought it was a good way. Yeah. As I said, it shows you the
actual ideas of simultaneous equations, it, in terms of two equations.
And also it's a case of interacting, answering back.
R. Supposing you were talking to that teacher, afterwards, and she said
how did you feel about the way I taught?. Is there anything further you
would add?
I. I think I would say that I felt that too few kids were
participating. She could have prompted others who were just quiet, or
she could probably see that some of them weren't even following the
class, following the lesson. So that I mean she should have prompted
them to attention. Sort of re-focussed their minds on the lesson as
opposed to their own things. Yeah, I think that was the main thing...
From the beginning I thought there was too much silence, too little
interaction. And I guess the solution to that would have been that she
should have asked more of the pupils to be actually involved in the
lesson, by questions and answers, by prompting those that were silent.
R. How might she have done that, by calling out someone's name and say
have you got an answer?
I. Well, I would have called out a name, and said what prices do you
think I could put into this equation? I would ask them directly. Maybe
they haven't worked out one, but I would ask them to think of one
answer. But you know I would try and make them take part in it. Maybe
also, when she introduced the second equation, she could have - one
pupil caine out with the right answer so maybe she could have asked other
pupils to try and fit in the other numbers to see what the outcome is,
to show them that there is only one answer that fits. Because I mean
its possibly only that single pupil who came up with the right answer,
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who had actually tried out any of the values.
	 Well I
	 an I wa
watching the teacher not the pupils, and so I don't know i any of the
other pu pils tried answers, tried other possible values. 	 ut I guess
that she could have demonstrated that the others don't fit b y asking the
pupils to do them. That's all really. The class were well behaved,
there was no chattering. It could have been the video or scething. I
don't know.
R. O.K.	 Thank you.
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R. RightS What did you thInk of the lesson?
I. Immediately I saw, it started, a good feeling came over me, because
I saw an attractive black teacher looking good, you know, in front of
the classroom, my first feeling. Then that passed, and I could
concentrate on what she was actually teaching. I had to assume that it
was a very bright set. I didn't like the fact that she had to keep
looking backwards at the book, because I think, she was teaching a
mainly white class, with a few Asians, I didn't see any blacks and I
think as a black teacher she has to be - she was confident, but I think
she has to be even more confident in that you know, you don't - I think
if you keep looking back at the book, looking back at the book, before
the class, it might get a bit - you know she has to refer to the book
all the time. I thought she stayed at the front - she was afraid to -
you could see she was testing her limits. She was good, I liked her, I
liked her, but she was afraid to move out. I gathered that she was
probably fresh, the first few times, maybe she was new at the school or
something.
R. What do you mean testing her limits?
I.	 ot willing to say right John what's the answer, or have you done it
Mary, or is everybody working on it. She waited for the class, waited
for the class. She got responses, maybe that's because they were a
bright set. But she could have done a lot more with them. You know
what i mean?
R. Like what?
I. Like walk around, make sure that everyone was doing what they should
have been doing, explaining a bit more. Was that the beginning of the
class? Did I see from the beginning? I did, didn't I?
R. I'm not sure, practically from the beginning, yes.
I. So she hadn't explained it. Maybe it's just my style, but I probably
would have gone to - maybe after that first example I would have given
the background, because I think it was a very interesting example she
did, she could have done a lot with the coffee and tea very - very wide,
I mean the whole class would have understood exactly what she was
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talking about, there wasn't anything archaic or anything, bt anyway I
suppose that's .just teaching styles.
R.	 t's that that I'm interested in, hearing your coments.
I. I'm talking about making the maths more real to the stude.ts, I mean
she's talking about coffee and tea and simultaneous equations, which 1
never thought of - simultaneous equations in that way - I mean she could
have said - right - show that those are all the different pcsible ways,
prices you could pay for tea and coffee, we've got another ecuation, and
do you think, how many values, you know, do you think would it the two,
or some thing. I can't think now but - you see she didn't do anything
at all, you know, she just gave the equation, they threw out lots of
answers, gave another equation, throw out the one answer that was
correct, but I don't know how she was going to tie it in. ut I would
love to see the end, how she tied it in.
R. But in general you liked the example she chose?
I. Gb yes. Even as a way of explaining the relationship. If I were a
student in that class, just below the average, you know, I'd have been
very frustrated in a class like that. I mean all the bright ones would
have given the answers. She didn't ask them for the answers, the bright
ones would have Just worked it out the quickest, kind of thing. And I
tend to be slow. So I'm sure I would have got lost, by the time I had
worked through the first one, I'd have been looking at the answer, have
sat there waiting to see how she did them on the board, and how that
gave 3&p or whatever. And then she worked down to the next lot. So if
I'm not very quick, if I'm not a quick person, I'd be very frustrated.
it was obviously a very bright class. She obviously had - you could see
she had a lovely personality which - a good personality for a teacher,
kind of thing, so she could have done so much, I think. She didn't walk
around at all, she just stayed there, she stayed, next to the
blackboard. I mean she didn't really - there was no - she spoke to the
class as a whole, she never spoke to any individual students. To build
a relationship there. That's why I feel that she was new. She was new
to the school.
R. You said something earlier about having introduced one equation and
then the other one, she could have asked them something like how many
-222-
answers are there for both. Can you explain a bit more about that. Why
it would have been a good thing to do.
I. Because, like i didn't - it was ony when she put up the second
equation that I realized the link, that it was simultaneous equations,
because they had up just Relations, with the first example and all the
possible solutions it didn't click then that it was simultaneous
equations. When she went on to the second I said well airight she's
going to link it up now, and all she did was to say if I wrote that and
that equals that, which one of these will fit in? You know what she
could have done, she could have said - she could have done the second
equation exactly like the first, and let them throw out about 10
different solutions, and then say, right, now what do you notice? And
if that goes, then say this is what we mean when we say solving
equations simultaneously. There is just one. You know that kind of
thing, this is what we mean by... I mean if you see it in a book and if
you go away, you will see that it will make sense to you when you begin
to solve equations simultaneously on your own. That's the rationale
behind it then. There's just one - two different relationships between
the price - you see that's why I said that this is a good example, two
different relationships we wrote down between the prices of coffee and
the tea, and If we want to use both simultaneously there is just one
pair of prices which will satisfy it. And you have done it yourselves.
you have seen that there is ,just one pair that satisfies it. That's the
kind of thing, you know what I mean, that I was looking for, at the end,
and then, something at the beginning, sort of.
R. O.K. Thank you.
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INTERVIEWEE
R. O.K. What did you think?
I. Do you mean of the teaching?
R. Yes.
I. I thought it was O.K. It was nice. She was very positive over the
kids responses, she was sort of testing them but I thought they were
kind of willing to put forward different - they felt able to put forward
all their different answers very comfortably. It's hard to know whether
the video made them behave differently, I don't know. It would me. She
looked a bit like it did initially, when she - everyone was very quiet,
a look came over her face, but that seemed to pass over quite quickly.
I thought that it was pleasant. It was a bit sort of - in a way slow
getting going, but maybe again the kids were used to being left.
R. You said she was quite receptive to their answers.
I. Yes, she took them all and she made them all right, I mean she
didn't come in on the one that was right straight away, I mean the one
that was really the most logical. She accepted that tea was 2 and the
other was 12, she accepted that they were all right answers 'cos they
fitted the equation. I mean she didn't act like at that point that she
was looking for a particular one, you know she made it rather open, so
that people were - felt happy making all those suggestions which I think
was good.
R. What about the actual subject, as a way of introducing it?
I. I thought it was nice, I thought it was better than how I did it.
It was what I had to do, but it was with younger kids. This was really
nice, it was practical, it made the variables concrete, which I liked,
and later, I think I would try to copy it, I thought it was a much
better way of introducing it than my way, which was completely algebra,
and in which I completely lost them. I thought that it was really nice,
because you were estimating, guessing, and it worked very well.
R. So you liked the fact that she made the variables concrete.
I. Yes, oh yes. I think that was really good. Much less boring than
teaching it straight.
R. How do you feel about how much the pupils would have appreciated
what simultaneous equations were all about?
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I. I don't think that they would have got the idea from iu: that one,
but I would think with doing more they would have. I think a discussion
about it, to tik about it, to draw out the fact that you re looking
for the place where the two sort of equations match up, co together,
sort of talk about it, and then maybe another concrete exaiple, would
help to draw it out. I don't think just one example would. 	 .ut I think
its a really good start.
R. You said that she made it rather oren for the pupils.
I. I don't think she was too open. In some ways she was very directed.
She knew what she wanted but on the other hand she did accept - she did
encourage all the possible solutions. Maybe with the second equation
look for possible solutions and then look to see where they overlap
instead of going directly, homing in on, pick only one of these maybe
they could have done the same thing with the second one, and then
compare tables and see where they did overlap. And also seeing where
they wouldn't overlap. I'm trying to think how you could make it more -
the only other thing you could do is that the kids could make up their
own combinations of tea and coffee. And see if they came u with the -
I mean they could maybe use the other values to make up different
combinations lots of groups of simultaneous equations.
	 I mean you
wouldn't want to confuse them too much. That might confuse them. I
didn't think she was too open - she could have been more open-ended - I
didn't think she was too open-ended at all.
R. You think she could have let them play around with the second
equation, and that would have been more open-ended?
I. Yes.
R. And to maybe let them make up their own combinations.
1.	 Yes.
R. But you'd be worried about them getting confused though.
I. I would do it, but I would also be worried - I would do it and see
if they get confused, I think there is a possibility. It depends how
well you do it. I think if you had them working in groups and each
making up another equation that was different but yet fitted in with the
sets of figures so you had them talking together a bit rather than them
each doing it on their own, so that they came up with maybe four pairs
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of equations, or maybe five pairs, depending on the number o kids. But
I liked the concrete examples much better than the way I did it.
R. How does it help?
I. It gives the kids something to grasp, understanding what you are
doing, not just manipulating an expression that has unknowns - you know
sometimes kids don't understand what those a's and b's are, and by
giving a concrete example it gives them something to latch onto. It
gives the whole exercise some meaning, it gives them something to latch
onto, helps them to connect, in a way that abstract algebra - it seems
to me that a lot of kids find that more difficult than any other topic,
especially manipulating, something in 2 variables.
R. Anything else you want to add?
I. Just that the class seem willing and not upset by making mistakes,
which seems nicew, when the girl, the first person gave a wrong answer
but it didn't stop everyone else from giving answers, and that was good.
I mean her acceptance - she didn't say this is wrong, she tried it out
and it was wrong. It made it perfectly acceptable to have a wrong
answer so it made the atmosphere nice, so that someone else was willing
to try. Most of the other answers were right, but it just encourages
everyone else to try if you don't jump down someone's throat.
R. OK. Thank you very much.
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